Swiss politics and political institutions: 2a) Federalism and Municipalities Prof. Dr. Andreas Ladner iMPA 2011

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | What is federalism all about?  Federalism is about organizing a territory  Federalism is about dealing with cultural differences  Federalism is about dealing with economic differences  Federalism is about organizing public services

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Territorial Challenges

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | 26 cantons and 2596 municipalities

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Inhabitants (7.8 Million) Quelle:

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | A center (capital city)?

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Cultural differences? The „Röschtigraben“The „Spaghettigraben“

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 |

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Source: Michael Hermann, Heiri Leutholt, sotomo

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | (Economic) Differences Alp Furna (GR)Zürich Paradeplatz (CS, UBS) BaselBerner Seeland

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | The rich and the poor

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Who does what?

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Program  Nation building without federalism would have been impossible in Switzerland.  Since then, however, things have changed considerably. The nation state has become much more powerful compared to the federal units, and complex patterns of cooperation emerged.  From the point of view of a political scientist we shall briefly analyze the functions and the functioning of Swiss federalism.  A special emphasis is put on the way Swiss federalism copes with challenges such as the increasing entanglement of the different layers of the state when it comes to the provision and funding of services, the growing disparities among the federal units, and the loss of sovereignty of the nation state due to globalization.

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Further readings  Ladner, Andreas (2010). "Intergovernmental relations in Switzerland: towards a new concept for allocating tasks and balancing differences", in: Michael J. Goldsmith and Edward C. Page (eds.). Changing Government Relations in Europe: From Localism to Intergovernmentalism. Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Science. pp ISBN  Ladner, Andreas (2009). "Local government and metropolitan regions in federal systems: Switzerland", in: Kincaid, John, Helen S. Meyner and Nico Steytler (eds.) A Global Dialogue on Federalism, Volume 6: Local Government and Metropolitan Regions in Federal Systems. McGill Queens University Press. p ISBN

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Content Block 2: Part 1: Federalism 1.Preliminary remarks about Swiss Federalism 2.Comparative Federalism 3.Swiss Federalism: instruments and functioning 4.A successful reform of Swiss Federalism

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | 1. Preliminary remarks about Swiss Federalism

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | | Diapositive 17 | “We could get everything much cheaper”

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | | Diapositive 18 |

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Cantonal identities

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | My conclusion  If there are no differences there is no need for federalism.  Federalism means accepting diversity. Do you agree?

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | 2. Comparative Federalism

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Confederations or unitarist states Alliance Federalism Unitary state Centrifugal state Centripetal state Co-operation Objectives: autonomy and diversity Objectives: integration and equality of living conditions Centralized organization in all domains Single purpose alliance (e.g. Nato) Confederation (e.g. EU) Confederal federal state (e.g. Canada, Switzerland, US) Unitary federal state (e.g. Germany, Austria) Decentralized unitary state (e.g. France) Centralized unitary state with centralized steering unit (communist republics) Quelle: Stalder, Kurt (1999). Föderalismus und Finanzausgleich. Schriftenreihe der Fachgruppe für kantonale Finanzfragen. Solothurn: Verlag FkF.

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Federalism and devolved governments  In confederal systems, the central government is a legal creation of the constituent units (see the two oldest countries US and CH). Important here is the autonomous constitutional existence.  In unitary systems, any regional governments are legal creations of the central institutions (devolution). Some unitary countries are more decentralized that some federations.  Unitary countries such as Colombia, Italy and Japan have relatively strong regional governments. France and Peru are moving towards significant devolution to elected regional governments. In some countries such as the UK there are some regions asking for devolution.

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Federalist countries

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Importance of Federalism  40 per cent of the world’s population  almost all democracies with large areas and/or populations are federal  democratization brings along federalism (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico)  with Belgium, Ethiopia and Spain formerly unitary countries become federalist  Federalism has been adopted in post-conflict democracies (Bosnia, Democratic republic of Congo, Iraq, Sudan, South Africa)  The EU has a number of federal characteristics Anderson (2008:1ff)

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | About 25 states

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Saint Kitts and Nevis

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | India

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | 29 La Belgique

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Kanada

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Common characteristics  At least two orders of government, one for the whole country and one for the regions with different elections  A written constitution with some parts which cannot be amended by the federal government alone  A constitution that formally allocates legislative and fiscal powers to the two orders of government ensuring some genuine autonomy for each order  Usually some special arrangements in the upper houses for the representation of the constituents units giving to smaller units greater weight than they would merit  An umpire procedure to rule on constitutional disputes between governments  A set of processes and institutions for facilitating or conducting relations between governments Anderson, George (2008). Federalism: an Introduction. Forum of Federations, Ontario: Oxford University Press.

