An Overview of Revenue Decoupling Mechanisms Dan Hansen Christensen Associates Energy Consulting November 2007.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Advantages and Drawbacks of Revenue Decoupling: Rate Design and Regulatory Implementation Does Matter Presented to the Florida Public Service Commissions.
Advertisements

Achieving Price-Responsive Demand in New England Henry Yoshimura Director, Demand Resource Strategy ISO New England National Town Meeting on Demand Response.
Efficient Pricing of Energy Conservation and Load Management Programs. August 9 th,2006 Kansas Corporation Commission Staff.
1 Conservation Program Cost-Effectiveness Tests Presentation to the: Florida Public Service Commission Workshop on Energy Efficiency Initiatives November.
Decoupling Utility Revenues and Sales: Anti-consumer...anti-poor Presented by: Roger D. Colton Fisher, Sheehan & Colton Public Finance and General Economics.
Authors: J.A. Hausman, M. Kinnucan, and D. McFadden Presented by: Jared Hayden.
Policy Options for Energy Efficiency Programs: Decoupling and Other Innovative Rates Joint Meeting of the NARUC Committees on Gas, Electricity, Consumer.
Impact of Revenue Decoupling: A Changed Rate Paradigm
Strategies for Addressing Fixed Cost Recovery Issues Dan Hansen Christensen Associates Energy Consulting October
The Regulatory Assistance Project 177 Water St. Gardiner, Maine USA Tel: Fax: State Street, Suite 3 Montpelier, Vermont.
An Overview of Revenue Decoupling Mechanisms Dan Hansen Christensen Associates Energy Consulting August 2012.
California Water Revenue Decoupling Pilot Programs Lisa M. Bilir, Senior Policy Analyst, Division of Ratepayer Advocates NASUCA 2010 Mid-Year Meeting.
A Summary of Revenue Decoupling Evaluations Dan Hansen Christensen Associates Energy Consulting July
Revenue Decoupling and Other Non-Volumetric Rates for Natural Gas Utilities NARUC Staff Subcommittee on Accounting and Finance Fall Meeting Jackson Hole,
Breaking Down Barriers to Energy Efficiency Utility Revenue Decoupling and other Revenue Stabilization Tools Jim Lazar, RAP Senior Advisor Presented to:
1 Managing Revenues in Regulated Industries Rate Design May 2008 Richard Soderman Director-Legislative Policy and Strategy.
OVERVIEW OF LOAD FORECASTING METHODOLOGY Northeast Utilities Economic & Load Forecasting Dept. May 1, 2008 UConn/NU Operations Management.
November 2001 CHRISTENSENASSOCIATES RTP as a Demand Response Program – How Much Load Response Can You Expect? Peak Load Management Alliance Fall Conference.
Revenue Decoupling: A proposed solution to the utilities’ traditional incentive to encourage wasteful energy use Christopher Grubb
REVENUE RECOGNITION Some Highlights and Examples from SAB 101.
Presented by: Fadhila MICHAEL C. NAUGHTON. Purpose  Develop and demonstrate a method for deriving and testing regulatory preferences within and across.
Fortis’ Residential Conservation Rate (RCR) How Rural Customers Are Subsidizing Lower Rates For Urban Customers.
1 TRADITIONAL PRODUCT COSTING METHODS Accounting Principles II AC Fall Semester, 1999.
Incentive Regulation Topics Scott A. Struck, CPA Financial Analysis Division Public Utilities Bureau Illinois Commerce Commission.
NASUCA 2015 MID-YEAR MEETING The Utility Push To Increase Customer Charge: What’s Wrong With It and How To Respond To It. Glenn A. Watkins, CRRA Senior.
1 THE RATE CASE PROCESS A Blend of Science and Superstition Presentation to the Mongolian Energy Regulatory Board By Burl Haar Executive Secretary Minnesota.
Incentive Mechanisms NARUC Staff Subcommittee on Accounting and Finance Portland, Oregon September 8-12, 2013 Presented By Bill Steele Bill Steele and.
Rate Design June 23, 2015 Laurie Reid. 2 Overview 1.A little bit of physics 2.The Ratemaking Process 3.Generally Accepted Ratemaking Principles 4.What’s.
Revenue Decoupling: New York’s Experience & Future Directions NARUC 2007 Summer Committee Meetings July 17, 2007 James T. Gallagher Director, Office of.
Rate and Revenue Considerations When Starting an Energy Efficiency Program APPA’s National Conference June 13 th, 2009 Salt Lake City, Utah Mark Beauchamp,
Presentation to the: Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission Demand-Side Response Working Group December 8, 2006 Gas Utility Decoupling in New Jersey A.
Example of Revenue Decoupling Utah Committee of Consumer Services Witness: David Dismukes Docket No T01 CCS Exhibit 1.1 Allowed Revenue per Customer.
