Work in progress. Do not cite Future Histories Aromar Revi Exploring Pathways for India and China in the 21st Century 30 th April 2007

Work in progress. Do not cite Why should India or China be interested in the long duree? History is often written by the ‘winning’ side or as a ‘hegemonic project’ Futures are often linear extrapolations of the past This is largely worthless during periods of non-linear change when stream- shifting between multiple narratives is typical The 21 st century will be a time of turbulent structural change in domestic and global environments, when conventional analytical methods break down China and India will be central to many non-linear disruptive changes through the 21 st century Future History is an examination of possible regime envelopes to help articulate key challenges and opportunities of possible traverses A shared Open Source framework (e.g. like IFs++) is needed to create a ‘space’ for conversations about dynamic, uncertain but high impact processes from both hegemonic and subaltern perspectives This could lead to more meaningful discussions on the traverse(s) required to address key national and global change challenges: e.g. poverty; political, economic and environmental security

Work in progress. Do not cite Background & Methodology This set of narratives / analysis is based on the International Futures (IFs) aggregate global model of 182 countries in its Jan 2007, Version It seeks to: 1.Use ‘standard’ scenarios to compare a few global and national trends for India, China, the US and the world, over the period 2.Explore whether these outcomes seem plausible given past trends and a broad understanding of current and emerging dynamics 3.Explore the possible strategic and policy implications, constraints and opportunities before governments and other global stakeholders 4.The primary objectives is to ask a few ‘big’ questions and underscore the need for a neutral national and global analytical framework to widen the dialogue between China and India on the construction of new domestic, bilateral and multilateral relationships, in the early-mid 21 st century CAVEATS: IFs forecasts are not predictions. They are scenarios to be used for thinking about possible alternative longer-term futures. The narratives and model results presented are only indicative, ranging from the moderately certain to the outrageously speculative. Some outcomes may be model ‘arefacts’ rather than based on real world dynamics. These are under test and ongoing revision. THIS SESSION PRESENTS SOME OF THE KEY ISSUES EMERGING FROM PHASE 1 OF THIS WORK

Work in progress. Do not cite International Futures (IFs) V 5.34 Lead Author: Prof. B. Hughes, Univ. of Denver See: Hughes, B and Hillebrand E.E. (2006) Exploring and Shaping International Futures, Paradigm, London

Work in progress. Do not cite What is International Futures (IFs)? A multi-level hybrid Global (Systems Dynamics and econometric model) based on 182 integrated 6-sector Country sub-models with a cohort- component demographic; General Equilibrium-seeking economic; SAM flow and stock model representations

Work in progress. Do not cite Geographic Representation in IFs Regions 182 Countries Groups of Countries & Regions Globe What if a: Region secedes Forms a Confederation Submerged by SLR

Work in progress. Do not cite Why IFs as a platform? Coverage: 182 countries with inbuilt dataset Multi-level regional structure: can/will be able to explore options beyond conventional nation-state boundaries In active use: US National Intelligence Council; EU; GM, UNEP; RAND, CIA etc. Transparent: Open Source structure & Code. Inclusive: scenario implementation from multiple sources… Well documented Unpretentious: work in progress…warts and all Responsive: Live project with quick response/development time Free

Work in progress. Do not cite Overview of a few IFs Features

Work in progress. Do not cite IFs Demographic Sub-model: Key Features Represents 22 age-sex cohorts up to age 100+ Calculates changes in fertility and mortality rates in response to income, income distribution and analysis multipliers Computes average life expectancy at birth, literacy rate, and overall measures of human development (HDI) and physical quality of life (PQLI) Represents Migration and HIV/AIDS Includes formal primary, secondary & tertiary education Does not simulate: rural-urban migration and multiple SECs

Work in progress. Do not cite IFs Demographic Sub-model Causal Structure

Work in progress. Do not cite IFs Economic Sub-model: Key Features 182 countries in a six sector economic model: Agriculture, Materials, Energy, Industry, Services and ICT using raw data from GTAP General Equilibrium-seeking Model that does not assume exact equilibrium in a given year. Uses inventories as buffer stocks to provide price signals so that the model chases equilibrium over time Computes and uses IO matrices that change with development level Uses an endogenous production function that represents MFP growth from R&D, education, worker health, economic policy and energy prices Linear Expenditure System to represent changing Consumption patterns Pooled rather than Bilateral trade approach for International trade Embedded Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) envelope ties economic production and consumption to intra-actor financial flows and stocks Weaknesses: market clearing, poverty analysis, I-O determinacy, too thin a SAM, PPP formalism etc.

