1 Don Walshe Economics Dept, UCC Tel: 021-4549212 “Budget, Banks and Bailout” Economics Webinar December 8 th, 2010.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
1 A DECADE OF ADJUSTMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE EUROZONE? THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIMENSION Christopher A Pissarides London School of Economics Chair,
Advertisements

A Two-Handed Economists Presentation on The Treaty Professor Karl Whelan University College Dublin Presentation for Labour Party April 28, 2012.
Credit Derivatives.
The Credit Crunch Banks. Overview The outline of the story is well known. –Banks in several countries may too many loans to the property market –These.
Economic Firefight – An Inside View Alan Ahearne Special Adviser to the Minister for Finance Presentation to NUI Galway Dublin Alumni Club 11 May 2010.
Conclusion of EFSF financial assistance programme for Portugal: an overview 18 May 2014.
Cross-Border Infrastructure: A Toolkit Raising Resources Corporate Debt Session on Finance Sidharth Sinha Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad The.
Vulnerabilities from the Sovereign Debt Crisis In Southeast Europe and Eurasia May 18, 2011 Partners for Financial Stability 2010 – 2013.
On the Brink of Default – The Greek Economy Tutor2u September 2011.
Government Finances By Shauna Hennessy.. The National Debt This is the total amount / cumulative of government borrowing which is outstanding.
1 The European sovereign debt crisis and the future of the euro Peter Bekx European Commission Reykjavik, 19 February 2013.
Chapter Six Regulation. After the Crisis Since the wave of government-backed bank bailouts, recapitalization plans, liquidity injections, and credit guarantee.
1 The Systemic Character of the Sovereign Debt Crisis: Policy Implications and Governance Issues Argentino Pessoa CEF.UP, Faculdade de Economia do Porto,
Key Points  Origins of the crisis  Thai Baht  Economy of S. Korea and Indonesia  The Chaebols  Beginning of the collapse  Seoul Stock Exchange 
“Today, there are three kinds of people: the have's, the have-not's, and the have-not- paid-for-what-they-have's.“ Earl Wilson.
Prof. Ian Giddy New York University Structured Finance: Restructuring.
Irwin/McGraw-Hill 1 Sovereign Risk Chapter 16 Financial Institutions Management, 3/e By Anthony Saunders.
Capital Structure (Ch. 12)
Business and Financial Planning for Transformation.
Recent Reforms to Deal with Recurrent Sovereign Debt Crisis in the Euro Area Waltraud Schelkle LSBU Centre for International Business.
Ireland: Debt Dynamics John FitzGerald Oireachtas Committee, 26 th October
Ireland’s Financial Crisis The Celtic Tiger Boom & Bust By: Griselda Hernandez, Jennie Duong, Driss Elouartallani.
How high up the political agenda is housing in the Republic of Ireland? John O’Connor Housing Agency 29 th August 2014.
The Shape of the EU Post Crisis Peter O’Shea Monash European and EU Centre January 2014.
1998 Russian Crisis Group 8 Nery Lemus Wilmer Molina Omer Erinal Mollah Yerima.
CEPS, 1 Place du Congrès, 1000 Brussels, , Analysis of the US approach: What the EU can learn from US policies and politics.
Managing Turnaround of the Slovenian Economy: Restructuring of Banking, Corporate and State Sectors Prague, November 2013 prof. Marko Simoneti
Financial sector crisis in emerging Europe and international policy response Alexander Pivovarsky EBRD Office of the Chief Economist USAID Regional Competitiveness.
16. December 2010 Perspectives on Financial Crises Perspectives on Financial Crises Discussion of Prof. Peter Diamond Gernot Doppelhofer.
L E A D E R S H I P  P R O B L E M SO L V I N G  V A L U E C R E A T I O N © Copyright Alvarez & Marsal Holdings, LLC. All Rights Reserved. Alvarez.
Sovereign Risk Chapter 15 © 2008 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved. McGraw-Hill/Irwin.
LARSEN & TOUBRO Challenges & Opportunities Global Meltdown Challenges & Opportunities 7 th November 2008 N. Sivaraman Executive Vice-President Financial.
The European Union and the Euro Crisis Layna Mosley Dept. of Political Science UNC Chapel Hill
Macroeconomics Prof. Juan Gabriel Rodríguez The Sovereign Debt Crisis.
Ilias A. Tsintavis Athens, 9/11/2013 Bank resolution in Greece & Cyprus – A comparative analysis Segmentation of the single market as a result of the financial.
Barclays Capital Ensuring Capital Efficiency of Russian Securitisation Transactions October 2006.
Slide 1 / Romania and the international financial and economic crisis Ionut DUMITRU Chief-Economist Raiffeisen Bank Romania.
Welcome to the Presentation
3 rd Bank of Greece Workshop The Euro Area Sovereign Debt Crisis and Its Implications for the Economies of SEE The implications for the financial sector.
PRESENTATION TO THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY AFFAIRS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Brussels, 16 th March 2010 CARMINE LAMANDA SENIOR EXECUTIVE VICE-PRESIDENT,
Copyright ©2003 South-Western/Thomson Learning Chapter 11 The Cost of Capital.
2 Trends in Restructuring Presented by John Doddy Partner – Debt & Capital Advisory Trends in Insolvency & Restructuring.
16th Dubrovnik Economic Conference June 2010 Athanasios Vamvakidis International Monetary Fund.
AEGON Asset Management Olaf van den Heuvel Head of Tactical Asset Allocation CFA Forecasting dinner.
The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly The Global Financial Crisis The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly The Global Financial Crisis.
Prof. Angel Saz-Carranza Director, ESADEgeo The European Union and The Interlocking Economic Crises 1.
Florian Fichtl, Country Manager World Bank October 19, 2009.
1 Economic Research Department 1The New International Financial Map for LAC Alicia García-Herrero Chief Economist Emerging Markets Economic Research Department,
Much Ado about EMU Andrew K. Rose Berkeley, Haas 1Andrew Rose, EMU.
Ireland’s Experience in the Bond Markets Presentation for IIEA Oliver Whelan Director Funding and Debt Management National Treasury Management Agency 20.
EAPN SIWG “The EUs response to the Crisis: Ireland 2008-current.” Session 2 Madrid, Friday 27 th May 2011.
How can the Euro be stabilized? Günter Franke May 18, 2016 Kiev National Economic University.
ABA Section of International Law Spring Meeting 2011 The Aftermath of the Financial Crisis – Part 1 Globalization of the crisis and European responses.
EU Debt Crisis Group 1 Day3 Pavlina Rucki, Tony Chen.
Euro area policy options to combat the debt crisis Christian Dreger, DIW Berlin.
Financial & Sovereign Debt Crises Reinhart & Rogoff.
May 2016 ARIZ AFD’s CREDIT RISK-SHARING MECHANISM.
Bail-in pre BRRD Dolphin Maxime, Polverini Lorenzo, Poncelet Valérie.
Greek bailout agreements
The European Economic Crisis: Origins and Prospect for the Future
Chapter 3 Development of financial strategy
The New European Legal Framework for Banking Crisis Management:
The Assisted Countries
© 2008 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved. McGraw-Hill/Irwin.
The Euro’s Three Crises (Shambaugh)
Measures taken By the ECB, EC, FMI to tackle the crisis
Gibraltar Resolution Planning Framework
From Crisis to Recovery
A crash-course on the euro crisis
A crash-course on the euro crisis
Presentation transcript:

1 Don Walshe Economics Dept, UCC Tel: “Budget, Banks and Bailout” Economics Webinar December 8 th, 2010

2 Bond ‘Vigilantes’ Ireland’s creditworthiness questioned on multiple fronts: –Inability of State to absorb banking losses (scale) –Austerity measures in NRP a drag on medium-term growth –Ad hoc, opaque, and uncordinated response from EU/ECB undermines effort to stabilise debt/GDP ratio If sovereign investors are forced to assume bank risk, they will charge a bank cost of capital (7.5% plus) As a consequence, ‘bail out’ should involve moving bank risk to where it is best borne (i.e. not with domestic taxpayers) This is the agenda of the bond ‘vigilantes’

3 Not a ‘Bail Out’ but a ‘Restructuring’ Package Emphasis on Systemic Risk management –Recapitalise (Taxpayer) –Restructure/Downsize (Taxpayer/Private Capital) –Recourse to Market Funding (Private Capital) Forced risk-sharing i.e. investor ‘bail in’ is not a feature Loss burden not to go higher than equity and junior lenders As a result, de-leveraging of bank sector amounts to raising €113bn (restructuring) to payoff senior debt Contentious as ‘bail-in’ measures such as debt/debt, debt/equity swaps commonplace in other IMF programmes such as the South East Asia in 1998.

4 The Euro Dimension is Critical ECB decided (Nov’10) that its exposure to Irish Banks unsustainable (€90bn + €30bn emergency liquidity from CBFSAI) ECB pushed Government to apply for external assistance and difficult to say no given extent of liquidity support from ECB ECB/EU require Irish Government to buffer (via NPRF) losses for senior bondholders even for the obviously insolvent banks such as Anglo and Irish Nationwide Moreover, special legislative regime will also find it difficult to burden-share with juniors as State injects first loss capital Funding to come from 6.05%) Not ‘bail-out’ terms, but terms to force bank restructuring

5 Walking a Tightrope Plan secures large package of funding for bank re-cap and commitment from ECB to provide large share of ongoing funding Systemic fears insulating bondholders for the time being Key issues –Can banks be re-organised and sold to well-funded outsiders quickly? –Can additional bank losses be contained within the NPRF portion of the funding? –If so, Ireland’s creditworthiness can be restored and reflected in lower bond yields –If not, default is inevitable and the systemic consequences will have to be dealt with by the ECB

6 Thank you!