National Study of Low Income Energy Programs Lessons for Connecticut January 29, 2008 David Carroll - APPRISE Roger Colton – Fisher, Sheehan, and Colton.
NW Natural’s Conservation Tariff NARUC Winter Meeting Washington D.C. February 14, 2006.
Center for Energy Studies National Association of State Utility Consumer Advocates (NASUCA) Mid-Year Meeting June 11, 2007 Regulatory Issues for Consumer.
Sonny Popowsky KEEA/PBI Energy Efficiency Conference Harrisburg, PA October 1, 2013.
DSM Incentive Returns Proposal – Benefit/Cost Ratio Approach Utah Committee of Consumer Services Witness: David Dismukes Docket No T01 Supplemental.
Energy Efficiency and Utility Finance: Decoupling and Incentive Mechanisms Presented to the Wisconsin Industrial Energy Group November 6, 2008.
The Regulatory Assistance Project 177 Water St. Gardiner, Maine USA Tel: Fax: State Street, Suite 3 Montpelier, Vermont.
Strategies for Addressing Fixed Cost Recovery Issues Dan Hansen Christensen Associates Energy Consulting August
Network Customer Meeting Access Metric Update November 16, 2006.
Leveraging the Skills of Load Research to Add to the Bottom Line AEIC Load Research Conference Myrtle Beach, SC July 10-13, 2005.
1  The IPM model projects increases in electricity prices as a result of the RGGI policy scenarios which, by themselves, would increase the household.
Designing Utility Regulation to Promote Investment in Cost-Effective Energy Efficiency Dale S. Bryk Natural Resources Defense Council Pennsylvania.
Rate Design Indiana Industrial Energy Consumers, Inc. (INDIEC) Indiana Industrial Energy Consumers, Inc. (INDIEC) presented by Nick Phillips Brubaker &
Perspectives on Impacts of the 2002 U.S. Farm Act Paul C. Westcott Agricultural Economist U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service April.
Energy Efficiency Action Plan Kathleen Hogan Director, Climate Protection Partnerships Division U.S. Environmental Protection Agency NARUC Winter Meetings.
R ATE D ESIGN : A PPROPRIATE P RICE S IGNALS TO E NCOURAGE THE M ORE E FFICIENT U SE OF E LECTRICITY, T HE C ASE FOR I NVERTED B LOCK R ATES FOR R ESIDENTIAL.
Overview of DSM Cost Tests June 25, Background Parties developed demand side resource performance standards for post 1994 program cost recovery.
NARUC SUMMER COMMITTEE MEETINGS Committee on Water Agenda California Regulatory Initiatives Case History – California American Water B. Kent Turner – President.
Trackers (Inflation Adjustment or Otherwise) Some Practical Litigation Strategies Roger Cox Harding & Shultz Nebraska Public Advocate.
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION BALANCED RATES RULEMAKING R California Water Association’s Restatement of Goals and Objectives for the.
 “No Conservation without Compensation” Compensating Consumers for Assuming New Risks When Water Utilities Implement WRAMs Presentation by Terry L. Murray,
2010 NASUCA Mid-Year Meeting NASUCA 2010 Mid-Year Conference Presented by: Lee Smith Senior Economist and Managing Consultant Presented to: June ,
Wisconsin Public Utility Institute Exploring Revenue Decoupling For The Energy Industry -A Utility Perspective James F. Schott November 6, 2007.
The Duke Save-A-Watt Proposal: An Economist’s Look James A. Polito, Ph.D. Director, Economic and Regulatory Analysis Indiana Office of Utility Consumer.
Revenue Decoupling Mechanism (RDM) H. Gil Peach, PhD H. Gil Peach & Associates LLC █
CEC Public Workshop Order Instituting Informational and Rulemaking Proceeding (08-DR-01) March 3, 2008.
R Comments on the Straw Proposal. Straw Proposal Scorecard Positives Attempt to reconcile rate structure and cost structure Focus on marginal.
Pay-As-You-Go Update November Program Overview Paying advance for electricity Flexibility and Customer benefits Make as many payments as necessary.
Tariff Structure Statements – Energex and Ergon Energy AER public forum.
Understanding the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP 2010 Rev 2)
CHAPTER 8 DIVIDEND POLICY. Concept of Dividend Policy Dividend policy involves the decision to –pay out earnings to shareholders –retain them for reinvestment.
Residential demand charges
National Study of Low Income Energy Programs Lessons for Connecticut
Kaysville City, UT Electric Rate Study Results
Transmission Pricing Options
Collecting Allowed Revenues When Demand is Declining
Homework Ch 12 Electricity Regulation
Rate-of-Return Regulation
Presentation transcript:

An Overview of Revenue Decoupling Mechanisms Dan Hansen Christensen Associates Energy Consulting November 2007

2 CA Energy Consulting Outline  Purpose of revenue decoupling (RD)  Different forms of RD  Alternatives to RD  Arguments for RD  Arguments against RD

November CA Energy Consulting Purpose of Revenue Decoupling  Traditional regulated rates recover fixed costs through volumetric rates  Provides utility with: — An incentive to increase usage — A disincentive to promote conservation and energy efficiency  Problem: revenues and sales are directly related  Solution? “Decouple” revenues from sales

November CA Energy Consulting Purpose of Revenue Decoupling (2)  By removing link between sales and revenues, decoupling makes the utility indifferent to the effects of conservation  Decoupling does not provide an incentive for the utility to promote conservation  Utility revenues are typically “recoupled” to some other factor(s), such as the number of customers  Natural gas industry: RD is also used to address declining use per customer

November CA Energy Consulting Basic Decoupling Concept  Basic form of RD: RD Deferral = Allowed Revenue – Actual Revenue “Allowed” revenue is also called “base” revenue  A positive number means the utility under- recovered, and will lead to a future rate increase  A negative number means the utility over- recovered, and will lead to a future rate decrease

November CA Energy Consulting Basic Decoupling Concept (2)  Typically every 6 or 12 months, the RD deferral is rolled into rates as follows: Rate change from RD = RD Deferral / E(Usage)

November CA Energy Consulting Where is Decoupling Used?  Electricity: — California — New York: PSC requiring decoupling proposals — Idaho Power pilot — Maryland — Connecticut: legislation requiring decoupling or SFV — Massachusetts: ordered investigation of decoupling  Natural Gas: — Many states, including IN, MD, NC, NJ, OH, OR, UT, WA — Most are RPCD, many adjust for weather effects

November CA Energy Consulting Types of Decoupling The exact terms that people use vary, but here is a list of the types of RD:  Full decoupling  Partial decoupling  Revenue per customer decoupling  Statistical re-coupling

November CA Energy Consulting Full Decoupling  Full decoupling is just the basic form described earlier: Deferral t = REV B t – REV A t  That is, the deferral in year t is equal to base revenue in that year minus actual revenue  Base revenue can vary across years, either according to a formula or a pre-specified “rate plan”  The base revenue formula can include adjustments for factors such as inflation and changes in productivity

November CA Energy Consulting Full Decoupling: Pros and Cons  Pros: — Certainty with respect to total level of distribution revenues (relative to RPCD) — Difficult to “game”  Cons: — Removes incentive to promote economic development — Removes incentive to provide high quality customer service — Removes incentive to enroll new customers (where there is no obligation to serve)