Work in progress. Do not cite IFs Economy Sub-model: Overall Causal Structure

Work in progress. Do not cite IFs Economy Sub-model: Causal Logic The economic module represents supply, demand, and trade in 6 economic sectors: agriculture, energy, raw materials, manufactures, services & ICT Inventories are the key equilibrating variables in two negative feedback loops. –As inventories rise, capacity utilization falls, decreasing production, and restraining inventories. –Similarly, as inventories rise, prices fall, increasing final demand and decreasing inventories. Physical investment and capital stocks are key driving variables in one positive feedback loop. –As capital rises, it increases value added and GDP, increasing final demand and further increasing investment. –Similarly, social investment can increase production and inventories in another positive feedback loop. A-matrices (I-O) computed dependent on the level of development (GDP per capita), allow computation of Gross Value Added and after satisfaction of intersectoral flows, production that is available to meet Final Demand. The balance of this Production for Final demand with Actual Final demand determines whether inventories grow or decline – hence, a General Equilibrium seeking structure

Work in progress. Do not cite Causal Structure of IFs Power & Threat Functions PowerThreat of Dyadic Interstate Dispute

Work in progress. Do not cite Why only these three Features today? Attempting to engage with the rudimentary dynamics of 1.A transition to a Tertiary/ Services-sector led economy, hence the population-education nexus 2.Global transitions in economic power 3.Global transitions in ‘hard’ power 4.Global transitions in ‘soft’ power 5.Climate change in the context of rapid economic growth within differing global and national policy trajectories, simulated via scenario analysis

Work in progress. Do not cite Global Scenarios: an Art of Quantitative Narrative

Work in progress. Do not cite

The NIC 2020 Global Landscape: ‘Relative Certainties’ 1.Globalization largely irreversible, likely to become less westernized. 2.World economy grows substantially larger 3.Increasing number of global firms spread new technology 4.Rise of Asia and possible new economic middle-weight powers 5.Aging populations in established powers. 6.Energy supplies “in the ground” sufficient to meet global demand. 7.Environmental and ethical issues even more to the fore. 8.Growing power of non-state actors. 9.Arc of instability spanning Middle East, Asia, Africa. 10. US will remain single most powerful actor economically, technologically, militarily.

Work in progress. Do not cite Goldman Sachs’ Imagined Futures: Dreaming with BRICs revisited Determinate trajectories Linear causality Unambiguous messages Captures the imagination of the diaspora & national elite

Work in progress. Do not cite Millennium Ecosystem Assessment: Economic Growth Scenarios 16X5X8X11X reactive, globalized, sustainable development reactive, devolution, protection proactive, global, eco-efficiency proactive, devolution, bioregionalism

Work in progress. Do not cite Integrated Global Scenarios - over the last decade Global Scenarios Group (1998) –Market World –Fortress World –Transformed World IPCC- SRES (2001) –A1 –A2 –B1 –B2 NIC Mapping the Future (2004) –Davos World –Pax Americana –A New Caliphate –Cycle of Fear Mill. Ecosystem Assessment(2005) –Global Orchestration –Order from Strength –Adapting Mosaic –Technogarden Shell Scenarios 2025 (2005) –Open Doors –Low Trust Globalisation –Flags UNEP GEO3/4 (2002, 2006-) –Markets First –Security First –Policy First –Sustainability First

Work in progress. Do not cite A ‘Past’ and Four Stylised Futures

Work in progress. Do not cite India & China: the two largest economies of the 16 th, 17 th and 18 th centuries Relative National Share of Global Economic Output (1500 ACE to 2050 ACE) Colonial engagement and decline A series of ‘imperial’ experiments Re-Orient: an Asian century?

Work in progress. Do not cite National Share of Global population (1500 ACE – 2050 ACE) The growth of large working populations in China & India underpins their growth as economic powers as the West ages and prefers ‘less’ and more productive work But potent competition from other emerging economies in Asia, Latin America and Africa

Work in progress. Do not cite Relative national share of World Urban Population (1700 ACE ACE) India, China & Japan had the largest urban populations in the world till the early 19 th century India, China & the US will have largest national urban populations in the mid-21 st century

Work in progress. Do not cite UNEP GEO3/4 Global Scenarios Markets First: trust in globalisation and economic liberalisation. Govt’s unable to cope with social and environmental issues Security First: great disparities across countries and environmental pressures lead to conflict; the rich and powerful separate themselves from the poorer world Policy First: Govts. take decisive initiatives towards social and environmental goals, but steps are not adequate to address them adequately Sustainability First: A new paradigm emerges. New values and institutions support changes in behavior and policies on social and environmental issues

