TPWS Deployment – Indian Railways

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Presentation transcript:

TPWS Deployment – Indian Railways Emerging trends in Train Protection Management and Electric Energy Management System July 2014

Rail Accidents.. Occurrence is Rare –Impact is Huge Trains potentially carry many people at high speed. They can travel in built up areas. They carry potentially huge volumes of hazardous material. Media Publicity, and society’s expectations of safety are very high for the railway. And Passenger Speed is ever increasing

Impact is Huge

Impact is Huge

ATP Preventable Accidents Worldwide, last 10 years Canada, Russell Hill Subway 1995 3 killed, 140 injured Australia, Hines Hill Train Collision 1996 2 killed, 1 injured UK, Watford Rail Crash 1 killed, 69 injured UK, Southall Rail Crash 1997 6 killed, >150 injured UK, Paddington Ladbroke Grove Rail Crash 1999 31 killed, >520 injured Australia, Glenbrook Train Disaster 7 killed, 51 injured Belgium, Pécrot Rail Crash 2001 8 killed, 12 injured Australia, Waterfall Train Disaster 2003 7 killed, 40 injured Japan, Amagasaki Rail Crash 2005 107 killed, 555 injured USA Chatsworth Metrolink Train Collision 2008 25 killed, 135 injured Germany, Hordorf Train Accident 2011 10 killed, 43 injured Argentina, Buenos Aires Rail Disaster 2012 51 killed, 703 injured Argentina, Buenos Aires Rail Collision 2013 3 killed, 315 injured Spain, Santiago de Compostela derailment 79 killed, 140 injured   340 People Killed, more than 3200 people injured

AWS – Low Cost Protection

AWS Operations Permanent Magnet on track alerts the onboard system Electromagnet on track indicates signal ahead is clear If signal ahead is not clear, driver receives a warning horn and he must acknowledge it The ‘sunflower’ indicator tells the driver he has received the warning and now he has full responsibility

TPWS (UK)

TPWS Operation Track positioned electronic loops OSS (Over Speed Sensor) loops are placed ‘1 second’ apart on approach to a signal A pair of loops positioned at the signal TSS (Train Stop System) will stop the train if it runs past the signal

Limitations of the Low Cost Options AWS – has only two states, so it can only relay to the driver ‘green’ or ‘not green’. Drivers can simply acknowledge out of habit and not react correctly AWS has no speed restriction capability TPWS has simple train overspeed sensing but only at fixed locations In any degraded mode, TPWS is isolated and ineffective AWS Limited UK TPWS Limited

Hence the emergence of ATP Essential component is a mechanism for continuously monitoring speed Early systems developed for HST in Sweden, Italy, Germany, France became the basis for pan European ETCS Several Levels of Implementation (allows an appropriate and staged degree of rollout) Several Modes of Operation (allows for various levels of protection)

Track to Train, Speed Monitoring, DMI & Brake Interface

Levels of Implementation ATP system has been overlaid on existing trackside installations. Train detection and Train integrity are performed by the existing interlocking. Lineside signals are retained, but interfaced to ERTMS balises situated at all signal locations. The trackside equipment is responsible for determining the available movement authority This is done at spot locations via balises, optionally at additional locations with infill balises, or continuously using radio or inductive loops. The on board equipment protects against overspeed, overrun and gives comprehensive information to the driver.

Levels of Implementation Digital radio-based system. Train detection and train integrity remain the responsibility of trackside equipment All trains automatically report their exact position and direction of travel to a Radio Block Centre (RBC) at regular intervals. Train movements are monitored continually by the radio block centre. The movement authority is transmitted to the vehicle continuously via GSM-R together with speed information and route data. Balises provide position reference information to the train

Levels of Implementation No trackside train detection or integrity proving is provided. The on board system is responsible for reporting train integrity. The Radio Block Controller continuously knows the speed and position of all trains. RBC implements a radio based train spacing methodology.

Modes of Operation Full supervision ETCS has all required information and can give full protection against overspeed and overrun Partial supervision Limited Supervision. Partial protection against over speed and over run, but the driver must observe and obey lineside signals. Unfitted – the line is not fitted with ETCS: the system will only observe master speed limit and train protection is left to older systems On Sight – the train has a movement authority but the track ahead may be occupied Staff Responsible – allows the driver to take full responsibility in an equipped area. The on board will monitor a ceiling speed only. Shunting Reversing

ERTMS Deployment Indian Railways TPWS Level 1: In operation across Europe, China, New Zealand and India. Level 2: Planned for the whole of Denmark. Deployed on a number of High Speed Lines in Europe and China. Level 3: Currently under development. “ERTMS Level 1 provides a consistent level of safety and protection. Levels 2 and 3 add better operational flexibility due to the fact that the radio block controller has knowledge of all the train positions and speeds. This allows better management of such functions as emergency stopping, boundaries for speed restrictions, and route cancellation”.

TPWS India in Action

On Board Cubicle

Drivers Display Over speed Brake Target Distance Numerical Actual Train Speed LED bar with colours of Speed Target value – Red Permitted Speed – Green Actual Speed - Yellow Brake intervention and Release Speed – Orange Mode Information (UN/SR/FS) Level information (1 or 0) Brake intervention SB or EB Acknowledgements Visual & audible warnings

TPWS South Implementation Customer Southern Railway, Chennai End User Southern Railway Scope Survey, Design, Supply, Installation and Commissioning of Car borne equipments and Line side equipments for Train Protection Warning System (TPWS) compliant to ETCS Level 1. Section Chennai Beach to Gummidipundi - Korukkupet to Chennai Central Number of stations 19 Length 50 Kms On-board equipment 82 EMUs Wayside equipment 150 Signals, 107 LEU, 323 Balises Commissioned on 02.05.2008

TPWS South - Availability Achieved between Jun 2012 and Dec 2013:

TPWS North Implementation Customer Indian Railways Project Management Unit End User Northern Railway, North Central Railway Scope Survey, Design, Supply, Installation and Commissioning of Loco Borne equipment and Line Side equipment for Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS) in H Nizamuddin - Agra Cantt section on Northern and North Central Railway. Section Agra Cantt – Hazarat Nizamuddin (INDIA) Number of stations 24 Length 192 Kms On-board equipment 35 Locomotives Wayside equipment 505 Signals, 107 LEU, 323 Balises, 303 Infill balises Commissioned on Baseline – 30/4/12, Infill in progress

TPWS North Project Status Completed training for 703 technicians and running staff of both NR and NCR. Regular trials at 110 kmph is conducted in 5 pairs of trains and ASTS engineers are manning four trains. Planning to complete the installation of additional, Infill balises before Nov 2014 Plan is underway to upgrade the lineside and on board configurations to allow for 160kph operation.

TPWS North Availability Monitoring

Actions and Approaches for Introduction Simple interface between TPWS system and wayside interlocking system – using spare contacts of an already operating lamp proving relay. Close cooperation and collaboration directly between the user (Southern Railway) and the supplier with committed support from the user. Effective training to the Loco pilots (Drivers) to enhance their understanding of the safety benefits and the operational requirements of the system and to gain acceptance. Consistent effort to ensure that all locos are fitted and running with TPWS supervision operational. Effective and timely feedback of TPWS failures to supplier engineer, and engineer rapid response to recover full operation of each train. Regular Foot Plate attendance by supplier engineer to directly observe and understand failures or failure reports. Routine, regular and correct preventive maintenance of trackside & onboard systems by supplier engineer. Effective spares holding, repairs and replacement management Routine monitoring of system availability with collaborative review to correctly allocate faults or incidents to root cause. Timely reply to the queries raised by Client.

Thank you for your Attention