1. Korean Competition Law and Practice in Perspective December 2007 Dr. Youngjin Jung Yulchon

2. 2 Origin of US/Korean Competition Law A.US  Populist View  Chicago School’s View B. Korea  Fair and Free Competition  Regulation of Economic Concentration

3. 3 Enforcement Mechanism A.US  Multiple Stakeholders (private litigation)  Judicial Decision-Making (common law system) B. Korea  KFTC  Limited Role of Courts

4. 4 Cartel Regulation (I) A.US  Section 1 of Sherman Act * Horizontal & Vertical Restraints B. Korea  Article 19(1) of MRFTA: Horizontal Restrains only? * Article 19(5): statutory presumption

5. 5 Cartel Regulation (II): Rule of Reason vs. Per se Illegal  US Rule of Reason vs. Per Se Illegal  Korea Rule of Reason vs. Per Se Illegal

6. 6 Cartel Regulation (III): Conscious Parallelism A. US * Oligopolistic Interdependence * Plus Factors B. Korea * Plus Factors * Amendment

7. 7 Cartel Regulation (III): re regulated industry A.US Trinko / Credit Suisse (implied immunity) A.Korea Statutory Exemption Administrative Guidance

8. 8 Cartel Regulation (IV): Leniency A.US Individual & Corporate Leniency * (i) Implication of discovery, (ii) Paperless application * (iii) marker system A.Korea Corporate Leniency

9. 9 Vertical Restraints A. US * (Minimum) Resale Price Maintenance * Tying * Tying vs. Exclusive Dealing B. Korea * Unfair Trade Practices * Abuse of Market Dominance

10. 10 A. US Leverage Theory Attempt to Monopolize B. Korea Abuse of Market Dominance Monopolization (I)

11. 11 Monopolization (II): Microsoft A. US * the concept of monopoly maintenance * Separate Product - backward looking vs. forward-looking B. Korea * Statutory foundation * dynamic leverage theory vs. two-sided market * predatory pricing

12. 12 Monopolization (III): essential facility doctrine A. US * Aspen Skiing * Trinko B. Korea * Statutory foundation N.B. Competition Agency as a Regulator

13. 13 Merger Control (I) A. US Substantial Lessening Competition (SLC) B. Korea Substantial Lessening Competition (SLC) * CR1/CR3 vs. HHI * Unilateral Effect vs. Coordinated Effect

14. 14 A.US Philadelphia National Bank case General Dynamics case B. Korea Statutory Presumption of SLC Merger Control (II): Market Share

15. 15  A. US H-S-R Pre-merger Notification  B. Korea Post-merger notification Pre-merger notification Foreign-to-foreign merger notification * Fund Merger Control (III): Notification

16. 16  Thank you.