Revocation Mechanisms for Hybrid Group Communication with Asymmetric Links Abstract Wildcard identity-based encryption (IBE) provides an effective means.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
A Judgment Mechanism for Key Revocation Abstract In this paper we present a new key-revocation scheme for ad hoc network environments with the following.
Advertisements

Mitigating Routing Misbehavior in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks Reference: Mitigating Routing Misbehavior in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, Sergio Marti, T.J. Giuli,
Authors: Yanchao Zhang, Member, IEEE, Wei Liu, Wenjing Lou,Member, IEEE, and Yuguang Fang, Senior Member, IEEE Source: IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE.
Group Protocols for Secure Wireless Ad hoc Networks Srikanth Nannapaneni Sreechandu Kamisetty Swethana pagadala Aparna kasturi.
Distribution and Revocation of Cryptographic Keys in Sensor Networks Amrinder Singh Dept. of Computer Science Virginia Tech.
1 Performance Char’ of Region- Based Group Key Management --- in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks --- by Ing-Ray Chen, Jin-Hee Cho and Ding-Chau Wang Presented by.
A Distributed Security Framework for Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks Presented by Drew Wichmann Paper by Himali Saxena, Chunyu Ai, Marco Valero,
Sec-TEEN: Secure Threshold sensitive Energy Efficient sensor Network protocol Ibrahim Alkhori, Tamer Abukhalil & Abdel-shakour A. Abuznied Department of.
TrustMe: Anonymous Management of Trust Relationships in Decentralized P2P Systems Aameek Singh and Ling Liu Presented by: Korporn Panyim.
1 Security in Wireless Sensor Networks Group Meeting Fall 2004 Presented by Edith Ngai.
Secure and Efficient Key Management in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks Bing Wu, Jie Wu, Eduardo B. Fernandez, Mohammad Ilyas, Spyros Magliveras Department of Computer.
Multicasting in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANET)
Secure Multicast (II) Xun Kang. Content Batch Update of Key Trees Reliable Group Rekeying Tree-based Group Diffie-Hellman Recent progress in Wired and.
Secure Multicast Xun Kang. Content Why need secure Multicast? Secure Group Communications Using Key Graphs Batch Update of Key Trees Reliable Group Rekeying.
1 Key Management in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks Presented by Edith Ngai Spring 2003.
Certificateless encryption and its infrastructures Dr. Alexander W. Dent Information Security Group Royal Holloway, University of London.
An Authentication Service Based on Trust and Clustering in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks: Description and Security Evaluation Edith C.H. Ngai and Michael R.
ITIS 6010/8010 Wireless Network Security Dr. Weichao Wang.
SUMP: A Secure Unicast Messaging Protocol for Wireless Ad Hoc Sensor Networks Jeff Janies, Chin-Tser Huang, Nathan L. Johnson.
Random Key Predistribution Schemes for Sensor Networks Authors: Haowen Chan, Adrian Perrig, Dawn Song Carnegie Mellon University Presented by: Johnny Flowers.
Distributed Collaborative Key Agreement Protocols for Dynamic Peer Groups Patrick P. C. Lee, John C. S. Lui and David K. Y. Yau IEEE ICNP 2002.
A Secure Network Access Protocol (SNAP) A. F. Al Shahri, D. G. Smith and J. M. Irvine Proceedings of the Eighth IEEE International Symposium on Computers.
Centre for Wireless Communications University of Oulu, Finland
© Honglei Miao: Presentation in Ad-Hoc Network course (19) Minimal CDMA Recoding Strategies in Power-Controlled Ad-Hoc Wireless Networks Honglei.
ITIS 6010/8010 Wireless Network Security Dr. Weichao Wang.
An Authentication Service Against Dishonest Users in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks Edith Ngai, Michael R. Lyu, and Roland T. Chin IEEE Aerospace Conference, Big.
Security Risks for Ad Hoc Networks and how they can be alleviated By: Jones Olaiya Ogunduyilemi Supervisor: Jens Christian Godskesen © Dec
1 29 September 2010 NATO IST-092 Symposium New Capabilities in Security and QoS Using the Updated MANET Routing Protocol OLSRv2 Christopher Dearlove
On the Anonymity of Anonymity Systems Andrei Serjantov (anonymous)
A Secure Protocol for Spontaneous Wireless Ad Hoc Networks Creation.