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Names of the constituent units  States: Australia, Brazil, Ethiopia, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, US  Provices: Argentina, Canada, Pakistan, South Africa  Länder: Austria, Germany  Cantons: Switzerland  Regions, communities: Belgium  Autonomous communities: Spain  Regions, republics, autonomous areas, territories, cities: Russia

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Distinctive characteristics A.Territorial structure, disparities in terms of population and economy B.Division of tasks and services between the different levels C.Income and spending of the different levels D.Tax autonomy, tax system, formal and material harmonisation E.Role of the federal units in the decision making process of national level F.Financial disparities between the federal units and mechanism of equalization Stalder 1999: 3

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | The Constituent Units  From 2 (St. Kitts and Nevis, Bosnia-Herzegowina) to 50 (USA) or 86 (Russia)  The largest unit may be bigger than many countries (Uttar Pradesh in India: 160 million people, California: 34 million)  Some units may be very tiny: Nevis has only 12,000 people, AI has 15,000.  In some countries one or two units encompass the majority of the population (St. Kitts 75 %, Flanders 58 %, Punjab in Pakistan 56 %)  In other countries the largest unit constitute a small part of the population (California 12 %, Moscow 7 %, Zurich 17.3 %) Anderson (2008:14ff.)

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Important distinction  Symmetric federalism –All federal units have the same tasks, competences and resources  Asymmetric federalism –There are differences between the federal units, especially as far as their autonomy is concerned

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 |  Federations typically divide their territory into one main class of unit  Some federations have special territorial units with lesser constitutional status usually making them subject to the central government (the national capital district -> Washington DC; remote and thinly populated territories -> Canada; special tribal areas, overseas territories, Québec) Anderson (2008:16) Exemples

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Congruent versus incongruent federalism  Congruent: The federal units are ethnically and culturally similar to the state as a whole.  Incongruent: The federal units differ from each other. Each unit is more homogeneous than the state as a whole.

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Examples  Argentina, Austria, Australia, Brazil, Germany, Mexico, the United States have a clearly dominant language and relatively low levels of religious or ethnic diversity  In Switzerland, India, Canada, Ethiopia, Spain, Belgium or Russia the diversity is reflected in the composition of the constituent units. Anderson (2008:17f.)

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Who Does What and How? Basically two different approaches:  Dualist Models: Different jurisdictions are assigned to each order of government, which then delivers and administers its own programs (Canada, Brazil, US).  Integrated Models: Many shared competences and the constituent-unit governments often administer centrally legislated programs or laws (Germany, Austria, South Africa, Spain).  India and Switzerland have strong features of both. Australia is dualist in administrative arrangements, but has many areas of concurrency. Anderson (2008:21 ff.)

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Integrated Models (-> co-operative federalism)  For most subjects central government sets framework legislation that constituent units can complement with their own legislation.  In these areas the government of the constituent units delivers programs -> small civil service for central government  Challenge: Restricting the detail of central government policy making  Sometimes there is also joint decision making. Federal law must be approved by all constituent units (Germany)

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Dualist Models  Each order of government delivers programs in the area of its responsibility using its civil service and departments, the federal government is thus present throughout the country.  In all dualist constitutions there are some shared or concurrent powers (very few in Canada and Belgium, many in Australia). Where powers are concurrent, federal power is usually but not always paramount.

