A Review Of The Threat To Civil Aviation & The International Response Speaker introduction. My presentation is titled ‘A review of the threat to civil aviation & the international response’ Gabriel Chow

Overview The threat The International Response Concluding remarks My presentation will be divided into 3 parts. Firstly, I will review the threat to civil aviation Secondly, I will briefly cover the response internationally Thirdly, I will conclude the presentation with some remarks regarding the areas of priority in the industry

1. The Threat To Civil Aviation

Who poses a threat? Unruly passengers Asylum seekers Criminals People with psychiatric disorders Terrorists A review of acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation reveals that several different groups of people pose a risk: Unruly passengers have endangered flight safety on many occasions and this has resulted in model legislation being developed to prosecute such people. Typically, these are passengers who get drunk and assault other passengers or crew. Asylum seekers. We have seen many incidents were asylum seekers have hijacked an aircraft and forced it to fly to another country. Criminals also pose a threat. For example a drug cartel in Colombia put a bomb on a plane and blew up the aircraft to kill someone belonging to another drug cartel. We have seen gangs attack an aircraft taxiing on the ground at an airport in West Africa, force open the door of the hold and steal money. There are also people with psychiatric disorders who cause trouble on aircraft and endanger flight safety. But, the group that represents the biggest threat obviously is the terrorist and my presentation is going to focus on terrorism.

The terrorist threat to civil aviation Attacks against aircraft Attacks against airports Using Aircraft as weapons of mass destruction Over the past 30+ years we have witnessed many different attacks on civil aviation. These attacks can categorised in different ways. I have categorised them for this presentation as: Attacks against aircraft Attacks against airports (and this includes other facilities on the ground) Attacks using aircraft as a weapon of mass destruction

Attacks against aircraft

Hijacking Hijacking an aircraft. This was the main type of attack in the late 1960’s and 1970’s. Terrorists managed weapons on board the aircraft in their hand baggage and then took control of the aircraft, threatening to harm passengers if their demands were not met. The industry responsed by introducing the screening of passengers and hand baggage. Fortunately, terrorist hijackings are rare these days.

Bomb attacks against aircraft As we made it more difficult for terrorists to hijack aircraft, so the terrorist changed tactic and put bombs on aircraft, either with timing devices or barometric devices which would explode when the aircraft was at high altitude. A small amount of explosive could cause the catastrophic failure and disintegration of the aircraft the top picture is one of the most famous of terrorist attacks – the blowing up of Pan Am Flight 103 over Scotland on 21 December 1988. 257 passengers and crew died as well as 13 people on the ground. the bottom picture is of an Air Lanka aircraft which was destroyed by a bomb that was put in the airlines technical stores, which travelled on the aircraft. The Tamil Tigers were responsible for that attack on 3 May 1986. 21 passengers were killed.

Suicide Bomber Richard Reid alias ‘The Shoe Bomber’ Richard Reid, a convert to Islam and member of Al Qaeda tried to blow up an America Airlines flight 63 from Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport to Miami, on 22 December 2001. He was overpowered by passengers and crew. The improvised explosive device was in his shoe and it had not be detected in the screening process. He was given the alias ‘The Shoe Bomber’. Richard Reid alias ‘The Shoe Bomber’ 22.12.2001 - Attempted to blow up AA Flight 63 From Paris CDG to Miami

MANPAD attack 28.11.2002 – Mombasa, Kenya Surface to air missile attack Against an Israeli charter aircraft There was an attack using surface to air missiles (also known as Man Potable Air Defence Systems or MANPADS) on Israeli Arkia Airlines Boeing 757 charter flight on 28 Nov 2002. 2 Soviet made SA 7 missiles were fired about 2km from Mombasa Airport on the Southern coast of Kenya. The missiles were fired by Al Qaeda terrorists but missed the aircraft, which flew on and landed safely in Tel Aviv.

