Biothreats and Public Policy IGCC/AAAS Wye River Biosecurity Workshop Critical Infrastructure Preparedness Michael Kleeman (UC San Diego/American Red Cross)

Critical Infrastructure Elements Critical infrastructures underly the operation of our society –Power (electricity and natural gas) –Telecommunications –Transportation –Information technology –Water –Food –Health Care

Critical Infrastructure Elements Sizing Philosophy All resources need to be sized to meet an expected societal demand Different models exist for determining sizing –Average demand - food –Annual peak demand and other emergency services –X year maximum peak demand - bridges/dams –Economic optimum for supplier - cellular systems Each is driven by costs and benefit assumptions Under monopoly conditions (power, communications, water) the public good was a principal driver

Critical Infrastructure Elements Deregulation and Policy There needs to be some economic rationale around sizing of infrastructure resources –There are not infinite funds for all purposes 911 resources –How they are sized –How they might fail Cellular systems –How they are sized –How they might fail Pure market forces in a for-profit model lead to hyper-optimization (JIT/WalMart effect) –This carries with it societal risks

Over-Optimized Systems When you remove robustness from systems they lose resilience –Excess or extra capacity needed for surges –But this extra capacity wastes resources Large vs. small horsepower engines When you push these systems too hard they tend to fail When critical infrastrucutures fail society pays –Power grids, food supply in emergencies, etc.

The Policy Question Why does business not respond appropriately? Why put society at risk, especially in these times? –The DHS question to business Who pays ? –Cellular, power, food, IT –Ultimately the consumer pays Business is aware of this but faces competitive risks How best to move this issue forward –A modest proposal

Local Resilience Critical for system survival –Dampens demand surges Permits better allocation of scarce resources –Permits local survival if larger systems fail A robust cell system vs. dedicated alternatives –Less prone to supply chain disruption A risk in terrorist events The Port of Los Angeles as an example Levee example in California

Building Local Resilience Red Cross Examples San Francisco –Prepare Bay Area, training one in four –Partnership with business, education, government Local capacity building, sheltering, food cache, etc. Gulf of Mexico Region –Pre-staging of resources –Deputizing agencies –Expanding shelter network –Distributed call center services

Recommendations Directly address the policy question of CIP –Convene business/government meeting Emphasize local preparedness –Supports community in natural and manmade events Re-examine deregulation impacts –Consider resilience as part of operations requirements in critical infrastructures