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Patterns of distribution of power in different policy area  Defence: always federal sometimes constituent units (CU)  Treaty ratification: almost always federal, sometimes CU  Major physical infrastructure: usually federal, sometimes concurrent, joint or shared or CU  Primary and secondary school: usually CU, occasionally concurrent, rarely federal  Post secondary education and research: no clear pattern  Pensions: either concurrent, joint, shared or federal  Health care: usually CU, sometimes concurrent, joint or shared  Police: usually shared, occasionally concurrent or joint, rarely federal or CU joint = to orders make concurrent decisions; concurrent = both make laws in defined areas; shared = different legal powers, decisions are made independently

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Residual Power  In bottom-up federations residual power is in the hands of the constituent units  In federations that emerged from previously unitary regimes, residual power is in the hands of the federal state

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Relationship between the federal units  Competitive federalism –There is competition between the different federal units to the benefit of the citizens (exit, voting by feet)  Solidary federalism –Compensation of disadvantages among the federal units, equalization systems, co-operation.

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Competition  Many economist argue that a federation should minimize the extent to which constituent units use tax competition to influence companies and individuals to locate in a particular area (limited control over mobile taxpayers). Danger: downward spiral of tax rates, loss of revenues, focus on other taxes.  Some economist favour fairly extensive tax competition because they believe it can promote better services (Anderson 2008: 31).

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Different revenue and spending arrangements  In some countries, the central government dominates the levying and collection of revenues as well as the delivery of programs.  In other countries, the constituent units play a more important role in the collection of revenues and their expenditures are larger.

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Central-government revenues relative to total government revenues

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Central-government direct spending relative to total government spending

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Public expenditures in Switzerland

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 |

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Transfers to constituent units  In all countries central government raises more revenue than it spends for its own needs.  Some transfers are unconditional, others are conditional (and for example promote the achievement of national purposes or standards).

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Central transfer relative to constituent-unit spending

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Tax system  Income tax and value added tax  Which shares go to the different tiers?  Who decides on the tax rate?

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Income tax SchweizKanadaUSADeutschlandÖsterreich Einkommenssteuer (Lohnsteuer) Einziehende Stelle Bund, Kantone, Gemeinden Bund, ProvinzenBund, Staaten Steuerverbund (Gemein- schaftssteuer) Bund Anteil Bund Anteil Gliedstaatenca Anteil lokale Ebeneca Steuerföderalis- mus Bund regelt Steuerbasis und Progression, über die Höhe entscheiden Provinzen Steuerföderalis- mus harmonisiert (Verteil- schlüssel) Nach Stalder 1999, eigene Ergänzungen

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | VAT SchweizKanadaUSADeutschlandÖsterreich Wahrenumsatz- steuer Anteil Bund Anteil Gliedstaaten Anteil lokale EbeneSpezialsteuern Weitere Umsatzsteuern VerteilungVerteilschlüssel Nach Stalder 1999, eigene Ergänzungen

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Revenue structure

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Disparities between constituent units  The wealth of constituent units within federation differs greatly, affecting their ability to raise own-source revenue.  Most federations have provisions for dealing with these differences through transfers.  There is a great variety in the design and the underlying principles for these transfers.

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Different redistribution systems  Usually there are transfers from central government to the constituent units. In Switzerland and Germany there also transfers from richer to poorer constituent units.  What is the aim of the equalization: minimal standards, same level, within a range, super-equalization?  The importance of unconditional transfers in equalization programs varies.  Conditional transfers can also include equalization considerations.  Central government spending (investments) in specific areas can also have a equalizing effect.

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Vertical Relations In federations the two houses the parliament  are constituted on different representative principles, with one chamber (usually the upper house) using a formula based on constituent units whereas the system for the lower house is closer to the representation by population  are elected or namend in different ways  can have quite similar or distinct powers

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Bundesrat (Germany)  Probably the most distinct Upper House  Länder delegates are not elected but named by their governments and officially led by their minister- presidents  Legislation that affects the Länder must be approved by the Bundesrat

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Representation in the Upper House  Equal number of members from each full constituent units: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Nigeria, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland  Unequal number with weight given to population: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Ethiopia, Germany, India

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Power of the Upper House  US: Senate has all power of the House of Representatives, but it alone approves key appointments, declarations of war and treaties.  Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Switzerland: absolute veto power  Germany: Veto over matters affecting Länder and suspensive veto over other matters  India, Nigeria: veto of the Upper House can be overridden in a joint sitting of the two Houses  Austria, Malaysia, Spain: Suspensive veto only  Canada: extensive legal powers but only uses them to revise and delay  Belgium: Veto on all matters that can affect the federal system.