Attacks against airports (and ground operations)

Mortar attack against airport facilities 9.3.1994 - IRA mortar attack on Heathrow One such attack has been the use of home-made mortars against airport facilities. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) fired home-made mortars from a car parked outside the perimeter of Heathrow Airport on 9 March 1994. The mortars did not cause much damage but forced the closure of runway and suspension of flights for a period of time. Home-made mortars fired from a car in a parking area

Armed attacks against passengers in airport concourses 5.7. 2002 – lone gunman attacked El Al passengers in check-in area at LAX Armed attacks against passengers in airport concourses A gunman, Hesham Mohamed Hadayet, opened fire at Los Angeles International Airport near the ticket counter of Israel's El Al Airlines, killing two people wounding at least three more. An El Al security guard returned fire, killing the gunman. Another example was when palestinian terrorists belonging to the Abu Nidal Organisation attacked EL AL passengers in the checkin area at Rome and Vienna Airports on 27 December 1985. 18 civilians were killed. Hesham Mohamed Hadayet

Attacks against air crew Attacks against air crew. Palestinian terrorists attacked EL AL crew at their London hotel on 20 August 1978. 2 persons were killed. Attack on El Al crew at hotel – London (20.8.1978)

CBRN attacks Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear agent attack                                                                          Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) attacks In the morning rush hour on March 20, 1995 a group of terrorists placed containers of the nerve gas Sarin in the Tokyo's underground railway. Twelve people were killed and just under 3,800 were injured. Anthrax tainted letters were sent to the US Senate building on 20 November 2001. Anthrax was developed as a biological warfare agent and terrorists could use it to target airport terminal buildings. Terrorists may not have the technology or ability to make a nuclear bomb. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, some nuclear material is unaccounted for and may have been stolen and sold to terrorists. It would be relatively simple for a terrorist to use conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material over a wide area. This is known as a dirty or radiological dispersion bomb. Again airport terminals are vulnerable. Anthrax Sarin Gas Attack – Tokyo 20.3.95 Dirty Bombs

Suicide Bomb Attack Suicide Bomb Attacks. I mentioned the Suicide bomber, Richard Reid and said that this was a threat to aircraft in flight. However, as we saw with the suicide bomb attacks on the London Transport System on 7 July 2005, transport facilities on the ground are also very vulnerable. The public areas of terminals, where large numbers of passengers, staff and members of the public gather are also vulnerable. 7.7.2005 - 4 suicide bombers attacked London transport system

Using aircraft as weapons of mass destruction

Using an aircraft as a weapon On 11 September 2001, we saw Al Qaeda terrorists use aircraft as weapons, flying airliners into the World Trade Towers in New York and the Pentagon, in Washington D.C., like guided missiles. We all witnessed in horror the destruction of the twin towers, with nearly 3,000 lives lost.

Using Remote Controlled Aircraft (to deliver bombs or disperse CBRN agents) We are also concerned that terrorists could use remote controlled aircraft to ‘deliver’ bombs and attack airport installations or to disperse CBRN agents.

2. The International Response So, Ladies and Gentlemen, that is a quick review of the main terrorits threats facing civil aviation. What is the international response?

Legal Framework ( ’The Chicago Convention’) Convention on International Civil Aviation ( ’The Chicago Convention’) International Conventions International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Annex 17 ‘Security’ Firstly, as you may know, there is international law under the Convention on International Civil Aviation (also known as the ‘Chicago Convention’ which regulates civil aviation. There are a number of subsidiary conventions which address specific aviation security issues. Contracting States to these conventions are then obliged to make provision for these issues in their national legislation. The day-to-day affairs relating to the regulation of civil aviation are underatken by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) based in Montreal, Canada. The requirements to safeguard civil aviation are laid down as ‘Standards’ and ‘Recommended Practices’ in Annex 17 ‘Security’ to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (‘ICAO Annex 17’). This provides the baseline for aviation security internationally.

Preventive Security Measures In addition to establishing a framework of international and national legislation to safeguard civil aviation, ICAO Annex 17 requires States to implement a wide range of preventive security measures.