1 Secure Cooperative MIMO Communications Under Active Compromised Nodes Liang Hong, McKenzie McNeal III, Wei Chen College of Engineering, Technology, and.
MOBILE AD-HOC NETWORK(MANET) SECURITY VAMSI KRISHNA KANURI NAGA SWETHA DASARI RESHMA ARAVAPALLI.
Key Distribution and Update for Secure Inter- group Multicast Communication Ki-Woong Park Computer Engineering Research Laboratory Korea Advanced Institute.
An efficient secure distributed anonymous routing protocol for mobile and wireless ad hoc networks Authors: A. Boukerche, K. El-Khatib, L. Xu, L. Korba.
Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks in Green Mobile Ad–hoc Networks Ashok M.Kanthe*, Dina Simunic**and Marijan Djurek*** MIPRO 2012, May 21-25,2012, Opatija,
A Study of Live Video Streaming over Highway Vehicular Ad hoc Networks Meenakshi Mittal ©2010 International Journal of Computer Applications ( )Volume.
ITEC 810 – Project Unit Trustworthy Sensor Networks Daniel Aegerter, Supervisor: Rajan Shankaran.
Overlay Network Physical LayerR : router Overlay Layer N R R R R R N.
ROUTING ALGORITHMS IN AD HOC NETWORKS
EAACK—A Secure Intrusion-Detection System for MANETs
Secure Group Communication: Key Management by Robert Chirwa.
SOS: Security Overlay Service Angelos D. Keromytis, Vishal Misra, Daniel Rubenstein- Columbia University ACM SIGCOMM 2002 CONFERENCE, PITTSBURGH PA, AUG.
Fall, Privacy&Security - Virginia Tech – Computer Science Click to edit Master title style Collusion-Resistant Group Key Management Using Attribute-
Cooperative Caching for Efficient Data Access in Disruption Tolerant Networks.
Improving MBMS Security in 3G Wenyuan Xu Rutgers University.
ENERGY-EFFICIENT FORWARDING STRATEGIES FOR GEOGRAPHIC ROUTING in LOSSY WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS Presented by Prasad D. Karnik.
Yu-Li Lin and Chien-Lung Hsu Department of Information Management, Chang-Gung University Information Science(SCI) Reporter: Tzer-Long Chen.
Rushing Attacks and Defense in Wireless Ad Hoc Network Routing Protocols ► Acts as denial of service by disrupting the flow of data between a source and.
A Highly Scalable Key Pre- Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks.
A secure re-keying scheme Introduction Background Re-keying scheme User revocation User join Conclusion.
Robustness of complex networks with the local protection strategy against cascading failures Jianwei Wang Adviser: Frank,Yeong-Sung Lin Present by Wayne.
Attacks in Sensor Networks Team Members: Subramanian Madhanagopal Sivasankaran Rahul Poondy Mukundan.
Mangai Vetrivelan Snigdha Joshi Avani Atre. Sensor Network Vulnerabilities o Unshielded Sensor Network Nodes vulnerable to be compromised. o Attacks on.
K-Anycast Routing Schemes for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks 指導老師 : 黃鈴玲 教授 學生 : 李京釜.
Ad Hoc Network.
Weichao Wang, Bharat Bhargava Youngjoo, Shin
Routing Metrics and Protocols for Wireless Mesh Networks Speaker : 吳靖緯 MA0G0101.
Authors: Ing-Ray Chen and Ding-Chau Wang Presented by Chaitanya,Geetanjali and Bavani Modeling and Analysis of Regional Registration Based Mobile Service.
Jinfang Jiang, Guangjie Han, Lei Shu, Han-Chieh Chao, Shojiro Nishio
Mona: Secure Multi-Owner Data Sharing for Dynamic Groups in the Cloud.
Key Management and Distribution Anand Seetharam CST 312.
Risk-Aware Mitigation for MANET Routing Attacks Submitted by Sk. Khajavali.
Dept. of Computer Science & Engineering, CUHK1 Trust- and Clustering-Based Authentication Service in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks Presented by Edith Ngai Supervised.
