BEIJING BRUSSELS CHICAGO DALLAS FRANKFURT GENEVA HONG KONG LONDON LOS ANGELES NEW YORK SAN FRANCISCO SHANGHAI SINGAPORE TOKYO WASHINGTON, D.C. S IDLEY.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
WTO AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE: LEGAL AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
Advertisements

State of WTO Agricultural Negotiations Meeting on the Integrated Assessment of Trade Liberalization in the Agriculture Sector February 2003 Note:
North American Free Trade Agreement
Overview ___________________________ Russian Dual Pricing Practices Russian Dual Pricing Practices Russia and the WTO Russia and the WTO Dual Pricing.
Global Sugar Policy Reform John Beghin and Amani El-Obeid Economics and CARD Iowa State University Silverado Symposium on Agricultural Policy Reform University.
Agriculture Negotiations in the WTO Dr Biswajit Dhar Professor and Head Centre for WTO Studies Indian Institute of Foreign Trade New Delhi WTO Cell, IIFT.
Chile Economics and food industry Indicators. General Indicators Population 17.4 millions Employed 7.7 millions Unployement 6.1% GDP USD 263,697 Inflation.
Doing Business in Korea October 22, 2008 Ken Nye, Commodity Specialist Michigan Farm Bureau.
Agriculture in the Republic of Moldova. Overview Impact on economic growth – 38% Agricultural lands – 2498,0 thousands ha (73,8%) including: including:
Origins of WTO General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) –Established in 1947 as a forum to reduce trade barriers WTO replaced GATT in 1995 as legal.
Subsidies in Agriculture – are they good/bad? MERC SEMINAR 10 September 2009 By Bonani Nyhodo (NAMC)
WTO AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS Portfolio Committee Agriculture and Land Affairs April 2003 Günter Müller Directorate: International Trade National Department.
Protecting Our Food But Leaving Our Harvest? Srividhya Ragavan University of Oklahoma Law Center.
1 [Giovanni Anania, IAAE Congress, Durban, August 2003] The Fischler reform of the CAP and the WTO negotiations Giovanni Anania Department of Economics.
The Doha Endgame SS Economics of Food Markets Alan Matthews.
The Instruments of Trade Policy
The EU’s CAP and the likely impact of a Doha Agreement Lecture 24. Economics of Food Markets Alan Matthews.
Chapter 8 The Instruments of Trade Policy
AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORM IN THE WTO The Road Ahead.
BEIJING BRUSSELS CHICAGO DALLAS FRANKFURT GENEVA HONG KONG LONDON LOS ANGELES NEW YORK SAN FRANCISCO SHANGHAI SINGAPORE TOKYO WASHINGTON, D.C. The Role.
Agri-Trade Subsidies: Recommendations to WTO Maxwell WTO Team: Maithreyi Seetharaman & Han Sic Cho.
U.S. Cotton Perspective The Next Steps for Africa October 26, 2006 Woodrow Wilson Center Washington, DC.
Farm Programs and the Economics of LDC Cotton Presented at the “International Conference on Cotton: The Next Steps for Africa” Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington.
What’s Ahead for the Central California Grower December 9, 2004 Fresno, California Presented By By Mechel S. Paggi & Fumiko Yamazaki Director, Center for.
The Economics and Politics of U.S. Agricultural Policy James Dunn Pennsylvania State University.
Andrew Percival Special Counsel European Lawyers Conference - Trade Relations between Australia and Europe.
The U.S. and World Sugar Industries under the EU and DOHA Trade Liberalization Won W. Koo   Chamber of Commerce Distinguished Professor and Director  
Sugar Policy in the United States: Pressures For Reform, Lessons From Europe German Marshall Fund November 10, 2005 Thomas Earley Executive Vice President.
Climate Finance. Two main issues Where to get the money? How to spend the money?
Trade Remedy Laws and Agriculture Anita Regmi David Skully 1 Paper presented at the Free Trade Area of the Americas, The WTO, and New Farm Legislation:
Directorate for Food, Agriculture, and Fisheries 1 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATION DE COOPÉRATION ET DE DEVELOPMENT.
School of International Trade and Economics, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies 广东省精品课程《国际贸易》 CH11 Export Promotion and other Economic Policies.
