Hey, You, Get Off of My Cloud: Exploring Information Leakage in Third-Party Compute Clouds By Thomas Ristenpart Eran Tromer Hovav Shacham Stefan Savage.

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Presentation transcript:

Hey, You, Get Off of My Cloud: Exploring Information Leakage in Third-Party Compute Clouds By Thomas Ristenpart Eran Tromer Hovav Shacham Stefan Savage Presented by Clint Sbisa Ionut Trestian

Amazon specific Only shows that the mapping, etc. works on Amazon EC2, and says that it generalizes to Azure, etc.-- but does not show this Example (Google Cloud Service)  Single process, no long running queries, no local file access, no network access  The delivery vehicle is the web browser. The data that is created goes right into big table.

Amazon specific The attacks depend on Amazon offering services Determining the internal IP address associated to a service – traceroute not so precise How does the accuracy of mapping change with an increase in the number of zones Can attack only 'small' instances as shown in paper

Amazon specific Provider can implement better monitoring and scaling mechanisms Cloud provider can monitor CPU/network usage of collocated VMs and make sure a single one doesn't hog a resource Many different types of applications run on EC2-- paper focuses only on web services/applications

Error-prone Co-residency checks (over covert channels) relies entirely on only two active VMs, which might lead to errors with more than two Many other methods outlined in the paper are also very vulnerable to noise

Targeting methods Paper assumes VMs are running web services, etc.-- focused attack methods (based on recently launched VMs) will not work on services they cannot access easily (or at all)

Cost Shows nothing about the cost of running such attacks Running so many instances of VMs with hourly billing, network usage, etc. might add up in price Low accuracy of method makes for a higher price, simple changes by Amazon (acknowledged in the paper) can increase the price even higher

Attacks - exaggerated Estimating traffic rates Requesting 3 megabytes text files, what web pages are that big? Web sites are usually much more complex, not single large files Keystroke timing attack Completely idle? Demonstration not on EC2 instances When do you know when someone is using SSH?

Thank you !