Optimal Use of Tennis Resources Tristan Barnett Stephen Clarke Alan Brown.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Some alternative mens doubles scoring systems Tristan Barnett – Sportsbet21 Pty Ltd Alan Brown – Swinburne University of Technology Graham Pollard – University.
Advertisements

Tennis. Goal Of Tennis Hit the ball into your opponent’s court once more than your opponent can hit it into yours.
GAME THEORY.
Module 4 Game Theory To accompany Quantitative Analysis for Management, Tenth Edition, by Render, Stair, and Hanna Power Point slides created by Jeff Heyl.
15 THEORY OF GAMES CHAPTER.
Chapter 6 Game Theory © 2006 Thomson Learning/South-Western.
NEW YORK STATE WEST YOUTH SOCCER ASSOCIATION nyswysa.org COACHES ASSOCIATION WORKSHOP February 9th 2002 Glen Buckley State Director of Coaching.
Chapter 6 © 2006 Thomson Learning/South-Western Game Theory.
Acevedo Team Sports Unit 3
Lecture 1 - Introduction 1.  Introduction to Game Theory  Basic Game Theory Examples  Strategic Games  More Game Theory Examples  Equilibrium  Mixed.
Mathematical Expectation. A friend offers you the chance to play the following game: You bet $2 and roll a die. If you roll a 6 you win $5 plus your bet.
Probability And Expected Value ————————————
Math 310 Section 7.2 Probability. Succession of Events So far, our discussion of events have been in terms of a single stage scenario. We might be looking.
Using Probabilistic Knowledge And Simulation To Play Poker (Darse Billings …) Presented by Brett Borghetti 7 Jan 2007.
Forecasting a Tennis Match at the Australian Open
Calculating Baseball Statistics Using Algebraic Formulas By E. W. Click the Baseball Bat to Begin.
Strategic Game Theory for Managers. Explain What is the Game Theory Explain the Basic Elements of a Game Explain the Importance of Game Theory Explain.
Volleyball.
PING PONG (Table Tennis)
Tactics Standard Grade Physical Education. Learning Intentions By the end of this lesson you will; Understand why we use tactics in games. Understand.
The possible outcomes are 2 + 2, 2 + 3, 2 + 4, 3 + 2, 3 + 3, 3 + 4, 4 + 2, 4 + 3, The probability of an even sum is ____. The probability of an.
Chapter 3 Section 3.5 Expected Value. When the result of an experiment is one of several numbers, (sometimes called a random variable) we can calculate.
Independence and Dependence 1 Krishna.V.Palem Kenneth and Audrey Kennedy Professor of Computing Department of Computer Science, Rice University.
Brian Duddy.  Two players, X and Y, are playing a card game- goal is to find optimal strategy for X  X has red ace (A), black ace (A), and red two (2)
Finding the Efficient Set
The Game of Tennis The game of tennis can be played as either singles or doubles. The singles game has two participants, two individuals teaming up to.
Tennis Notes. The Court Court Terminology Net (3 feet) Doubles Sideline Single Sideline Alley Baseline Center Mark Right Service Court Left Service Court.
Twenty Questions … all about tennis! Twenty Questions
TENNIS UNIT LIFETIME SPORTS.
How to Keep Score for Tennis How to Keep Score for Tennis
Direct Variation What is it and how do I know when I see it?
TIMES 3 Technological Integrations in Mathematical Environments and Studies Jacksonville State University 2010.
Chapter 9Section 7 Mathematical Expectation. Ch9.7 Mathematical Expectation To review from last Friday, we had the case of a binomial distribution given.
Public Policy Analysis MPA 404 Lecture 24. Previous Lecture Graphical Analysis of Tariff and Quota Game Theory; The prisoner's Dilemma.
Probability With Number Cubes Today’s Learning Goals  We will continue to understand the link between part-whole ratios, decimals, and percents.  We.
5.1 Probability in our Daily Lives.  Which of these list is a “random” list of results when flipping a fair coin 10 times?  A) T H T H T H T H T H 
Part 3 Linear Programming
Analyzing Puzzles and Games. What is the minimum number of moves required to complete this puzzle?
Chapter 2.5 Notes: Reason Using Properties from Algebra Goal: You will use algebraic properties in logical arguments.
6.5 Find Expected Value MM1D2d: Use expected value to predict outcomes. Unit 4: The Chance of Winning!
Tennis Mr. Schmidt.
Bell Ringers Solve the following equations and write the commutative property equation and solve: (-74) + 54 (-87) + (-32) Solve the following equations.
Decision Making Under Uncertainty - Bayesian Techniques.
12.1 – Probability Distributions
Strategic Game Theory for Managers. Explain What is the Game Theory Explain the Basic Elements of a Game Explain the Importance of Game Theory Explain.
Independence and Dependence 1 Krishna.V.Palem Kenneth and Audrey Kennedy Professor of Computing Department of Computer Science, Rice University.
IntroductionCB and MUResultsConclusions IASE Annual conference. Gijón May 9-10, 2008 Data Measuring Competitive Balance and Match Uncertainty in Professional.
Statistics Overview of games 2 player games representations 2 player zero-sum games Render/Stair/Hanna text CD QM for Windows software Modeling.
The Tennis Club Problem Supplementary Notes  A tennis club has 2n members.  We want to pair up the members (by twos) to play singles matches  Question:
Chapter 7 Introduction to Sampling Distributions Business Statistics: QMIS 220, by Dr. M. Zainal.
Example 31: Solve the following game by equal gains method: Y I II I II I X II II
Find Expected Value.  A collection of outcomes is partitioned into n events, no two of which have any outcomes in common. The probabilities of n events.
By: Donté Howell Game Theory in Sports. What is Game Theory? It is a tool used to analyze strategic behavior and trying to maximize his/her payoff of.
Honors Stats 4 Day 9 Chapter 16. Do Now Check Your Homework Homework: Chapter 16 p. 382 #1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 17, 18 Objective: SWBAT understand and calculate.
The Rules of Tennis. Rule #1 Opponents stand on opposite side of the court. The server is the person who delivers the ball. The other person who stands.
Indirect Reciprocity in the Selective Play Environment Nobuyuki Takahashi and Rie Mashima Department of Behavioral Science Hokkaido University 08/07/2003.
Input – Output Models P = # of items produced
Chapter 6- Random Variables
Game Theory “How to Win the Game!”.
Tennis.
Chapter Notes: Properties and Algebraic Proofs
Tennis.
Chapter 6 Game Theory (Module 4) 1.
Game Theory.
Game Theory II.
Investigation 2 Experimental and Theoretical Probability
6.5 Find Expected Value MM1D2d.
Tennis.
Using Microsoft Excel to model a tennis match
Forecasting a Tennis Match at the Australian Open
Presentation transcript:

Optimal Use of Tennis Resources Tristan Barnett Stephen Clarke Alan Brown

Background Mathematics in Industry Study Group 2003 (MISG) Defence Science of Technology Organisation (DSTO) Tennis: (points, games, sets, match) Warfare: (skirmishes, battles, campaigns, war) Analysis of Hierarchical Games The value of a point depends on the current score.

Introduction On which point should a player increase his effort to optimize his chance of winning a game? Are there situations where it is correct for a player to throw a game, or even a set? Does varying effort about an overall mean have an effect on the chance of winning a game? Applications to solving defence strategy problems.

Probabilities on winning a 3 set match Chance of winning a match = p 2 ( 3 – 2 p ) where p = probability of a player winning a set The chance of a player winning the match when he decides at the start of the match to apply one increase in effort on the first, second or third set played is equal to p 2 ( 3 – 2 p ) + ε 2 p ( 1 – p ).

Importance Reference: Morris, The Most Important Points in Tennis (1977) If P ( a,b ) is the probability a player wins the game from game score ( a,b ), then the importance of a point I ( a,b ) is represented by: I ( a,b ) = P ( a+ 1,b ) - P ( a,b+ 1) Multiplication result for importance: I PM = I PG I GS I SM where : I PM = importance of point in a match I PG = importance of point in a game I GS = importance of game in a set I SM = importance of set in a match

Weighted-Importance Morris: If N ( a,b| 0,0) is the probability of reaching game score ( a, b ) from game score (0,0), then the time-importance of a point T ( a,b ) is represented by: T ( a,b | 0, 0) = I ( a,b ) N ( a,b | 0, 0) If N ( a,b|g,h ) is the probability of reaching game score ( a, b ) from game score ( g, h ), then the weighted-importance of a point W ( a,b|g,h ) is represented by: W ( a,b | g,h ) = I ( a,b ) N ( a,b | g,h ) Weighted importance for any point in the match is represented by: W ( a,b:c,d:e,f | g,h:i,j:k,l ) = I ( a,b:c,d:e,f ) N ( a,b:c,d:e,f | g,h:i,j:k,l )

