Global Climate Change Negotiations: A Perspective on Intergenerational and Social Equity P.R. Shukla.

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Presentation transcript:

Global Climate Change Negotiations: A Perspective on Intergenerational and Social Equity P.R. Shukla

NORTH-SOUTH EQUITY: UNFCCC Article 3.1 M “common but differentiated responsibilities” Article 3.2 Special attention and considerations for parties: N “that would have to bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden under the Convention” N “vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change”

Carbon Emissions per Capita (1993) Africa India China Other Asia Latin America Other Europe EU12 Former USSR Japan Australia USA Canada Carbon emissions per Capita (tC/cap)

Historic CO 2 and Methane Contribution (%)

EFFICIENCY: UNFCCC Article 3.3 “policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost”

Why Delay Mitigation Actions? Future Generations shall be: 2Affluent 2More Capable êKnowledge êTechnologies

BURDEN SHARING AGREEMENT: Developing Country Concerns ê UNFAIR BACKGROUND CONDITIONS ê ASYMMETRY OF EMISSIONS & IMPACTS ê UNFAVOURABLE TIMING

Intergenerational Concerns 2Total Burden Sharing JMitigation JImpacts JRisks (including extreme events) 2Minimize Welfare Losses JBurden Sharing based on Income

North + EFFICIENCY (MARGINAL COST) + GRANDFATHERING Equity Principles: The North - South Divide South +HISTORICAL RESPONSIBILITY +BASIC NEEDS +OBLIGATION TO PAY +ABILITY TO PAY +RAWLSIAN CRITERIA +PER CAPITA ENTITLEMENTS (EGALITARIAN)

Cumulative Carbon Emissions(1991 to 2100) for IPCC - IS92 Emission Scenarios Emissions Cumulative Emissions: Scenario (Giga Ton Carbon) IS92a 1500 IS92b 1430 IS92c 785 IS92d 975 IS92e 2187 IS92f 1845

Cumulative Carbon Emissions (GT Carbon) Stabilization“S” Trajectory “WRE” Trajectory Target 450 ppmv ppmv ppmv ppmv Cumulative Carbon Emissions (1991 to 2100): “S” and “WRE” Concentration Stabilization Trajectories

Mitigation Needed for Stabilization (from 1990 to 2100) Stabilization Mitigation Needed Target for IS92 Case (Billion Tons of Carbon) 450 ppmv ppmv ppmv ppmv

Convergence of Per Capita Emissions Conventional Concept Industrial Countries Emission Profile Developing Countries Emission Profile Convergence Target Years

Equitable Convergence Convergence Target Industrial Countries Emission Profile Developing Countries Emission Profile Convergence Target Years

US$ Billion (1993) Grandfathered Per capita Gain/Loss for India under Different Permit Schemes Distribution matters India’s gains/ losses can be several % of GDP

PROTOCOL WITH INCOME BASED ENTRY AND TECHNOLOGY CONDITIONS EQUITY CRITERIA / Non- Annex I enters when income (in PPP) equals 2020 Annex I Income TECHNOLOGY CONDITIOS TECHNOLOGY CONDITIOS (Annex I to implement after 2020) / New Fossil Power Plants to scrub and dispose carbon from exhaust / New Synthetic fuels to capture and dispose carbon released in conversion WHEN SOME NON-ANNEX JOIN IN? / China in 2045; India in 2062EFFICIENCY / 30 percent expensive than most cost-effective mitigation

SEPARABILITY OF EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY COASE THEOREM Stipulates çin absence of transaction costs, market exchange will lead to efficient resource allocation regardless of distribution of rights Implies çthe process of minimizing burden size is independent of the burden sharing scheme

SEPARABILITY OF EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY COASE THEOREM: TWO INTERPRETATIONS 1. Neo-Classical/ Northern World View Equity is irrelevant to global co-operation 2. Developing Country Perspective Efficiency is simple - just needs agreeing on instruments. Equity (sharing of burden) is vital

Sharing the Burden 1. Stabilization Burden shall be substantive 2. Significant mitigation shall be in NA-I (“Where” Flexibility for Cost Effectiveness) (“Where” Flexibility for Cost Effectiveness) 3. Transition from Cost to Welfare Effectiveness (“Justice” in Burden sharing is vital)

Conclusions: A Fair Agreement Burden Sharing JExplicit Burden Sharing Regime Fair Competition JPolluter Pays JMarket Price for CDM Mitigation Minimize Welfare Losses JAbility to Pay JCompensation for Impacts Precautionary Principle JHedge against extreme events JProtect most vulnerable

“ It is the nature and the advantage of strong people that they can bring out the crucial questions and form a clear opinion about them. The weak always have to decide between alternatives which are not their own.” Dietrich Bonhoeffer German Philosopher, anti-Nazi thinker (executed in Flossenburg concentration camp, April 9, 1945)