Lecture 3: Criticisms of Positivism; and the Interpretivist Approach Research Methods Lecture 3: Criticisms of Positivism; and the Interpretivist Approach

Introduction In the previous lecture we examined positivism Positivism has had considerable influence; but it is subject to many strong criticisms In this lecture we examine some of the criticisms, which also imply a completely different approach to social science: interpretivism

Miscellaneous Criticisms of Positivism Kuhnian criticisms of notion of rational scientific progress; e.g. K controversy Is scientific method practiced at all? Duhem-Quine problem suggests crucial tests are impossible Dow (1996): complexity of world makes positivist precision impossible/undesirable

Miscellaneous Criticisms of Positivism Apparent failure of social science to find ‘laws’ Science/non-science distinction reflects historical power Truth, observations and ‘facts’ are contestable Key distinctions: fact/value, observation/theory, fact/theory dubious

Observation or Fact/Theory Distinction Is a worker being exploited or paid fairly? Impossible to decide w/o using some theory All observations reflect some existing theoretical framework: e.g. ‘that cat is red’ Observed behaviour can be interpreted differently according to theory/context (e.g. woman dying of CO poisoning (H&S: 120)) Acts are complex: neutrality = lose richness

Fact/Value Distinction Smith was a moral philosopher! NB title of Ricardo (1817) In Mill, economics is a moral science Weber: choice of research topics reflects values Bhaskar: standards of inquiry  values Influential account by Myrdal (1954)

Myrdal’s Criticisms Utilitarianism/natural law philosophy plays (unacknowledged) role in neo-classicism Language of economics implicitly values entities (e.g. use of ‘principle,’ ‘function’) Conscious and unconscious motivations affect interpretations; must admit biases in order to achieve objectivity

Related Criticisms on F/V Significance of a cultural (social) event cannot be determined without recourse to evaluation (Weber) Positivist accounts implicitly value certain things or are politically motivated (Robbins, 1932: 132, 135) Policy makers/funders etc. put pressure on scientists – influence their findings

Interpretivism Many of the above criticisms reflect ‘interpretivist’ philosophy of science Idealism: Vico, Rousseau, Hegel Society different from nature Objective of inquiry is verstehen Regularities result from rules

Verstehen Translation of biblical texts: linguistic but also social exercise - need to understand social context (hermeneutics) Problem of incommensurability Dilthey: observer has to access cultural world through empathy To understand the past, need to identify with it (H&S: 97)

Verstehen Need to understand from the inside: not view people as if from the outside Verstehen: attempting to reconstruct the subjective experience of actors without distorting the world itself (Weber) Task of social science is to find meanings (Winch) Starting point of social science is the observation of people’s behaviour or words

Rules versus Regularities Any regs in society are not natural causal laws but result from reactions to rules Example: traffic lights Rickert: nomothetic vs. ideographic Weber: social science - deeper study Free will vs. determinism Reasons are not causes

Implications Impossibility of social science? Find meanings; verstehen Ideal types (Weber): abstracting from the real, emotional, irrational Narrative emphasised Quantitative methods unlikely to be useful Use ethnographic methods

Conclusions Interpretivism emerged from its own tradition and as a response to positivism Objective observation of causal regularities impossible for various reasons Objective of social inquiry is verstehen Implies radically different research process Interpretivism less influential in economics