Sarit Kraus Bar-Ilan University

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Presentation transcript:

Sarit Kraus Bar-Ilan University

 Agents negotiating with people is important and useful  Developing proficient automated negotiators is challenging but possible

Opponent* model Human behavior models Take action 3 machine learning Optimization methods Data (from specific country)

4 4

 Buyers and seller across geographical and ethnic borders  Electronic commerce  Crowd-sourcing  Automated travel agents 5

7 Gertner Institute for Epidemiology and Health Policy Research 7

10

The development of standardized agent to be used in the collection of data for studies on culture and negotiation. 11

12

13  Results from the social sciences suggest people do not follow equilibrium strategies: ◦ Equilibrium based agents played against people failed.  People rarely design agents to follow equilibrium strategies. 13

 Irrationalities attributed to ◦ sensitivity to context ◦ lack of knowledge of own preferences ◦ the effects of complexity ◦ the interplay between emotion and cognition ◦ the problem of self control 14

 There are several models that describes people decision making: ◦ Aspiration theory.  These models specify general criteria and correlations but usually do not provide specific parameters or mathematical definitions.

Opponent* model Human behavior models Take action 16 machine learning Optimization methods Data (from specific country)

Amos Azaria, Zinovi Rabinovich, Sarit Kraus, Claudia V. Goldman, Ya’akov Gal 17

People and computers are self-interested, but also have shared goals My goal is to minimize fuel consumption 18 I want to get to work every day and try to minimize travel time

Opponent* model Human behavior models Take action 19 machine learning Optimization methods Data (from specific country)

A state is sampled and observed by Sender Sender sends his advice to Receiver Receiver receives advice and performs an action Both players receive their costs Two players: Sender and Receiver With some probability

Opponent* model Human behavior models Take action 21 machine learning Optimization methods Data (from specific country)

 We assume the user faces a multi-armed bandit problem where the advice is an extra arm.  While fully rational users would use methods such as epsilon-greedy or SoftMax, humans tend to use other methods.

Opponent* model Human behavior models Take action 23 machine learning Optimization methods Data (from specific country)

 Hyperbolic Discounting  Logit Qunatal Response: People choose actions proportionate to their expected utility. Problem: parameters

Opponent* model Human behavior models Take action 25 machine learning Optimization methods Data (from specific country)

Opponent* model Human behavior models Take action 27 machine learning Optimization methods Data (from specific country) Markov Decision Process

 C(r)= W* driving time(r) + (1-W)*fuel consumption(r)  Recommend r with the lowest cost  Determine W in simulations using the human’s model

 375 subjects from Mechanical Turk.  We used 6 different settings for our experiments.  95 subjects were used for the training data-set.  In some settings the fuel consumption and the travel time were independent.  The last settings were more realistic and the travel time and fuel consumption were based on real data.

 AMT has been studied for bias compared to other recruitment methods.  Our experience AMT workers are better than students  Our efforts:  Subjects were required to pass a test at start  The bonus given was relatively high and therefore significant to subjects  We have selected Turker's with high reputation  In multiple-choice questions tasks we intended to cut off all answers produced quicker than 10 seconds 31

Agents negotiating with people is important General opponent* modeling: machine learning human behavior model Challenging: how to integrate machine learning and behavioral model ? How to use in agent’s strategy? Challenging: experimenting with people is very difficult !!! Challenging: hard to get papers to AAMAS!!! Fun

 This research is based upon work supported in part by the ERC grant # and U.S. Army Research Laboratory and the U. S. Army Research Office under grant number W911NF