Safety issues in the SPS Exp. Areas Outline Generalities Radioprotection The access system Ilias Efthymiopoulos AB/ATB-EA SPS/EA Training Lecture Program.

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Presentation transcript:

Safety issues in the SPS Exp. Areas Outline Generalities Radioprotection The access system Ilias Efthymiopoulos AB/ATB-EA SPS/EA Training Lecture Program March 2003

25/03/2003ie-spstraining2 What makes the SPS Exp. Areas a special case Many people involved  users (~2000 each year);  beam line experts and technical staff (ATB/EA, BDI, AT/MEL,…)  outside technicians (general infrastructure for buildings, beam-line work, …) The overall environment  frequent changes  Detectors/Experimental Installations can change in a weekly basis  Beam line changes during shutdown  Frequent changes and/or modifications to access system  detectors – huge variety  size: very small (PIXEL detectors)  very heavy and large objects (calorimeters)  complexity: simple (few scintillators & phototubes)  very complicated detectors (i.e. involving cryogenics) CERN specific  Newcomers not always familiar with the safety structure and policy at CERN  Lack or inadequate training? Too complicated?  Tendency from “us” not to apply rigorously some safety rules to help the users Generalities

25/03/2003ie-spstraining3 The SPS operators are our “eyes” to the Exp. Areas Frequent visits to the experimental hall and areas 24h/day available First line of call in case of problems/questions also Borderline between operators and Liaison Physicists or other CERN services not clearly defined for many outside users The aim is to help the users to complete their experiments Guarantee that safety is applied to the beam lines and experimental areas Actually the situation is not that bad ! No major incidents over the last years Generalities

25/03/2003ie-spstraining4 Safety structure Operators direct contact with the users, report possible safety hazards perform and monitor changes to the access system handle access and radiation protection system alarms Liaison Physicists responsibility for the beam line, and corresponding experimental areas design/initiate/approve changes to access system holder of the manual veto for each beam line RSO applies/defines safety rules in terms of radiation protection  recommendations/consultation with TIS/RP and Liaison Physicists TSO applies/defines safety rules for general safety  recommendations/consultation with TIS and liaison physicists Everybody vigilant, preventive, report problems as soon as possible Generalities

25/03/2003ie-spstraining5 AB Safety structure for SPS Exp. Areas DSO Gilbert Daems, John Poole (deputy) TSO EHN1: Bruno Chauchaix EHN2, ECN3: Thierry Reynes EHW1: B.Tomat RSO Charles Hill, Daniel Gueugnon (deputy) Assisstant RSO: SPS beams and EA: Ilias Efthymiopoulos SPS ring and transfer lines: Alan Spinks Note: experiments themselves under the EP umbrella Generalities