Alan Matthews UNECE Executive Forum May 2004 Implications of enlargement for agricultural trade Alan Matthews Trinity College Dublin Ireland.
WTO Disciplines and Biofuels: Opportunities and Constraints in the Creation of a Global Marketplace Presented at: World Bank – Rural Day 9 November, 2006.
Dumping (I) No prohibition: generic condemnation. Anti-Dumping Agreement. No duty of enacting anti-dumping legislation and adopting anti-dumping measures.
South Africa Agricultural Situation Economic Highlights Five year average real GDP growth of 3.7%, higher then the world average of 3.3% but lower.
(c) Kiyoun Sohn, I How to Deal with Countervailing Duty Cases in the Future? Professor Kiyoun SOHN University of Incheon.
Agreement on Anti-Dumping Measures Anti - Dumping Importers would like to import goods if available at a price lower than that of the good in the importing.
1 Nepal’s WTO Membership and the Agriculture Sector Navin Dahal South Asia Watch on Trade Economics and Environment.
WTO rules on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Prof. Gan Ying 12-Feb-2008.
BEIJING BOSTON BRUSSELS CHICAGO DALLAS FRANKFURT GENEVA HONG KONG HOUSTON LONDON LOS ANGELES NEW YORK PALO ALTO SAN FRANCISCO SHANGHAI SINGAPORE SYDNEY.
Chapter 11 Pushing Exports.
Ministry of Agriculture LATVIA Agricultural reform in Europe: 2013 and beyond May 14, 2008 Tallinn.
1 Cal-Med Consortium Workshop Domestic Policies and Mediterranean Products Washington - December 7 and 8, 2006 Domestic Policy Reform in the EU: What is.
SANDLER, TRAVIS & ROSENBERG, P.A. An International Trade & Business Practice CCBFA Seminar Program The Impact of Antidumping and Countervailing Duties.
International Policy Live in a global economy where: –Interdependence means that any policy decisions made by one country has a impact on the U.S. –Many.
A Basic Primer on Trade Policy A Basic Primer on Trade Policy Dr. Andrew L. H. Parkes “Practical Understanding for use in Business” 卜安吉.
The Economics and Politics of U.S. Agricultural Policy James Dunn Pennsylvania State University.
April 17, The Midterm Review of the CAP Issues and options Franz Fischler.
Subsidies No clear rules and no prohibition in GATT 1947 (notification and negotiation about limiting subsidies). Tokyo Round Subsidies Code. Revision.
AG -1 © WTO – OMC 2012 The WTO Agreement on Agriculture Serafino Marchese, Chief, Training and Capacity Building Section WTO Institute for Training and.
BEIJING BRUSSELS CHICAGO DALLAS FRANKFURT GENEVA HONG KONG LONDON LOS ANGELES NEW YORK SAN FRANCISCO SHANGHAI SINGAPORE TOKYO WASHINGTON, D.C. Dawn raids.
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT TOTAL (trillion $) PER CAPITA ($/person) WORLD37.07,600 U.S ,300 France1.525,400 Spain0.818,900.
BEIJING BRUSSELS CHICAGO DALLAS GENEVA HONG KONG LONDON LOS ANGELES NEW YORK SAN FRANCISCO SHANGHAI SINGAPORE TOKYO WASHINGTON D.C. Todd J. Friedbacher.
Brazil’s Challenge to the U.S. Cotton Subsidies
Sino-US Agriculture Trade and WTO Negotiations (Draft) Embassy of China, P.R. Weining Zhao March, 2005.
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade Major Provisions of GATT: 1.Tariff: GATT obligates each country to accord nondiscriminatory, most favored nation.
Manila, June Fisheries in the WTO. Manila, June DDA and Fisheries Main centre of interest to fisheries and aquaculture are negotiations.
WTO Status of Negotiation, July 2004 Framework... and Beyond Debra Henke USDA/ Foreign Agricultural Service.
1 Impact of Agricultural Trade Liberalization Between the EU and Mediterranean Countries: the case of the Tomato Processing Industry Document prepared.
Sophie Drogué UMR Economie Publique INRA-INAPG Istambul 9-12 may 2005
The EU’s CAP and the likely impact of a Doha Agreement
Blockchain – The Next Great Disruptor?
The Potential Impact of the Doha Round on Grains
The 2007 Farm Bill: More of the Same or a New Path?
Stephen J. Powell & Dr. Andrew Schmitz University of Florida
The WTO-Agreement on Agriculture
The EU-US Agricultural Framework Agreement
The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM)
Presentation transcript:

BEIJING BRUSSELS CHICAGO DALLAS FRANKFURT GENEVA HONG KONG LONDON LOS ANGELES NEW YORK SAN FRANCISCO SHANGHAI SINGAPORE TOKYO WASHINGTON, D.C. S IDLEY SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP EC Agricultural Subsidies for Mediterranean Products and the WTO June 2006 Montpellier, France

S IDLEY SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP The WTO Agreement on Agriculture Green Box –Single Farm Payment not green box because of fruit and vegetable restriction Blue Box –Less important after 2003 reform (if SFP is notified as green box) Amber Box –EC AMS limit is € 67.2 billion –Applied AMS is far lower, reforms in 1999 and 2003 Notified Export Subsidies –Still important for sugar, dairy, pigmeat, rice and alcohol –Declining use for other products

S IDLEY SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ( SCM Agreement ) Disciplines the provision of subsidies by WTO Members –Prohibited Subsidies Local content subsidies Unscheduled export subsidies –Actionable Subsidies Any subsidy that involves a financial contribution that confers a benefit and is specific

S IDLEY SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP Prohibited Subsidies Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement Except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture, the following subsidies … shall be prohibited: (a) subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon export performance…; (b) subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported goods.

S IDLEY SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP Prohibited Subsidies Prohibited Fruit and Vegetable Processing Subsidies 2005 Outlays in millions: Tomato Products € 298 Canned Peaches € 20 Citrus Products € 261 Canned Pears € 15 Raisins € 114 Dried Figs € 1.6 Dried Plums € 45 Total - € 755 million “harvested in the Community”Subsidies are contingent on the use of products “harvested in the Community” for the production of the processed products.

S IDLEY SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP EC GrowerProcessor payments subsidized products supervision Prohibited Subsidies Processing subsidies for tomatoes, peaches, pears, citrus fruits and raisins

S IDLEY SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP Prohibited Subsidies EC ProcessorGrower payments products supervision Processing subsidies for prunes and figs minimum price

S IDLEY SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP Prohibited Subsidies Title III of the Wine CMO includes distillation subsidies, private storage aid, and aid for the use of must Title III expenditures in millions Distillation Subsidies€ 512 Private Storage Aid€ 67 Aid for the Use of Must€ 156 Total – € 735 million Article 78(3) of the Wine CMO: “may only be granted in respect of products produced in the Community from grapes harvested in the Community.” The subsidies “may only be granted in respect of products produced in the Community from grapes harvested in the Community.”

S IDLEY SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP Actionable Subsidies Article 5 of the SCM Agreement No Member should cause, through the use of any subsidy … adverse effects to the interests of other Members, i.e.: (a) injury to the domestic industry of another Member … (c) serious prejudice to the interests of another Member

S IDLEY SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP Injury to the Domestic Industry Article 5(a) of the SCM Agreement is similar to a CVD proceeding under Part V of the SCM Agreement For a determination of injury there must be: –Imports of a subsidized product –Material injury to the domestic industry producing the like product –A causal link between the subsidized imports and material injury to the domestic industry. Examples of Potential Claims –EC canned peach exports to the United States –EC olive oil exports to Morocco

S IDLEY SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP Serious Prejudice Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement: Serious prejudice in the sense of paragraph (c) of Article 5 may arise in any case where one or several of the following apply: (a) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede … imports … into the market of the subsidizing Member; (b) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede … exports … from a third country market; (c) the effect of the subsidy is significant price undercutting … or significant price suppression, price depression or lost sales in the same market; (d) the effect of the subsidy is an increase in the world market share of the subsidizing Member…

S IDLEY SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP Serious Prejudice Components of Serious Prejudice: –Level of EC subsidization –EC market share –Nature of EC subsidies (and reform) –EC costs and returns –EC tariff levels and other import barriers (e.g. SPS) –Product differentiation issues

S IDLEY SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP Serious Prejudice: Fresh Fruits and Vegetables Operational Funds for Producer Organizations –Expenditures are between € 500 million to € 700 million per year –Their purpose is to improve product quality and boost products’ commercial value –Where is this money going? Which products are benefiting? Compensation for Withdrawals –Which products are receiving these funds? Processing subsidies –Do processing subsidies benefit the market for fresh fruits and vegetables?

S IDLEY SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP Serious Prejudice: Tomato Products Canned Tomatoes Tomato Paste Tomato Sauce/ Ketchup Value of World Exports$224 million$869 million$320 million EC Exports as % world total84 percent38 percent17 percent Imports as % world total13 percent14 percent3 percent Production as % world total70 percent36 percentNA Estimated value of EC market$900 million$980 millionNA EC Support Import Tariffs14.4 percent 10.2 percent Subsidization of primary input65 percent Trade data based on average of Excludes EC internal trade. Value of EC market based on the product of consumption (production minus net trade) and unit export values.

