Electoral Competition and Accountability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of China’s Village Elections Hiroki Takeuchi Department of Political Science University of California, Los Angeles Presentation prepared for the 2007 EITM Workshop University of California, Los Angeles, July 20, 2007

Electoral Competition and Accountability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of China’s Village Elections I. Motivation II. Null Hypothesis III. Premises IV. Conclusion

Motivation (1) Field Research  40 villages across seven provinces Literature  Many cases, few theories

Motivation (2): Anecdotes Vice Party Secretary of R Town in Hunan Province “Candidates in the village elections in our town never carry on a campaign. So we don’t have a problem of ‘buying votes’ (mai piao). No campaign, no corruption.” Chief of D Village in Hebei Province “I did nothing during the last election. I felt that I did not have to be Village Chief as I had already been Village Party Secretary. But villagers nominated me for candidacy and I was elected.”

Motivations (3): Observations Competitive elections are often corrupt. Village cadres elected by competitive and corrupt elections often do not provide public goods. Village cadres who provide public goods are often elected by non-competitive elections.

Null Hypothesis  Electoral competition holds candidates accountable to the electorate. Competition brings uncertainty of an electoral result. The uncertainty gives candidates an incentive to campaign. Candidates are held accountable to the electorate.

The Institutional Setting Organic Law Established in 1988 and revised in 1998 Article 14: Each election must be contested. Village Governmental Organizations Villagers’ Committee (VC) Village Party Branch (VPB) VPB > VC

Premises Candidates seek to win the election. Some elections are competitive and others are not. A village is a small community (b < c).  Campaigning is not effective to win an election.  The number of votes needed to win is small.

Parameters w = a candidate’s benefit from winning an election c = a candidate’s cost of campaigning b = a candidate’s cost of buying votes p = the probability that candidate 1 will win when both candidates take the same strategy.

Candidate 2 CampaigningBuying VotesDoing Nothing Campaigning (1 – p)w – c pw – c w – b –c 0 w – c Candidate 1Buying Votes –c w – b (1 – p)w – b pw – b 0 w – b Doing Nothing w – c 0 w – b 0 (1 – p)w pw

Conclusion of the Model Electoral competition may raise the probability of a vote-buying candidate’s win. The increase in b may lower the probability of a vote-buying candidate’s win.

The Future for Expanding Township Elections? (Increase in b) b > c Voters do not know candidates personally. Candidates have an incentive to campaign to sway voters. Electoral competition will hold candidates accountable to their policy proposals through campaigning. Elected cadres will be less accountable to higher authorities or the Party organization.

Conclusion: Limits of Election under an Authoritarian Regime The Chinese Communist Party has encouraged elections at the village level but hesitated to introduce elections for higher levels. It is because candidates and local cadres will be truly accountable to the electorate, not to the Party, once elections are introduced above the village level.