Economic History (Master APE & PPD, Paris School of Economics) Thomas Piketty Academic year 2015-2016 Lecture 1: Income, capital and growth since 1800:

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Economics of Inequality (Master PPD & APE, Paris School of Economics) Thomas Piketty Academic year Lecture 7: The regulation of capital and inequality.
Advertisements

ECO Global Macroeconomics TAGGERT J. BROOKS.
Capital is Back: Wealth-Income Ratios in Rich Countries Thomas Piketty & Gabriel Zucman Paris School of Economics September 2012.
Distribution of Wealth – U.S. Survey: What they would like it to be Survey: What they believe it to be Reality: What it is – Where is the bottom 40%?
Economics of Inequality (Master PPD & APE, Paris School of Economics) Thomas Piketty Academic year Lecture 2: The dynamics of capital/income.
Economic Growth and Globalization since 1850
Chapter 12 Production and Growth
1 of 37 chapter: 7 >> Krugman/Wells ©2009  Worth Publishers Tracking the Macroeconomy.
Production and Growth Chapter 25.
1 MACROECONOMICS AND THE GLOBAL BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT Capital Accumulation, Technological Progress, and Economic Growth Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons,
Economic Growth. The World Economy Total GDP: $31.5T GDP per Capita: $5,080 Population Growth: 1.2% GDP Growth: 1.7%
J. K. Dietrich - FBE 524 – Fall 2005 Financial System Overview and the Flow of Funds Week 1 – August 24, 2005.
Chapter 6: Economic Growth Estimate economic growth and implications of sustained growth for standard of living. Trends in economic growth in U.S. and.
1 Introduction to Macroeconomics Chapter 20 © 2006 Thomson/South-Western.
Chapter 10: Long-Run Economic Growth: Sources and Policies © 2008 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Economics R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick O’Brien,
Performance of World Economies Gavin Cameron Monday 25 July 2005 Oxford University Business Economics Programme.
Economic Growth: Malthus and Solow
Long Run Growth Chapter 26. Wide Variation in Income per Capita, 2000.
MACROECONOMICS AND THE GLOBAL BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT The Wealth of Nations The Supply Side.
Public Economics: Tax & Transfer Policies (Master PPD & APE, Paris School of Economics) Thomas Piketty Academic year Lecture 4: Income Taxes.
An Introduction to International Trade
Should the Rich Pay for Fiscal Adjustment? Income and Capital Tax Options Thomas Piketty Paris School of Economics Brussels, ECFIN Workshop, October 18.
Fighting inequality in society through tax policy Income and Capital Tax Options Thomas Piketty Paris School of Economics Brussels, Progressive Economy.
Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. Chapter 6 Economic Growth: Malthus and Solow.
Long-Run Economic Growth
12 Production and Growth.
GDP and the CPI: Tracking the Macroeconomy
Economic History : Capital, Inequality, Growth (Master APE & PPD, Paris School of Economics) Thomas Piketty Academic year Syllabus & Course Material.
Chapter 9 Economic Growth and Rising Living Standards
Technological Progress
Production and Growth Chapter 7.
Copyright © 2004 South-Western 12 Production and Growth.
Production and Growth Week-2 Pengantar Ekonomi 2.
The Global Economy The Production Function
Copyright © 2006 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. 4-1 The Theory of Economic Growth: The Solow Growth Model Reading: DeLong/Olney:
Long-Run Economic Growth
Reflections on Inequality and Capital in the 21 st century Thomas Piketty Paris School of Economics Miami, BHC-EBHA Meeting, June
1 Convergence and Divergence in the Global Economy University of Hull.
Public Economics: Tax & Transfer Policies (Master PPD & APE, Paris School of Economics) Thomas Piketty Academic year Lecture 1: Taxes & transfers:
Economic History (Master PPD & APE, Paris School of Economics) Thomas Piketty Academic year Lecture 7: Government intervention and the regulation.
Economic Growth The long run view. Why economic growth is important The society’s standard of living Ability to produce goods and services Within a country.
Economics of Inequality (Master PPD & APE, Paris School of Economics) Thomas Piketty Academic year Lecture 3: The dynamics of capital/income.
Economics of Inequality (Master PPD & APE, Paris School of Economics) Thomas Piketty Academic year Lecture 1: Income, capital and growth (Tuesday.
Macroeconomics Chapter 5
Macroeconomics Chapter 31 Introduction to Economic Growth C h a p t e r 3.
The Economic Picture Understanding the global economy Prof. Patrick GOUGEON, ESCP-EAP Understanding the economic system: “The circular flow” Understanding.
© 2007 Thomson South-Western. In this section, look for the answers to these questions: Why does productivity matter for living standards? What determines.
Global Economic Issues Gregory W. Stutes. Global Village Do we live in a global village? – Do events around the world affect us as quickly as if they.
Production Functions. Students Should Be Able To Use the Cobb-Douglas production function to calculate: 1. Output as a product of inputs 2. marginal and.
9 THE REAL ECONOMY IN THE LONG RUN. Copyright © 2004 South-Western 25 Production and Growth.
Prepared by: Jamal Husein C H A P T E R 10 © 2005 Prentice Hall Business PublishingSurvey of Economics, 2/eO’Sullivan & Sheffrin Measuring a Nation’s Production.
1 20 C H A P T E R © 2001 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 2/eO’Sullivan & Sheffrin Measuring a Nation’s Production and.
Ecological Economics Lectures 04 and 05 22nd and 26th April 2010 Tiago Domingos Assistant Professor Environment and Energy Section Department of Mechanical.
Macroeconomics Chapter 51 Conditional Convergence and Long- Run Economic Growth C h a p t e r 5.
Reflections on Inequality and Capital in the 21 st century Thomas Piketty Paris School of Economics Johannesburg, October
Economics of Inequality (Master PPD & APE, Paris School of Economics) Thomas Piketty Academic year Lecture 1: Income, capital and growth (Tuesday.
Macroeconomics Chapter 31 Introduction to Economic Growth C h a p t e r 3.
Inequality & Capitalism in the Long-Run Thomas Piketty Paris School of Economics HONG KONG, October 18 th 2013.
AP MACRO MR. LOGAN KRUGMAN MODULES ECONOMIC GROWTH & PRODUCTIVITY.
Reflections on Inequality, Capital and Carbon in the 21 st century Thomas Piketty Paris School of Economics Paris, November
Economics of Inequality (Master PPD & APE, Paris School of Economics) Thomas Piketty Academic year Lecture 4: From capital/income ratios to capital.
GDP and the CPI: Tracking the Macroeconomy Chapter 7 THIRD EDITIONECONOMICS and MACROECONOMICS MACROECONOMICS By Nimantha Manamperi.
Economics 302 Growth 2 Getting a Sense of Magnitudes Some Questions: 1.How large is the effect of a change in the saving rate on output in the long run?
Production and Growth  How economic growth differs around the world  Why productivity is the key determinant of a country’s.
THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 1. Questions How important is faster labor-growth as a drag on economic growth? How important is a high saving rate as a.
Chapter Production and Growth 12. Economic Growth Around the World Real GDP per person – Living standard – Vary widely from country to country Growth.
Reflections on Inequality and Capital in the 21st century
Reflections on Inequality and Capital in the 21st century
25 Production and Growth.
Econ 101: Intermediate Macroeconomic Theory Larry Hu
Presentation transcript:

