The problem of evil Philosophy of Religion 2008 Lecture 5

Procedural work  Draft exam answers: complete in an hour!  Handwritten is fine, but do give references … 1. Does the ‘soul-making’ theodicy provide an satisfactory answer to the problem of evil? 2. Is divine hiddenness essential to human freedom? 3. Is there a logical problem of evil for the theist? 4. If the universe shows evidence of design, does this prove the existence of God?  Hand in by 4pm Friday Week 8.

Today  A forgotten proof? Franklin’s ‘beer proof’ (!)  Two problems of evil: The logical problem The evidential problem …the coherence of theism and the existence of God  Selected theistic responses  Opposition to theodicy

Problems of evil: 1  The logical problem: a problem of consistency :  If God is good; and omnipotent; and omniscient  There shouldn’t be human and animal suffering  But there is – inconsistency?  Which premise will the theist give up … ?  (See Hume DCNR Part X)

The logical problem  Mackie (‘Evil and omnipotence’): ‘God is omnipotent, God is wholly good, yet evil exists … the theologian it seems at once must adhere, and yet cannot consistently adhere to all three’  Strictly, to produce inconsistency, need added premise(s). E.g.: An omnipotent God can do anything Good must always seek to eliminate evil

Pause for clarification  Suffering as evil, or as the result of evil … so evils/suffering interchangeable  Evils: Moral: resulting from human action/inaction Natural: resulting from other causes  God as good or God as loving?  These last two may affect the sort of defence the theist can mount

The logical problem  Possible defences for the theist?  The theist may simply deny one of the premises (unattractive) …  More likely to point out that: a)These premises need to be understood in a certain way, or b)The hidden premises (omnipotence all powerful, goodness must oppose evil) are wrong

Possible defences  So: perhaps God is not good in our sense of morally good Evil does not exist …  Or: God has reasons for allowing evil (goodness will not always seek to overcome evil) God has created the world in such a way that he cannot intervene …

God not good?  Does calling God ‘good’ mean morally good … Goodness is not always a moral property It may be a expression of gratitude..?  Can God be subject to moral judgment?  ‘God can no more be part of a moral community [with his creatures] than he can be part of a political community with them …’ (Kenny, What is Faith? )  Does the same apply to ‘loving’ …?

Evil doesn’t exist?  Aquinas: evil is not a positive quality  It is ‘a certain absence of a good’ ( Summa Theologiae - cf. discussion of omnipotence)  So God cannot cause evil … but does he therefore permit this absence to occur ?  Augustine: evil as ‘the name for nothing but the want of good’ ( City of God Bk XI)  And this want arises from the fall, original sin …

The free will defence  And note, the fall arises from human choice …  Allowing choice seems to limit God’s power  Challenges the hidden assumptions: An omnipotent God can do anything Good must always seek to eliminate evil  ‘Greater good’ defences – goods which cannot be achieved without allowing (possibility of) evil

The free will defence  It is good to have free agents, and so it is good to allow agents freedom  God cannot let us be free and ensure we chose good (incompatibilism)  And so God must allow us to do evil …  Plantinga: ‘thus is the power of an omnipotent God limited by the freedom he confers upon his creatures’

The free will defence  But what relationship between God and freedom?  Is God still responsible for the actions of free agents? Since he created them, and sustains them (Aquinas) God is not a worldly cause, so he can bring human actions without limiting freedom (compatibilism) But is this plausible?

The free will defence  General problem: is the good worth the evil? Maybe if the free creatures do more good than evil?  Can our free will account for natural evils? As they affect both us and other creatures… Should they be laid at God’s door? Or the fall/original sin (Augustine, van Inwagen)

Free will and natural evils  Maybe being able to enjoy free will depends on the existence of natural laws, that will not always work in our interests …  We cannot all get what we want: what decides the matter will be certain natural facts (Mawson)  But what can this say about other creatures’ suffering – the fawn in the forest fire (Rowe)  Do all creatures have free will?

Overcoming evils  ‘The worst evils demand to be defeated by the best goods. Horrendous evils can be overcome only by the goodness of God’ (Marilyn Adams).  We may not fathom the reasons for evil …  … but God’s ensures that each person’s life is a good to them, by ‘engulfing’ evils.  God is still good, despite evils …  Transcendent goods: relations with God; God’s gratitude; identification with Christ …

Problems of evil: 2  Or an evidential problem (Mackie MoT, Rowe):  If there were an omni – God …  There would not be evil/suffering  But there is …  So there cannot be such a God (modus tollens)  Suffering as evidence for atheism - not proof, but supports a ‘strong presumption’ (Mackie)

The evidential problem  A Bayesian approach (e.g Draper in Copan and Meister)  This evidence may increase the balance of probability of God’s non-existence  By increasing the ‘antecedent probability’ of atheism, prior to our considering any further arguments

Some responses  We know that God exists for some other reason … so while this presents a problem, it cannot count as evidence against His existence  We don’t see the whole picture Not having God’s omniscience, all the evidence is not available to us Relies on first point? Otherwise we can judge only on evidence we have … Combines with ‘greater good’ theodicies?

Defences and theodicies  Defences: challenging one of the premises of the argument  Theodicy (after Leibniz): explaining why God might act in a certain way  Not always an easy distinction to draw …  And defences may work against both forms of argument, or only against one: careful!

Greater good arguments  Is the existence of evil necessary to bring about a greater good (cf free-will)? No ‘gratuitous evil?  Hick: soul-making/Iranean theodicy: God intends to bring us to moral/spiritual maturity This must be a free choice: epistemic distance ‘A world without problems … would be morally static’ So to grow, we must live in a world with evil But … could we not learn virtues in a good world?

Greater good arguments  Swinburne: if we are to become morally mature  … we must act freely, and have knowledge of the consequences of actions, both good and evil  Again, we cannot be force-fed this: we must work it out inductively  … and this means both bringing about moral evil and having experience of natural evils

Against theodicy  Are greater good arguments too anthropocentric  Or not respectful of suffering humans, animals?  Responses: Acknowledge our lack of understanding: ‘if [God] is there, he is surely something bigger and more mysterious than a corrupt or stupid official’ (Midgley; see also DZ Phillips) God as human love and effort (Soelle)  Are theodicies besides the point …?

References/additional reading  Seminar readings  Davies Introduction Ch3 (2 nd edn) or 10 (3 rd edn)  Davies G uide Part V  Mackie: ‘Evil and omnipotence’ ( Mind 64, Peterson)  Mackie: Miracle of Theism Ch.9  Rowe: ‘The problem of evil and some varieties of atheism’ (Taliaferro & Griffiths)  Augustine: City of God Bk XI (or passages in Peterson, Davies, Hick Ch.2)

References/additional reading  Hume Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Part X  Swinburne: Existence of God Ch.11, or Stump & Murray Ch.25  Hick: ‘An Iranean theodicy’ (in Hick, Peterson)  Adams: ‘Horrendous evils and the goodness of God’ (in Stump & Murray, Taliaferro & Griffiths)  Midgley: Wickedness ( extracts in Taliaferro & Griffiths)  Against theodicy: see Clack and Clack Chapter 3.

Questions  Can you distinguish the various defences and theodicies?  Which do you think are the strongest?  Can we combine approaches to give a complete defence of God’s existence in the face of both moral and natural evils?