Additional Preventive Security Measures Sterile Areas Passenger / Hand Baggage Screening Access control Passenger / Baggage Reconciliation Hold Baggage Screening Hardening the cockpit Suicide bombers Liquid explosives These additional preventive security measures have increased in response to terrorist attacks and threats. For example, in the 1970’s the main threat was from hijackings and so the focus was on establishing sterile departure lounges and screening passengers and hand baggage for firearms and weapons. In the 1980’s more emphasis was put on controlling access to the airside areas of airports. And after the blowing up of an Air India aircraft over the Irish Sea in 1985, we saw the introduction of passenger/baggage reconciliation measures. The Pan Am 103 and other similar attacks at the end of the 1980’s led to the implementation of hold baggage screening in the 1990’s. And in the new Millenium, with the 911 attack and the advent of the suicide bomber, we have seen the focus shift to the hardening of the cockpit and preventing the commandeering of aircraft – and the prevention/detection of liquid explosives.

3. Concluding Remarks Concluding Remarks In this brief presentation I have attempted to review the threat to civil aviation and explained the international response. Let me conclude by highlighting what I feel to be the key challenges facing us in aviation security.

Reactive  Proactive In the past aviation security - has reacted to new threats In the future aviation security – needs to predict new threats Firstly, we need to move from a reactive approach where in the past we have reacted to new threats by implementing additional measures – to an approach where we predict and foresee new threats and take the necessary precautions.

Improvement Strategy Improve the security processes More intelligent processes Focus resources on those that present a risk Better facilities Improve the performance of security staff Develop and apply ‘Human Factors’ best practices Improve and increase the use of technology Explosive detection equipment in passenger screening We need to implement a strategy of improvement that: Improves the security processes. We need to make our processes more intelligent, focusing our resources where there is the most risk. We need to improve our screening facilities and plan for future requirements. We need to improve the performance of security staff and reduce the potential for human error, by developing and applying ‘human factor’ best practices. And We need to improve and increase the use of technology, for example having explosive detection systems for all hand baggage. Liquid explosive detection technology is also urgently needed.

Secure the Global Supply Chain Regulated agent regime needs to be strengthened Majority of air cargo – travels on passenger aircraft is not security screened As an industry we need to further strengthen the global supply chain. Much of the trade in high value commodities uses air transportation. Air cargo is strategically important to global trade and it is strategically important to the airport and airline business. The Regulated Agent Regime does not provide the same level of confidence in the security of air cargo as the screening of passengers and baggage. I am not advocated 100% screening of cargo but I do feel that the Regulated agent regime needs to be strengthened. The majority of air cargo travels on passenger aircraft and is not screened. That is an area of weakness.

Restoring the Balance - Security and Facilitation Security requirements  Since 9/11 Passenger numbers  Complexity of processes  Airport efficiency  Passenger experience  Operating costs  Airport retail revenue  And, finally we need to focus on restoring the balance between the security requirements and the needs of facilitation. Since the Al Qaeda attacks on the US in September 2001 (‘911’) we have seen a trend of increasing and more onerous security regulation and this has had a huge impact on facilitation. Airports are facing a very challenging period. Passenger numbers are increasing, our passenger processes are becoming more complex, the efficiency of our airport systems and processes has decreased by the security requirements. The passenger experience travelling through airports is generally worse, as passengers have to queue longer and experience greater inconvenience. And for airports, operating costs for security have increased. Airports are seeing a negative impact on airport retail revenues from the latest security restrictions on the carriage of liquids and gels in hand baggage. Indeed, if ICAO urges States to extend the restrictions that are in place in the EU and North America to the rest of the world and there is no corresponding solution to facilitate transfer passengers with duty free wines and spirits (etc.) the impact on passenger facilitation will be even worse. Thus we need to restore the balance between the needs for security and the needs of facilitation. Restriction on liquids (etc.) in hand baggage – Potential major impact on facilitation

Thank you Thank you.