Major Communications Cables - Points of Convergence - ATT Verizon British Telecom T-Mobile New York New York New York New York Chicago Chicago Chicago Chicago Los Angeles Los Angeles Los Angeles Los Angeles Salt Lake City Salt Lake City Salt Lake City Denver Denver Denver Phoenix Phoenix Phoenix Kansas City Kansas City Kansas City Atlanta Atlanta Atlanta Miami Miami Miami Washington DC Washington DC Washington DC Seattle Seattle Seattle San Francisco San Francisco San Francisco Dallas Dallas Dallas

Major Cable Convergence Points (Cont.) ATT Verizon British Telecom T-Mobile San Jose San Jose San Diego San Diego St Louis St Louis Orlando Orlando Boston Boston Newark Newark Houston Houston Philadelphia Philadelphia Nashville Cleveland Portland San Diego Las Vegas Detroit Charlotte NC Richmond Sunnyvale Burbank Tucson Tampa Eckington

Major Cable Convergence Points (Cont.) Amsterdam Amsterdam Amsterdam Frankfurt Frankfurt Frankfurt Paris Paris Paris London London London London Tokyo Tokyo Tokyo Tokyo Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong Singapore Singapore Singapore Stockholm Stockholm Sydney Sydney Toronto Redditch Sophia Antipolis Bangolor Shanghai Buenos Aires Copenhagen Rio De Janeiro Marseille Santiago Hamburg Lima Hanover Mexico City Nuremberg Bogota Zurich Mumbai Vienna ATT Verizon British Telecom T-Mobile

FISA Amendments Act Section 702 Operations

FAIRVIEW Sites

3 Global Public Service Telephone Network Switching System

The Phone System Knows What It’s Doing – Why Don’t U.S. Officials? FOREIGN TO FOREIGN 00 FOREIGN TO UNITED STATES00 UNITED STATES TO FOREIGN01 or 011 UNITED STATES TO UNITED STATES1 PHONE CALL (LANDLINE OR CELL) REQUIRED PREFIX STELLAR WIND

Both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are generally assigned in a hierarchical manner. Users are assigned IP addresses by Internet service providers (ISPs). ISPs obtain allocations of IP addresses from a local Internet Registry (LIR) or national Internet Registry (NIR), or from their appropriate Regional Internet Registry (RIR): RegistryArea Covered AfriNIC Africa Region APNIC Asia/Pacific Region ARIN North America Region LACNIC Latin America and some RIPE NCC Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia

Target Development and Discovery Zone of “Suspects” 2º of separation from “Knowns” Known Unknown Suspect

Focus of Analysis: One Degree and Two Degrees of Separation Known Bad Guy Suspected Bad Guys

Encryption – The key to Protecting the Privacy of U.S. Citizens Using encrypted identifiers of US individuals  Relationships can still be mapped  Communities can still be determined  Connections with known US or foreign targets can be traced  IC and/or LE analysts can look at any relationships without identifying protected persons  IC analysts cannot purposefully or accidentally access and analyze protected citizen data without probable cause  Identifying data can be decrypted for targeting, once criteria constituting probable cause are met  Civil liberties are protected while preserving the ability to detect terrorists and/or other activities

?<|{ Hollywood, FL Mohamed Atta Hollywood, FL Majed Moqed Daytona Beach, FL Marwan Alshehhi Hollywood, FL Hani Hanjour Hollywood, FL WANTED U.S. WANTED UNKNOWN U.S. PROTECTED Nawaf Alhazmi San Diego, CA Khalid Almihdhar San Diego, CA Mustafa Alhawsawi Dubai, UAE Ramzi Binalshibh Hamburg, Germany E Mullah Omar Kandahar, Afghanistan +^#* Hollywood, FL Hollywood, FL ){;?] %)/’| Daytona Beach, FL Ramzi Binalshibh Hamburg, Germany Mustafa Alhawsawi Dubai, UAE Discovering and Protecting - Guarding Privacy While Finding the Threat -

Community Transaction Timeline

Illegal Use of Private Information U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency/Special Ops Division

Illegal Use of Private Information - Masking the (Illegal) Source -