November CA Energy Consulting Partial Decoupling: Percentage of Full Decoupling  Partial decoupling applies a pre-specified percentage to full decoupling: Deferral t = F x (REV B t – REV A t )  F can vary from 0 (no decoupling) to 1 (full decoupling), but is usually set at around 0.90 where it is used

November CA Energy Consulting Partial Decoupling, Percentage: Pros and Cons  Pros: — Reduces risk shifting relative to full decoupling (to the extent that it occurs)  Cons: — Percentage (F) seems to be set as a compromise position, with no theoretical basis — Percentage dilutes the incentive effects

November CA Energy Consulting Partial Decoupling: Removing the Effect of Weather  Another form of partial decoupling removes the effect of weather from deferrals: Deferral t = REV B t – REV A,WN t  Note the “WN” superscript on actual revenue, indicating that the revenue value is adjusted for deviations from normal weather conditions  The goal is to prevent RD-induced rate changes because of weather fluctuations

November CA Energy Consulting Partial Decoupling, Remove Weather: Pros and Cons  Pros: — Can lead to less variation in rates than full decoupling  Cons: — More complicated and controversial to set parameters Errors in the normal weather definition can skew decoupling deferrals toward either the utility or ratepayers — Removes opportunity to reduce weather risk for both the utility and its ratepayers

November CA Energy Consulting Revenue per Customer Decoupling  Revenue per customer decoupling (RPCD) changes base revenue with the current number of customers: Deferral t = C t x (RPC B t – RPC A t )  C t is the number of customers at time t, and “RPC” refers to revenue per customer  Can also be written in terms of use per customer: Deferral t = C t x R t x (UPC B t – UPC A t )  R t is the per-unit rate  RPC B t can be adjusted according to a formula (e.g., including inflation and productivity adjustments)

November CA Energy Consulting Revenue per Customer Decoupling: Pros and Cons  Pros: — Provides an incentive to promote economic growth — Provides an incentive to provide high quality customer service — “Recouples” revenues in a comparatively simple way — Easier to administer than some other options (e.g., SR)  Cons: — Utility has an incentive to “game” the number of customers and use (or revenue) per customer values — Changes in revenues may not be closely related to changes in costs

November CA Energy Consulting Statistical Recoupling  Statistical recoupling (SR) uses the results of a statistical model to determine base usage levels (total, not per customer): Deferral t = R t x (Q B,E t – Q A t ) Q B,E t = F(weather, economic conditions, retail price, number of customers)  The goal of SR is to limit deferrals to only the effects of conservation  Attempts to do so by “normalizing” for the effects of other major drivers of usage

November CA Energy Consulting Statistical Recoupling: Pros and Cons  Pros: — Can eliminate deferrals due to changes in economic conditions or commodity prices  Cons: — Likely to lead to a very contentious process to reach agreement upon a statistical model for baseline usage

November CA Energy Consulting Examples of Decoupling Deferrals  Assume: — 100,000 customers initially — Baseline use per customer = 15,000 kWh per year — $0.02 per kWh for fixed costs  Therefore: — Baseline revenue per customer = $300 per year — Total baseline revenue = $30 million per year

November CA Energy Consulting Comparison of Full Decoupling to RPCD  Suppose use per customer increases by 10% — Actual RPC = $330 — Actual Revenue = $33 million — Number of customers stays the same  Under full decoupling: Deferral = Base Revenue – Actual Revenue Deferral = $30m - $33m = $3m Refund  Under RPCD Deferral = C t x (RPC B t – RPC A t ) Deferral = 100,000 x ($300 - $330) = $3m Refund

November CA Energy Consulting Comparison of Full Decoupling to RPCD (2)  Suppose the number of customers increases by 10% — Actual number of customers = 110,000 — Revenue per customer stays the same  Under full decoupling: Deferral = Base Revenue – Actual Revenue Deferral = $30m - $33m = $3m Refund  Under RPCD Deferral = C t x (RPC B t – RPC A t ) Deferral = 110,000 x ($300 - $300) = $0