A Secure Routing Protocol with Intrusion Detection for Clustering Wireless Sensor Networks International Forum on Information Technology and Applications.
Chapter 8 Fault Tolerance. Outline Introductions –Concepts –Failure models –Redundancy Process resilience –Groups and failure masking –Distributed agreement.
Indian Institute Of Technology, Delhi Page 1 Enhancements in Security, Performance Modeling and Optimization in Vehicular Networks Ashwin Rao 2006SIY7513.
網路環境中通訊安全技術之研究 Secure Communication Schemes in Network Environments
MZR: A Multicast Protocol based on Zone Routing
Path key establishment using multiple secured paths in wireless sensor networks CoNEXT’05 Guanfeng Li  University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA Hui Ling.
Privacy Preservation and Protection Scheme over ALARM on Geographical routing B. Muthusenthil, S. Murugavalli Results The PPS is geographical routing protocol,
Presentation transcript:

Revocation Mechanisms for Hybrid Group Communication with Asymmetric Links Abstract Wildcard identity-based encryption (IBE) provides an effective means of communicating among groups which do not have a well-defined membership or hierarchy pre-established, as may frequently be the case in dynamic coalition operations. The protection of group communication against compromised nodes is, however, expensive in that it typically requires frequent re- keying in the case of attribute-based IBE or voting-based revocation mechanisms, which can be problematic in multi-hop ad-hoc networks. In this paper we investigate the use of asymmetric communication links such as may be provided by unmanned aerial vehicles to provide efficient revocation mechanisms for small ad-hoc networks. Such link characteristics allow the efficient maintenance and propagation of blacklists as proposed by Saxena et al. and also enable the development of probability and plausibility metrics for revocation requests. We therefore propose a scheme for the distribution of group keys that requires nodes of the group to collaborate in order to obtain the group secret key. Consequently, untrusted nodes are hindered from communicating with other groups. This isolation from untrusted nodes allows to avoid or at least to postpone expensive node revocations which require the rekeying of the whole group. Steffen Reidt, Stephen Wolthusen, Building on UAVs In this paper we introduce a protocol for inter-group commu- nication which builds on groups that are organized by group access control schemes. We assume a military setting, where groups are supported by UAVs, which can help to distribute key material and act as relay nodes for inter-group communication. The figure on left shows one such UAV which is in communication range with three groups. Groups can vary in size, starting from a single node. Nodes can also belong to several groups. For example, the platoon leader and squad leaders of a platoon might build their own group of group leaders but also belong to the group that contains the whole platoon. Revocation In our protocol for distributing the session key, nodes depend on the willingness of k other nodes to collaborate. The figure on right shows the communication overhead depending on k that can be expected by this strategy. No honest node should collaborate with a node on the black-list or suspicious nodes that are not yet on the black-list. Consequently, our protocol helps to secure inter- group communication by enforcing that only nodes with a certain reputation in their group are allowed to communicate with other groups on behalf of their own group. This kind of soft revocation has the benefit that nodes can react quickly to attacks in their group. The drawbacks however are, that i) revocation decisions are based on local observations and are thus not reliable, and ii) nodes keys are not revoked what increases the risk that the number of malicious nodes reaches the critical number of k + 1 (see section IV-A). To actually revoke keys in a secret sharing scheme, all nodes in a group need to be equipped with new secret shares leaving out the revoked ones. As this hard revocation requires a considerable communication effort, it shouldonly be performed when required. Key distribution We assume that several groups exist which are organized by a secret sharing scheme. Each group has at least intermittent contact to an UAV (figure on right), several of which may communicate among each other. Moreover, each group maintains a black-list containing identities of suspicious nodes. This black-list can either be handled by each node independently, or group-wide by a threshold revocation schemes. Group Key: As described in the introduction, we wish to enable nodes to multicast messages based on several identity attributes including geolocation. To this end, we propose the use of identity-based encryption (IBE) to encrypt messages with a group-identity, where the identity can contain information about the location of the group. Using the WIBE scheme from Birkett et al. the identity of a group can be a concatenation of several parameters such as the location, a group Id, and the clearance level of a group.