Can Accounting Standards Help Address Defined Benefit Pension Problems? Shyam Sunder, Yale University Global ARC, Boston October 17, 2012.

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Presentation transcript:

Can Accounting Standards Help Address Defined Benefit Pension Problems? Shyam Sunder, Yale University Global ARC, Boston October 17, 2012

An Overview Why can’t they do the accounting for DB plans “right”? Because the “right” accounting for DB plans can exist only in a world of dreams DB plans are designed to make it impossible to do any sensible or defensible accounting for them Even if we devise “better” accounting, the plans will be, and are modified to defeat that goal – Bad incentives all around And the consequences of “better” accounting are basically unacceptable Few options other than abandoning DB plans altogether in favor of alternatives Public sector has yet to learn this lesson from the private sector

Why can’t we do the accounting for DB plans right? Let us look at the logic of DB plans

Logic of Defined Benefit Plans Cost of living is constant, at least predictable, over several generations Rates of return are constant, at least predictable, over several generations Shape of demographic tree (mouths-to-hands ratio) is stable Economic growth, employment and wages are stable Any deviations from assumed parameters are random, allowing the law of large numbers to keep the accumulated gap between funding and obligations near zero Future generations have as much voice as the current retirees in setting DB policy Socio-political mechanisms for setting premiums and benefits look beyond the election cycles and take a multi-generational steady-state perspective

Consumer Price Index (U) Changes

Rates of Return on Investment Does the future look like the past? What do you wish to invest in?

And the demography? Birth and death rates Working life and retired life Gender Age distribution Mouths/hands (consumer/workers) ratio

Economic Factors Economic growth Employment Wages

Who knows the “right” assumptions for the future: cost of living, rate of return, Number of beneficiaries, Economic growth, Unemployment, and Wage growth Depending of what economic and econometric method you use, you can come up with virtually any number Accountants and actuaries can do this right when they can call The Future to get the right numbers Until then, we shall have surprises—neither small nor infrequent

On Top of that, Assumptions about Socio-Political Decision Mechanisms Any deviations from assumed parameters are random, allowing the law of large numbers to keep the accumulated gap between funding and obligations bounded near zero Future generations have as much (any?) voice as the current retirees in setting DB policy Socio-political mechanisms for setting premiums and benefits look beyond the election cycles and take a multi-generational steady-state perspective

DB Is an Impossible Dream It can work only as a Ponzi scheme, or by shear luck in periods of high growth, not in steady state or decline It has all the wrong incentives for just about everyone No accounting standards and actuarial assumptions can be devised to deal with the uncertainty and incentives challenges – That is not what accountants and actuaries can do Accounting standards have difficulty dealing with short- term uncertainty, much less multi-generational projections to get the DB obligations right Looking to accountants and actuaries for the solution is barking up the wrong tree They cannot solve the DB problem

Business Firms: Some US Facts (2007) 56% companies in US have DB plans (41 Intl) DB Obligations/Mkt. Capitalization 19% (18%); range 800%-0% Average underfunding 8% (23%); Average service cost 15.8% of OP Profit New accounting standards have helped push the private sector away from DBs

When the Public Sector Abandon DBs? “Almost every state in the U.S. has made cuts to its public-employee pensions, seeking to dig out from the economic downturn, but so far the measures have fallen well short of bridging a nearly USD 1 trillion funding gap.” Wall Street Journal, September 21st 2012 DB bankruptcies may help drive reforms Bankruptcies may be the only effective way of getting claw-backs of excessive benefits promised in such plans

How do we define a government’s role in retirement planning? Educational to inform, Convening to get everyone to the table, Drafting boiler plate alternatives, Compulsion to minimize free riding, and ultimately, Risk pooling and safety net for the truly unfortunate

Thank You!