S IDLEY SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP Serious Prejudice: Tomato Products Processing Subsidies: –Expenditures are € 300 million in total –Grower receives € 34.5 per tonne unless quantity overrun –Contract price for processing tomatoes ≈ € 50 - € 55 per tonne –Subsidization rate ≈ 65 percent Compensation for Withdrawal –Benefit to processed tomato products unknown Operational Funds: –Benefit to processed tomato products unknown Countries that export tomato products, such as the United States, China, Chile, Tunisia and Morocco, can claim that EC subsidies impede or displace their exports to third countries and cause price suppression.

S IDLEY SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP Serious Prejudice: Canned Peaches Canned Peaches Value of World Exports$231 million EC Exports as % world total41 percent Imports as % world total17 percent Production as % world total48 percent Estimated value of EC market$300 million EC Support Import Tariffs15 to 19 percent Type of SubsidyProhibited Subsidization of primary input20 percent Trade data based on average of , Greek crop failure in 2003 changed EC production and export/import share substantially. Excludes EC internal trade. Value of EC market based on the product of consumption (production minus net exports) and unit export values.

S IDLEY SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP Serious Prejudice: Canned Peaches Processing Subsidies: –€ 20 million total –Grower receives € 47.7 per tonne unless overrun –Contract price for processing tomatoes ≈ € € 300 per tonne –Subsidization rate ≈ 20 percent Compensation for Withdrawal –Unknown Operational Funds: –Unknown Countries that export canned peaches, such as South Africa, Australia, China, and Argentina, can claim that EC subsidies impede or displace their exports to third countries and suppress prices in world or specific country markets.

S IDLEY SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP Serious Prejudice: Other Fruit and Vegetable Products Other products include: –Dried plums- Almonds –Raisins- Walnuts –Canned pears- Filberts –Grape juice- Pistachios –Citrus products The EC is a net importer of these products –Major exporters can potentially claim that EC subsidies impede or displace exports into the EC market within the meaning of Article 6.3(a) of the SCM Agreement

S IDLEY SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP Serious Prejudice: Olive Oil Olive Oil Value of World Exports$1.5 billion EC Exports as % world total74 percent Imports as % world total25 percent Production as % world total74 percent Estimated value of EC market$4.8 billion EC Support Import Tariffs40 to 50 percent Type of SubsidyActionable Subsidization rate30 percent Trade data based on average of Excludes EC internal trade. Value of EC market based on the product of consumption (production minus net exports) and unit export values.

S IDLEY SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP Serious Prejudice: Olive Oil Production aid of € 2.2 billion per year The 2004 Mediterranean reform will shift 60 percent of production aid into the SFP scheme. The remaining 40 percent will become an area aid for the upkeep of olive groves of economic or social value. –Will reform result in lower production? –Is the SFP needed to cover production costs? Are any countries in a position to challenge EC olive oil subsidies? –Turkey is the second largest exporter –Tunisia, the third largest exporter in the world, exports 56,000 tons of olive oil to the EC duty free

S IDLEY SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP Serious Prejudice: Wine Wine Value of World Exports$8.404 billion EC Exports as % world total54 percent Imports as % world total25 percent Estimated value of EC market$57.8 billion Production as % world total60 percent EC Support Import Tariffs$12 to $38 per hl Type of SubsidyProhibited / Actionable Subsidization Rate??? Trade data based on average of Excludes EC internal trade. Value of EC market based on the product of consumption (production minus net exports) and unit export values.

S IDLEY SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP Serious Prejudice: Wine Restructuring Subsidies –Expenditures are € 450 million per year –Their purpose is to adapt production to market demand –Which wine varieties are benefiting from these subsides? Is production benefiting from restructuring subsides displacing imports from Australia, Chile, Argentina and U.S.? Distillation Subsidies –Expenditures are € 500 million per year –Distillation subsidies remove wine from the EC market and protect EC wine producers from low prices. What is the net impact on producers in third countries?

S IDLEY SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP Reform of Wine CMO The EC is unlikely to introduce decoupled payments The EC would like to reduce emphasis on distillation measures. –How will surplus wine be dealt with? –How will the existing distillation infrastructure be dealt with? Restructuring subsidies will likely remain –Are their effects alone enough to support a serious prejudice?

S IDLEY SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP Reform of the Fruit and Vegetables CMO Operational funds for producer organizations are likely to remain Processing subsidies will likely be reformed –Decoupled processing aid? Probably result in a large decline in production –Area payments? May continue to constitute a prohibited local content subsidy

S IDLEY SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP Preparing for WTO Cases Prohibited subsidy claims are easier to prosecute Actionable subsidy claims are factually intensive. The following information is needed: –Trade data –Subsidy amounts and recipients –Costs and returns data The EC is far less transparent than the US –No centralized source of information (e.g. USDA)