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | 3. Swiss Federalism: Instruments and Functioning

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | The basic characteristics of Swiss Federalism  The existence of the cantons is guaranteed  The cantons are free to organize themselves internally  The cantons elect their own authorities  The cantons dispose of far reaching competences  The cantons dispose of their own financial resources  There is no political control ruling over the cantons  The cantons participate equally in the decision making process on federal level

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | The institutions of Swiss Federalism  Vertically: Participation of the cantons in the decision making on national level  Horizontally: Co-operation between the cantons Neidhart, Leonard: Föderalismus in der Schweiz. Zürich: Benzinger, 1975

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Horizontal institutions  Treaties between cantons (Konkordate)  Conference of high civil servants and directors  The conference of the cantonal governments  Regional governmental conferences

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | The House of the Cantons in Bern

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Vertical institutions:  The second chamber in the Parliament („Ständerat“)  The majority of the cantons which is needed to change the Constitution („Ständemehr“)  The right of the cantons to launch an initiative  The possibility of eight cantons can launch a referendum  The possibility to call for a joint assembly of the two chambers of Parliament  The role played by the cantons in the pre- parliamentary decision making process  The execution of federal policies by the cantons

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | The Council of States

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Party composition of the Council of States

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | The National Council

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Party composition of the National Council

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | The majority of the people versus the majority of the cantons

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | The Council of the States and the majority of the cantons: an increasing disequilibrium  One person from Appenzell Innerrhoden = 35 people from Zurich  Theoretically about 9 percent of the citizens can block a political project, in reality this percentage, however ist higher (20 – 25 percent or even higher) Do you know about similar problems in other countries? Are there any solutions to solve the problem?

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | 4. A successful reform of Swiss Federalism

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | „The Reform of financial equalization and task allocation (RET)”

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Problems of the old system 1.Increasing centralization, cantons and municipalities are increasingly concerned with the execution of federal projects 2.Increasing inequalities between the cantons 3.Opacity of the transfer system 4.„Violation of basic principles of political economy and fiscal federalism“

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Goals of the new system  Modernizing and strengthening Swiss Federalism through clearer assignment of tasks and disentangled of responsibilities between the federal state and the cantons.  Increasing the performance of the equalization system and decreasing the cantonal differences as far as the financial resources and the tax burden is concerned.  Making the provision of public services more efficient through a more modern form of co-operation between the different layers of the state and through a stronger inter- cantonal co-operation.

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Expected efficiency gains At the beginning of the reform project: about 3 billion Swiss francs (vgl. Klöti 2000: 20)

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Four instruments to achieve the above mentioned goals: 1.A disentanglement of tasks and financial responsibilities 2.New forms of co-operation and funding 3.A more encompassing inter-cantonal co-operation with an equalisation of the financial burden 4.A new financial equalisation scheme

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | How can these goals best be achieved?

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | 1. Disentanglement of tasks and financial responsibilities Disentanglement of tasks: 15 task will be entirely assigned to the cantons, 6 tasks will be entirely assigned to the federal state.  The guiding principle for the assignment of tasks is the principle of subsidiarity.  In the course of the disentanglement of the funding of public services conditional grants are abolished as well as payments depending on the financial situation of the cantons. The new financial equalisation scheme (see beyond) will provide the cantons with more freely spendable resources (unconditional transfers).  -> These changes should stop the increasing centralisation, increase the responsibilities of the cantons and provide them with more unbound financial resources.

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Tasks which will entirely fall into the realm of the federal state

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Tasks which will entirely fall into the realm of the cantons

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | 2. New forms of co-operation and funding  In spite of the effort to disentangle public functions there still remain a number of shared tasks.  In general, the Confederation will be responsible for the definition of strategies, the cantons for their execution.  Through this differentiation cantons will be able to decide for themselves on the way a specific public good or service should be produced to meet the citizens’ demands.  Instead of subsidies the cantons will receive global transfers based on the services they provide (products).

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Shared Tasks

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | 3. A more encompassing inter-cantonal co-operation with an equalisation of the financial burden  In a number of sectors inter-cantonal cooperation can be declared mandatory. Among those sectors are universities, special health care institutions, cultural institutions and public transportation in urban areas.  The general conditions for mandatory inter-cantonal cooperation define a well qualified majority of the cantons (eighteen) which can ask the Confederation to declare inter-cantonal cooperation mandatory.  A inter-cantonal equalisation of financial burdens guarantees the principle of fiscal equivalence.