  Economic History (Master APE & PPD, Paris School of Economics) Thomas Piketty Academic year 2015-2016 Lecture 1: Income, capital and growth since 1800: how did rich countries become rich ? (Tuesday September 8th 2015) (check on line for updated versions)

Introduction: three U-shaped curves (1) Global income inequality 1800-2015: divergence between Western and other countries during 19c & until mid 20c, convergence since 1980-1990 (reduction of inequality) (2) Within-country income inequality: in the US, income inequality rose since 1980 & is now back to the levels observed in early 20c : i.e. about 50% of national income for the top 10% (3) Capital/income ratio: in Europe & Japan, K/Y is almost back to the level observed in early 20c : i.e. about 500-600% for K/Y These three evolutions are partly related (world wars, decolonization, end of communism, globalization), but also invole country specific mechanisms: (1) largely due to internal evolutions of emerging countries ; (2) = mostly US trend; (3) mostly Europe and Japan (postwar recovery, demography) ; (2) and (3) could happen together everywhere in the future - or not One of the central objectives of this course is to better understand these long-run evolutions: how did rich countries get rich, and how do inequality and state formation interact?

Basic concepts: income and capital National income Y = domestic output Yd (NDP) + net foreign factor income Domestic output Yd (NDP = Net domestic product) = GDP (Gross domestic product) – capital depreciation Typically Y and Yd = about 85-90% GDP in rich countries today I.e. capital depreciation = about 10-15% GDP (but can be <5% in agrarian societies: low land depreciation rates as compared to buildings, equipment, computers, etc.) Net foreign factor income can be >0 (typically in countries with net foreign asset position > 0), or <0 (typically in countries with net foreign asset position < 0)

Net foreign asset position (NFA) = gross foreign assets (gross assets owned by the residents of a country in the rest of world) – gross foreign liabilities (debt) (gross assets owned by rest of the world in the country) Net foreign capital income = close to 0% of Yd in most rich countries (between +1-2% & -1-2% Yd) : right now, rich countries own approximately as much foreign assets in rest of the world as ROW owns in home assets, so that national income ≈ domestic output But this has not always been like this (colonial times); and it could change again: Germany and Japan – and China and oil producing countries – are currently accumulating large foreign assets position At the world level, net foreign income flows cancel out, so that national income Y = domestic output Yd

National income Y = Yd + r NFA Private capital (or private wealth) W = non-financial assets (real estate, family firms,..) + financial assets (equity, bonds, life insurance, deposits, cash, pension funds,..) – financial liabilities (debt) held by private individuals (households) (+non-profit inst.) Public capital (or public wealth) Wg = non-fin + fin assets – liabilities held by the government (all levels) National capital (or national wealth) Wn = W + Wg National wealth Wn = domestic capital K + net foreign assets NFA Domestic capital K = agricultural land + housing + other domestic capital (=structures, equipment, patents,.. used by firms & govt) Note that firms are valued at market prices through equity Private wealth/national income ratio β = W/Y National wealth/national income ratio βn = Wn/Y Domestic capital/output ratio βk = K/Yd At the world level, national wealth/national income ratio = domestic capital/output ratio; but at the country level, it can differ

Basic orders of magnitude in rich countries today National wealth Wn ≈ private wealth W (i.e. public wealth Wg ≈ 0) (or <0..) National wealth Wn ≈ domestic capital K (i.e. net foreign asset NFA ≈ 0) (but large gross foreign positions) National wealth Wn ≈ 500-600% of national income Y ≈ residential housing + other domestic capital (≈ 50-50) Typically, in France, UK, Germany, Italy, US, Japan: Per capita average income Y ≈ 30 000€ (= national income/population) Per capita average wealth W ≈ 150 000-180 000€ (=private wealth/pop) I.e. β = W/Y ≈ 5-6 YK = capital income = rent, dividend, interest, profits,.. α = YK/Y = capital share in national income ≈ 25-30% I.e. average rate of return r = α/β = 4-5% Basic accounting law: α = r x β → see Lecture 2 on the dynamics of β and α

Data about long-run growth Long run national accounts: see Maddison 2008 (and official series for recent decades); see this excel file See Capital…, chapters 1-2 Maddison: no data on capital stock See Piketty-Zucman; see Goldsmith

Facts & questions about long-run growth Fact 1: Convergence Convergence between poor and rich countries now seems well under way; but not over yet (?) Fact 2: Global growth slowdown in 21c Productivity growth is always slow for countries at the world technological frontier; once global catch-up process is over, growth might be low everywhere (?) Population growth seems to be →0 (or <0) (?)

Fact 1. Convergence Between 1900 and 1980, Europe + America ≈ 70-80% world GDP In 2013: down to about 50% (as in 1860) At some point during 21c: down to 20-30%, i.e. to the share of Europe + America in world population = convergence in per capita output and income But will convergence be over in 2030, 2060 or 2090? Nobody knows. Probably closer to 2030 in East Asia, and closer to 2090 in South Asia and Africa. Convergence occured mostly through domestic investment (not so much through foreign investment: emerging countries are not owned by rich countries… except Africa) Economic openness had a critical impact on development via free trade (specialization effect) and via diffusion of technology and know-how; but maybe not so much via free capital flows More on this below