Weighted-Importance Property Suppose a player, who ordinarily has probability p of winning a set, decides that he will try harder every time the set ( e,f ) occurs. If by doing so he is able to raise his probability of winning from p to p + ε, ( p + ε < 1 ) for that set alone, then he raises his probability of winning the match from P ( k,l ) to P ( k,l ) + ε W ( e,f | k,l ). The optimal strategies for a player with 1 ≤ M ≤ 3 available increases, is to apply an increase in effort on any M sets of the match.

Optimizing a game Table 3: The weighted importance of points in a game from (0,0), where the probability of the server winning a point is 0.6. An optimal strategy for a player with M ≥ 1 available increases, is to apply an increase in effort on the first M points of the game.

Optimizing a set and a match Suppose player A is leading in a set with a score of (5,3) (A score = 5, B score =3), with player B to serve the next game. It can be shown that player A should aim to win with a score (6,4) by conserving energy while player B is serving. If it happens that the score reaches (5,4) he should increase his effort to win his own serve and the set. This strategy dominates the alternative of expending the energy to break B’s serve and trying to win the set with a score (6,3). It can also be shown that a player ahead on sets, but behind in the current set, may be better off to save energy to try and win the next set, rather than expend additional energy in the current set. Example: 2003 Davis Cup final: Philippoussis df Ferrero

Varying the Effort An increase in effort by ε on a set played and a corresponding decrease in effort by ε in another set played will preserve the overall mean of winning a set. However the chance of a player winning the match by varying effort about the mean is p 2 ( 3 – 2 p ) + ε 2 ( 2 p – 1 ). For p > ½ (i.e the stronger player), the chance of winning has increased. The increase or decrease in probability of winning the match for a player is caused by the variation about the mean probability of winning a set.

Varying the Effort However, since the 3 rd set is only played a proportion of the time the better player can further increase his chance of winning the match by applying an increase in effort on the 3 rd set played and a proportion of the time on the 2 nd set played. For example: p =0.6, ε = 0.1 A B Table 4: Chances of players winning a match Chances of winning match with: 1 no increase/decrease in effort 2 increase on 3 rd set and decrease on 1 st set 3 increase on 3 rd set and decrease on 1 st set and ½ the time on 2 nd set

Optimizing a game Table 5: The importance of points in a game, where the probability of the server winning a point is 0.6. A player can gain a significant advantage by increasing effort on the important points and decreasing effort on the unimportant points. For the better player, this gain is a result of both the variability about the mean and also the importance of points.

Applications to warfare Tennis: (points, games, sets, match) Warfare: (skirmishes, battles, campaigns, war)

Applications to warfare A team has M available increases in effort available for use in the war. Where should they apply the increases to optimize their chances of winning the war? A team has M available increases in effort available for use in the war. However there are costs associated for applying an increase in effort at a particular skirmish (and a reward for winning the war). Where should they apply the increases to optimize their chances of winning the war? A team has a “large” number of available increases in effort available for use in the war. However there are costs associated for applying an increase in effort at a particular skirmish (and a reward for winning the war). Where should they apply the increases to optimize their chances of winning the war?

Applications to warfare Let E [ X ( e,f )] = [ pP ( e+ 1,f ) + (1 -p ) P ( e,f+ 1)] r E [ X I ( e,f )] = [( p+ε ) P ( e+ 1,f ) + (1 -p-ε ) P ( e,f+ 1)] r - c where: E [ X ( e,f )] = expected payout at set ( e,f ) in a match with no increase E [ X I ( e,f )] = expected payout at set ( e,f ) in a match with an increase r = reward for winning the overall war c = the cost of applying an increased effort If E [ X I ( e,f )] – EX [( e,f )] > 0, then an increase should be applied at ( e,f ) or equivalently: I ( e,f ) ε r – c > 0 Similarly an increase should be applied for points in a match for which: I ( a,b: c,d: e,f ) ε r – c > 0

Further Research  The effect on the probability of winning the match arising from depleting available energy to win the point.  The ability to generalise from tennis to a more complex game structure.  The definition of a model of match outcome into which the effect of morale or other psychological effects can be incorporated. Acknowledgements Elliot Tonkes Vladimir Ejov