The State of Panchayats in South India Vijayendra Rao Development Research Group The World Bank

Research Projects Village and Household Survey -All 4 states: December 2002 and June 2004 (revisit tentatively scheduled Nov 2008) Gram sabha recordings (June 2004-October 2006) Karnataka: Randomized Trial (ongoing) Collaborators: Kripa Anantpur, Radu Ban, Tim Besley, Monica Das Gupta, Jeff Hammer, Rohini Pande, Paromita Sanyal.

Impact of Panchayat Decentralization in India Goal: To study the impact of decentralization to democratically elected village governments in South India. Method: Uses a unique natural experiment exploiting the idea that the four southern states (AP, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu) were carved out three larger entities (Hyderabad, Madras and Mysore) in Focus on villages on either side of the border that belonged to the same political entity prior to 1956, but now belong to different states. Allows us to control for political and social forms of path-dependency in comparing the four states. Sampling method is explained in the map at right

Village Services in South India (pre-NREGA: December 2002 and June 2004) Kerala tops as expected – but considerable dissatisfaction and slippage AP (Telugu Desam) and Karnataka are on par in service delivery Tamil Nadu is comparatively the worst on services, but good on quality of deliberation. Implication: Financial devolution is a necessary condition for panchayat effectiveness. Deliberation is essential after devolution.

Confusion on Tasks Disagreement within states on GP responsibilities in sanitation (Tamil Nadu is clearest, Karnataka and AP are most confused). In Karnataka approx. 30% of GPs do not know whether they or some higher level of govt. is responsible for a variety of sanitation tasks

Political Economy of Village Democracy Political Class is selected on the basis of social networks and economic advantage Tend to be opportunist – looking after their own group, their own village, and their own neighborhood (clean streets) Higher levels of education in politicians tends to improve performance and reduce opportunism.

Caste Reservations Dalits fare better under Dalit presidents in being more likely to receive targeted benefits. Dalit and OBC presidents are no different than others in actions on public good provision.

Women’s Reservations Men and women want different things (Roads vs Water and Sanitation). But Unlike West Bengal and Rajasthan – Women and Men Presidents do not take different decisions. Institutional Context matters a lot to women’s effectiveness: Experience, Upper Caste Domination, Maturity of Panchayat System

Gram Sabhas ¼ GPs did not hold any gram sabha in the previous year. Most held just one. More literate villages more likely to hold Gram Sabhas Only 20% of households have attended. Participation is biased in favor of landless and scheduled castes – beneficiary selection. Women have much lower participation. When they are held GPs are more effective and beneficiary selection is fairer.

Anatomy of Gram Sabhas (350 tape recordings - December 2002-December 2006) Conditioned more by state than by social structures. Kerala –efficient and purpose-driven Tamil Nadu – chaotic, vocal, and directive- driven Karnataka – lot of variation, but focused on beneficiary selection. AP –very short (10-15 minutes), problems noted and promises made to inform authorities.

Action Research (Starting) Can Karnataka learn from Kerala? Randomizing People’s Planning Campaign In Collaboration with Abdul Nazir Saab SIRD – Mysore NREGA and Gram Swaraj Villages (lots of money) 50 GPs treatment – 50 Control tracked over 2 years.

Future Challenges NREGA and other programs Push-Back from MLAs (e.g. Karnataka) Change in State Governments (especially AP and Kerala) Enforcement of Right to Information Act Plea for research to be integrated into policy changes.