Basic orders of magnitude to remember: World GDP 2012 = about 70 trillions € (i.e. 70 000 billions €) World population = about 7 billions Per capital GDP = about 10 000€ Per capital income = about 800€/month Rich countries = about 2000-3000€/month Poor countries = about 200-300€/month More inequality in income than in output, and in market exchange rates than in PPP

Fact 2. Growth slowdown Productivity growth is always slow for countries at the world technological frontier; once global catch-up process is over, growth might be low everywhere Population growth seems to be →0 (or <0) Average world growth 1700-2012: g=1,6%, including n=0,8% for population and h=0,8% for per capita output But 0,8% per year was enough to multiply world population (and average income) by a factor of 10 g = n + h with n = population growth and h = productivity growth In the very long run, maybe n ≈ 0% and h ≈ 1-1,5%, so that g=n+h≈1-1,5% Some economists are even less optimistic: long-run g<1% according to Gordon 2012

Per capita growth was exceptionally high in Europe and Japan in the 1950-1980 period (h=4-5% per year) because of a catch-up process with the US; but since 1980, per capital growth rates have been low in all rich countries In the very long, h=1% is already quite fast and requires permanent reallocation of labor (about one third of the economy is being renewed at each generation)

How did convergence happen? One possible view: with free markets and private property, everybody should become rich. The West first adopted these « institutions » (the rule of law and well-protected property rights) and became rich. Now that the rest of the world is following this strategy, everybody will become rich A bit simplistic: (1) Rising living standards in 20c came with the rise of government (tax revenues: 10% Y before WW1; 30-50% Y in all developed countries today). In order to understand development, one needs a broader view of institutions: public infrastructures, education, social welfare, economic and political democracy (2) Rise of the West over 1500-1900 period came with violence: key role of slavery, colonization, political domination. Not really peaceful institutions and rule of law…

(3) Free markets and private property led to extreme inequality and social tensions by 1900-1910 >>> nationalism, wars, communism >> the elites accept public regulation >>> reduction of inequality ( But complex legacy: different memories of post-WW2 exceptional period: high-growth egalitarian ideal in western Europe; « catch-up » period, except for US/UK (Reagan-Thatcher reaction); low-growth communist nightmare in Russia/China; decolonization period and mixed experience with state intervention; European colonial power replaced by US power system… until today

(4) Rise of emerging countries did not come from foreign invt.. Standard growth model: output cv, not income cv Learning to live with inequality: the dimensions of political conflict

The standard growth model (1) Output Y = F(K,L) with K = capital input (=non-human capital: buildings, equipment, robots, patents, etc.) and L = labor input (=human capital) Constant-returns-to-scale production function: F(µK,µL)=µF(K,L) → F(K,L) = L f(k) , with k = K/L = capital per labor unit and f(k) = F(K,L)/L=F(K/L,1) = output per labor unit Exemple: Cobb-Douglas production function: F(K,L)=Kα L1-α, i.e. f(k)=kα As k → ∞, marginal product of capital f’(k) → 0 : capital accumulation is not sufficient in itself to generate long-run growth; one also needs long-run population and/or productivity growth; see Solow 1956

The standard growth model (2) Steady-state growth path = everything grows at rate g Yt = F(Kt,Lt) = Y0 egt with Kt = K0 egt and Lt = L0 egt (all ratios are constant) The growth of labor input Lt = Nt x Pt can be decomposed into the growth of (employed) population Nt=N0ent and the growth of productivity Pt=P0eht I.e. g = n + h with n = population growth and h = productivity growth Convergence: standard growth model implies output convergence, not income convergence; possibility of persistent wealth inequality

The standard growth model (3) Where does population growth rate n come from? Fertility decisions, health conditions, etc. Where does productivity growth rate h come from? Human capital accumulation, educational institutions, innovations, etc. Endogenous growth literature = endogenizing g=n+h ; see e.g. Jones-Romer 2010 for a brief survey Steady-state capital-output ratio β=K/Y matters for output level, but not for output growth; same thing for employment rates Note: annual growth rates (Yt = Y0 (1+ga)t ) do not perfectly coincide with instantaneous growth rates (Yt = Y0 egt ): 1+ga = eg , i.e. ga ≈ g only if ga and g are small The advantage of instantaneous growth rates is additivity: g=n+h With annual growth rates, 1+ga = (1+ na) x (1+ha)