Work in progress. Do not cite Global Demographic & Educational Trends in an IFs world ( )

Work in progress. Do not cite Global Population trajectories by Educational status Three cross-overs in the transition to a global knowledge society:~2050; ~2065 and ~2085 Incomplete- Primary Tertiary- Secondary Tertiary- Primary

Work in progress. Do not cite National Populations with Only Primary Education ( ) Chindia will have up to 1 billion people with only a primary education – limiting formal knowledge intensive occupations and underscoring the importance of traditional knowledge

Work in progress. Do not cite National Populations with Only Secondary Education ( ) China leads with its secondary educated population till late century, followed by steady Indian growth, EU and Brazil expansion and more or less steady US population India-EUIndia-US China-India

Work in progress. Do not cite National Populations with Tertiary Education ( ) India and China in competition as potential lead knowledge powers followed by US and EU? India-China-EUIndia-China-US

Work in progress. Do not cite Speculation on Global & Regional Challenges & Opportunities ( )

Work in progress. Do not cite Global & Regional Challenges & Opportunities I 1.Global population peaks at ~ 10 billion in the 2060s, its structure driven largely by DC growth trends 2.Population in the working age peaks pre-2050 implying changes in retirement age, nature of work, the inter-generational social compact of the 20 th century western European welfare state 3.With much of the global working population of Asian origin, with some from Africa and Latin America, pressure on immigration to address the ‘greying’ of the ‘OECD’ workforce may be significant 4.Russia could be severely challenged in maintaining its territorial integrity given its population decline 5.Japan could be eclipsed as a manufacturing power, potentially changing the geo-political character of East Asia 6.Densities in much of Asia rapidly become unsustainable without dramatic changes in ecopotential, technology, management and institutional regimes 7.Demographically dominant and economically significant new BRIC regions may experience new forms of stratification e.g. based on education 8.This along with large rural populations may deepen the divides between the biomass, industrial and knowledge economies as their productivity and per capita output levels diverge, leading to a trifurcated economy

Work in progress. Do not cite Global & Regional Challenges & Opportunities II 7.Apart from a large and increasingly aged illiterate population, over a billion people could have only a primary education, requiring a new link between traditional and formal knowledge production and transmission 8.China could have the largest Secondary-level educated population till late century, followed by steady Indian growth, some EU and Brazil expansion and a more or less steady US population 9.These may be the major manufacturing powers of the 21 st century, if no dramatic shifts in current modes of industrial production take place 10.India and China could be in close demographic competition as potential lead knowledge powers followed by US and EU. Educational, innovation and institutional quality may be key differentiators. 11.The penetration and importance of the ‘knowledge economy’ to the livelihoods of these populations is a key question. Will these groups become a large urban underclass? What with that imply for social stability, the role of the middle class and the future of capitalism? 12.The standard OECD-following shift towards a capitalist knowledge economy may not come to pass for much of the century

Work in progress. Do not cite Global & Regional Challenges & Opportunities III 13.This is a world in which economic power is increasingly wielded by low and middle income countries with large populations of relatively poor people; an aging ‘core’ and a new set of global corporations 14.Demographic momentum and economic growth trends in Asia, could shift the balance of economic and soft power towards Asia by This may not be followed by a hard (military) power shift 16.The close integration of the Chinese and Indian diasporas and elites with the US will provide an interesting backdrop to these changes 17.Shifting alliances between China, India, the US and EU and the role of large corporations in this game are big open questions. 18.Traditional global centre-periphery relationships of the industrial era may change under the influence of a range of regional forces leading to an increasingly fractal regionalised landscape of connectivity, throughput and power. 19.Therefore, the language and style of hegemony of the (New Knowledge?) economy of the 21 st century could probably be quite different from that of the 20 th

Work in progress. Do not cite China Demographic & Educational Trends in an IFs world ( )

Work in progress. Do not cite China: Population cohorts by Education (2000) Incomplete education (54%); Primary (33%), Secondary (12%); Tertiary (2%).

Work in progress. Do not cite China: Population cohorts by Education (2005) Incomplete education (48%); Primary (36%), Secondary (14%); Tertiary (2%).

Work in progress. Do not cite China: Population cohorts by Education (2010) Incomplete education (43%); Primary (38%), Secondary (15%); Tertiary (3%).

Work in progress. Do not cite China: Population cohorts by Education (2015) Incomplete education (40%); Primary (40%), Secondary (17%); Tertiary (4%).

