The Antitrust Masters Course V ABA Section of Antitrust Law Plenary Session Slides Day 3, Session 2 October 2, 2010 Principal Lecturers Professor Andrew I. Gavil Honorable William E. Kovacic Williamsburg Lodge, Williamsburg, VA

Introduction to Multi-Jurisdictional Competition Law Trends: Global Adoption of Competition Law –Transformation since 1980 from 100 members of the ICN Institutional Design –Is there a dominant institutional model? Legal Commands –Is there a dominant model law(s)? Economic Ideas –Source? 2

Focus on US/EU EC Organization and Decision Process –European Commission Competition Commissioner, Joaquin Almunia –DG Competition Director General, Alexander Italianer Chief Competition Economist, Damien Neven –General Court (Formally CFI) –European Court of Justice EU Substantive Prohibitions –Article 101 TFEU –Article 102 TFEU –20 th Anniversary of the Merger Regulation –New Developments: Horizontal & Vertical Agreements –State Aid concerns unique 3

Global Competition Law Institutional Features –“Operating System” of Institutions Dominant Model: Civil Law framework –Administrative enforcement –Most influential model: EU –“Applications” (Analytical Concepts) Diverse sources: e.g., Merger guidelines 4

Institutional Traits Multi-Purpose Agencies: >60 –Example: Antitrust/Consumer Protection Antitrust Offenses as Crimes: 30+ Private Rights of Action: 30+ –Scope (e.g., Indirect Purchasers) –Procedure (e.g., class actions, discovery, experts) Merger Review Systems: 80+ –Pre-merger notification –Authority to block 5

Unique Challenges for New Agencies Stage of national economic development History/stability of rule of law Legal infrastructure for successful competition Competition for agency resources and intellectual capital See generally William E. Kovacic –Numerous speeches and articles 6

EU/US: Institutions Compared Governance: Administrative vs. Executive Role of Agencies & Courts: E.g., Mergers Decentralization: States/Private Rights –European Competition Network –Work in progress in EU Administrative Process: EU and US –Evidence gathering and hearings –Role of economists –Third parties – bring complaints/challenge decisions –Disclosure: access to file/reasons for decision 7

Due Process Debate in EU See Alexander Italianer Speech at Fordham, Safeguarding Due Process in Antitrust Proceedings (Fordham 23 Sept. 2010) – 10_06_en.pdf 8

Convergence Overview Substantial –Goals: “Consumer Welfare” (Wishing Well?) –Means: “Effects Test” (Which? How Tested?) –Cartels –Horizontal Mergers Moderate: Vertical Agreements/Mergers Less: Abuse of Dominance/State Action –See Christine Varney, International Cooperation: Preparing for the Future (Sept. 21, 2010) – 9

Policy Instruments Statutes and Regulations –TFEU 101/102; Sherman, Clayton, FTC Acts –EU Merger Regulation –EU Block Exemptions Guidelines Guidance Documents 10

Cartels EU –Leniency –Progression of fines –Imprisonment Member states –UK –Ireland –See also: Procurement Others –Australia –Canada –Brazil US –Leniency –Fines –Imprisonment 11

Mergers – Some Parallel Challenges for Agencies EU –AirTours –Tetra Laval –Schneider –GE/Honeywell –BMG/Sony –Google/Doubleclick US –Arch Coal –Giant Western –Whole Foods –Inova –CCC Mitchell –Google/Doubleclick 12

Abuse of Dominance EU –France Telecom –Microsoft –Rambus –Intel –Michelin II/BA/Tomra US –Brooke Group –Microsoft –Rambus –Intel –Compare to LePage’s – PeaceHealth 13

Vertical Restraints EU –Block exemption –RPM never formally “per se” –Softening of presumption against –Still difficult to justify (See Gavil CPI article on distributed CD) US –Leegin – federal –Dr. Miles/Leegin split among states 14

Convergence/Divergence? 15 Eastwood/Kovacic? Dreyfuss/Gavil?

Day 3, Session 2 The End 16