CYBER - PHYSICAL SECURITY James Maki & Mason Vogel

WHAT IS IT? Normally a system that monitors behaviour of physical processes and takes actions to correct those behaviors. Two Major Components

Cyber Process Network of tiny devices (like sensors) Can sense, compute, and communicate (wireless)

Physical Process Monitored by the cyber system Could be naturally occurring phenomenon Man-made Combination of the two

Example Cyber-Physical Systems Temperature/Humidity Controlled Labs Sense Temperature Sense Humidity Act accordingly

ATTACKING Areas to Attack Physical and control (Physical) Communication and Network (Cyber) Supervisory and Management (Human) Attack Types Actuator State Data Insert picture of six layer of hierarchical system Common Attack: Eavesdropping Compromised-Key attack Man-in-the-Middle Denial-of-Service

Green Lights Forever broadcast on a similar protocol as 802.11 (WLAN) unencrypted Controller setting may be configured in person or cyber default usernames and passwords Integrate security into system and change from factory default

War Games film 1983 SHALL WE PLAY A GAME?

Drone Attacks Drones are basically flying computers Incredibly hard to detect drones Drone crash in Texas

Phase of Worm: targeted Winodws machine Siemens Step7 software compromised PLCs Some Features: All actions were done in memory-no disk evidence Self-scalability control-prevent spreading to more than three others uninstall mechanism Code for man-in-the-middle Could have centrifuges tear themselves apart

STUXNET WORM targeting highly specialized industrial systems in critical high-security infrastructures (at least 14 sites were infected). Modifying the code running in PLCs in order to make them deviate from their expected behavior. Believed to had sponsorship from a nation-state, it has been suggested it was United States and Israel Other attacks 2000 Maroochy water breach, Brazil 2003 SQL Slammer worm Davis-Besse nuclear plant 2010 Stuxnet Could derail trains, poison water supplies, and cripple power grids (2012 Leon Panetta)

DETECTING AN ATTACK Cross-correlator technique to detect False Data Injection Attacks Intelligent Checker Layer 1: basic process control system Layer 2: alarm and operators Layer 3: safety instrumented systems Secutiry Objective: Integrity Authenticity Confidentiality Big thing is Attack detection and identification

Update the system

REFERENCES IEEE Control Systems Magazine Feb 2015 - Cyberphysical Security Stuxnet Worm Impact on Industrial Cyber-Physical System Security, Stamatis Karnouskos SAP Research, Germany, IEEE 2011 The Real Story of Stuxnet, spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-real-story-of-stuxnet Feb 2013 Countermeasures to Enhance Cyber-Physical System Security and Safety, Giedre Sabaliaukaite and Aditya P. Mathur, 2014 IEEE Green Lights Forever: Analyzing the Security of Traffic Infrastructure, Branden Ghena, William Beyer, Allen Hillaker, Jonathan Pevarnek, and J. Alex Halderman, 2014 Proceedings of the 8th USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies (WOOT)

REFERENCES Security Issues and Challenges for Cyber Physical System, Eric Ke Wang, Yunming Ye, Xiaofei Xu, S.M. Yiu, L.C.K. HUI, K.P.Chow, 2010 IEEE Cyber-Physical Security via Geometric Control: Distributed Monitoring and Malicious Attacks, Fabio Pasqualetti, Florian Dörfler, and Francesco Bullo, 2012 IEEE Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon, Kim Zetter, 2014 http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/07/05-drones-villasenor