November CA Energy Consulting Comparison of Full Decoupling to RPCD (3)  How much would the $3 million refund affect rates in the next year? Rate Change = Deferral / E(Usage) Rate Change = -$3m / (100,000 x 15,000) Rate Change = -$0.002 per kWh  This is a 10% decrease in the fixed cost portion of the rate  The percentage decrease in the total rate will be significantly smaller

November CA Energy Consulting Other Forms of Decoupling  Partial decoupling as a percentage of full: — Deferral = F x $3m refund  Partial decoupling removing the effect of weather: — Deferral is reduced (closer to zero) by an amount equal to the change in revenue per customer that is due to weather  Statistical recoupling: — If parameters are set correctly, deferral would be $0, unless the increase in RPC would have been higher in the absence of conservation

November CA Energy Consulting Alternatives to Decoupling  Lost Revenue Adjustments  Straight Fixed Variable Rates  Frequent Rate Cases  Forecast Test Years

November CA Energy Consulting Lost Revenue Adjustments  Lost Revenue Adjustments (LRAs) compensate the utility for lost revenues from utility sponsored Demand-Side Management (DSM) programs  Requires estimates of load reductions from each DSM program

November CA Energy Consulting Lost Revenue Adjustments: Pros and Cons  Pros: — Adjusts revenues only for reductions in revenues due to utility-sponsored conservation  Cons: — DSM load reductions can be difficult to measure and will likely lead to disputes — Limits scope of DSM programs to be offered — Utility has an incentive to promote DSM programs or measurement methods that will produce over-estimates of load reductions — Does not address the utility’s incentive to grow load under standard rates

November CA Energy Consulting Straight Fixed Variable Rates  Straight Fixed Variable (SFV) Rates recover fixed costs through fixed charges and variable costs through variable charges  May significantly increase customer charges and demand charges relative to “standard” rates  Tends to reduce energy charges

November CA Energy Consulting Straight Fixed Variable Rates: Pros and Cons  Pros: — Provides foundation for most efficient pricing, with addition of “externalities” (i.e., pricing for factors such as pollution) in energy rate — If SFV prices are set correctly, customers decide how much to conserve based on the “correct” price signals  Cons: — Adverse bill impacts for low use (and likely low income) customers — Difficult to account for externalities in pricing — If no accounting for externalities, customer-level incentive to conserve is reduced

November CA Energy Consulting Frequent Rate Cases  Supporters assert that more frequent rate cases allow for rates to better track changes in usage levels  Will allow the utility to recover the revenues lost from conservation more quickly

November CA Energy Consulting Frequent Rate Cases: Pros and Cons  Pros: — Familiar procedure for all parties  Cons: — Does not alter the utility’s incentives regarding conservation or load growth — Once rates are set, the utility has an incentive to maximize load regardless of the duration of time until the next rate case

November CA Energy Consulting Forecast Test Years  Use a forecast test year in standard ratemaking methods to account for the expected effects of DSM programs

November CA Energy Consulting Forecast Test Years: Pros and Cons  Pros: — Can reduce regulatory lag relative to “frequent rate cases” alternative  Cons: — Does not alter the utility’s incentives regarding conservation or load growth — Once rates are set, the utility has an incentive to maximize load regardless of the duration of time until the next rate case

November CA Energy Consulting Arguments for Decoupling  Removes utility disincentive to promote conservation and energy efficiency  Removes utility incentive to promote load growth  Does not alter fixed charges, so no distributional effects (i.e., does not harm low-use customers like SFV does)  Retains customer-level to conserve in “standard” rates  Does not require measurement of DSM load reductions  Expands the range of conservation activities that the utility is likely to engage in (relative to LRAs)

November CA Energy Consulting Arguments against Decoupling  “Too broad”: leads to rate changes that far exceed the effects of utility-sponsored DSM programs  Single-issue ratemaking: focus is only on conservation  Shifts normal business risks from the utility to its ratepayers  Provides clear benefit to utility; no clear benefits to ratepayers  Concern about rate impacts for customers who do not conserve