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Newly organized domains of inter-cantonal co-operation

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | 4. The new financial equalisation scheme  On the financial side, the equalization of resources will guarantee a minimal amount of income to each canton.  In the new system, the former “index of financial strength” is replaced by a “resource indicator”. The resource indicator measures the financial capacity of the cantons, or, technically spoken, their resource potential.  The resource indicator is calculated on the basis of taxable income and wealth of the natural persons (inhabitants) and the profits of the juristic persons (business, firms, enterprises). These elements reflect the economic situation in the cantons more accurately than does the current system.

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | –Resource equalization is accompanied by cost compensation. The mountain regions on one side and the cantons with central cities on the other are confronted with specific production costs that cannot be compensated by resource equalization. Therefore, the reform of financial equalization and task allocation includes two specific instruments. –The geographic and topographic cost compensation takes into consideration the specific production cost of mountainous cantons due to the steepness of their surface as well as to the low density of their population. Examples for such additional cost are snow removal, expensive road construction, avalanche protection and so on. –With the socio-demographic cost compensation cantons with high per capita cost for social welfare and infrastructure resulting from central city problems will be compensated. In central cities there is usually a concentration of poor, elderly and unemployed people as well as immigrants and addicts. In addition, these regions have higher expenditure on services such as public security and public transportation. Cost compensation

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | The compensation schemes

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Compensation in cases of hardship  RET is designed to be neutral as far as the cost for the Federal state and the Cantons are concerned.  However, a political fund was needed (for the next 28 years) in order to prevent some poorer cantons to be even worse off in the new system (“political fund”).  Two thirds of the money come from the national state, one third from the cantons.

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | The differents steps of the reform

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | 64.4% Yes- and 35.6% No-votes, accepting cantons 18 5/2, refusing 2 ½ (ZG, SZ and NW) Step 1: Constitutional changes

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 18 April 1999 (Status as of 7th March 2010) The cantons and the assignment of their tasks New:

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 |. Duties of the Confederation and the Cantons

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | New: Principles for the allocation and fulfilment of state tasks

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | New: Inter-cantonal agreements and co-operation

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Step 2 Two years after the vote (Flims 2006) the Parliament accepted the necessary changes of about 30 federal laws. No referendum was launched against these changes.

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Step 3: How much money goes into the different „compensation baskets“?

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 |  2,5 billion  -> 72,5 percent(1,8 billion) for the vertical equalisation of the resources  27,5 percent (682 million) for cost compensation.  The contribution of the strong cantons in terms of resources amounts to 70 percent (about 1,26 billion.) of the vertical resource compensations.  The fund for cases of hardship paid by two thirds by the national state and one third by the cantons and amounts to 430 million for the first eight years. Money initially promised (Federal Proposition of December 2006):

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | First message 2001

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| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Final decisions  Parliament accepts the transfers suggested in 2007  The new scheme starts on January 1, 2008

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| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Finanzausgleich: Ausgleichszahlungen für 2011 errechnet  Bern, Die Eidgenössische Finanzverwaltung (EFV) hat die fälligen Ausgleichszahlungen der einzelnen Kantone für das Jahr 2011 ermittelt.  Für das Jahr 2011 stellen der Bund und die ressourcenstarken Kantone insgesamt 3,635 Milliarden Franken zugunsten der ressourcenschwachen Kantone zur Verfügung. Weitere 705 Millionen stellt der Bund für Kantone mit Sonderlasten bereit. Der Betrag für den Härteausgleich in der Höhe von rund 366 Millionen bleibt gemäss Finanzausgleichsgesetz (FiLaG) gegenüber 2010 unverändert. Damit stehen für den Finanzausgleich nächstes Jahr insgesamt rund 4,702 Miliarden in Form zweckfreier Mittel zur Verfügung.

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Evaluation -> Wirksamkeitsbericht des Finanzausgleichs zwischen Bund und Kantonen 2008 bis 2011; Vernehmlassung

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Minimal availability of resources after equalisation : 85 percent

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Metropolitan Regions

| ©IDHEAP – | | 30/06/2015 | Thank you for your attention!