Work in progress. Do not cite China: Population cohorts by Education (2020) Incomplete education (37%); Primary (40%), Secondary (18%); Tertiary (5%).

Work in progress. Do not cite China: Population cohorts by Education (2025) Incomplete education (34%); Primary (41%), Secondary (19%); Tertiary (6%).

Work in progress. Do not cite China: Population cohorts by Education (2030) Incomplete education (31%); Primary (41%), Secondary (20%); Tertiary (7%).

Work in progress. Do not cite China: Population cohorts by Education (2035) Incomplete education (29%); Primary (41%), Secondary (21%); Tertiary (9%).

Work in progress. Do not cite China: Population cohorts by Education (2040) Incomplete education (27%); Primary (41%), Secondary (22%); Tertiary (11%).

Work in progress. Do not cite China: Population cohorts by Education (2045) Incomplete education (25%); Primary (40%), Secondary (23%); Tertiary (12%).

Work in progress. Do not cite China: Population cohorts by Education (2050) Incomplete education (23%); Primary (39%), Secondary (24%); Tertiary (14%).

Work in progress. Do not cite China: Population cohorts by Education (2055) Incomplete education (21%); Primary (38%), Secondary (24%); Tertiary (16%).

Work in progress. Do not cite China: Population cohorts by Education (2060) Incomplete education (19%); Primary (38%), Secondary (25%); Tertiary (18%).

Work in progress. Do not cite China: Population cohorts by Education (2065) Incomplete education (18%); Primary (36%), Secondary (25%); Tertiary (20%).

Work in progress. Do not cite China: Population cohorts by Education (2070) Incomplete education (17%); Primary (35%), Secondary (26%); Tertiary (23%).

Work in progress. Do not cite China: Population cohorts by Education (2075) Incomplete education (16%); Primary (33%), Secondary (26%); Tertiary (25%).

Work in progress. Do not cite China: Population cohorts by Education (2080) Incomplete education (15%); Primary (32%), Secondary (26%); Tertiary (27%).

Work in progress. Do not cite China: Population cohorts by Education (2085) Incomplete education (15%); Primary (30%), Secondary (26%); Tertiary (29%).

Work in progress. Do not cite China: Population cohorts by Education (2090) Incomplete education (14%); Primary (28%), Secondary (26%); Tertiary (32%).

Work in progress. Do not cite China: Population cohorts by Education (2095) Incomplete education (14%); Primary (27%), Secondary (26%); Tertiary (34%).

Work in progress. Do not cite China: Population cohorts by Education (2100) Incomplete education (14%); Primary (25%), Secondary (25%); Tertiary (36%).

Work in progress. Do not cite China Population trajectories by Educational status Massive growth in tertiary education, overtakes secondary in ~2075 and primary in ~2085

Work in progress. Do not cite China Population-Education Trends (2000 – 2100) 1.China’s population is expected to peak c at about 1.5 billion 2.The population in the working ages peaks c and child population declines 3.The greying of China will be a significant challenge by mid-century, especially in maintaining growth, social security and health care systems. 4.Health care and education will continue to be growth businesses in China, as possibly be edutainment and travel 5.China will continue to have a large population (~ 600 million) of increasing age with only primary education. Productive economic activity and social security for this population will be a critical challenge. 6.China could become an important knowledge power before 2025, enabled by massive growth in tertiary education, S&T and R&D investment 7.Global corporations will be important to leveraging on the potential of a Tertiary sector population of 200 to 400 million. 8.Collaboration with India, the EU and the US could be important to this, as will be a world-class education system

Work in progress. Do not cite India Demographic & Educational Trends in an IFs world ( )

Work in progress. Do not cite India: Population cohorts by Education (2000) Incomplete education (74%); Primary (18%), Secondary (6%); Tertiary (1%).

Work in progress. Do not cite India: Population cohorts by Education (2005) Incomplete education (69%); Primary (22%), Secondary (7%); Tertiary (2%).

Work in progress. Do not cite India: Population cohorts by Education (2010) Incomplete education (64%); Primary (25%), Secondary (8%); Tertiary (3%).

Work in progress. Do not cite India: Population cohorts by Education (2015) Incomplete education (59%); Primary (28%), Secondary (9%); Tertiary (4%).

Work in progress. Do not cite India: Population cohorts by Education (2020) Incomplete education (55%); Primary (30%), Secondary (10%); Tertiary (5%).

Work in progress. Do not cite India: Population cohorts by Education (2025) Incomplete education (50%); Primary (33%), Secondary (11%); Tertiary (7%).

Work in progress. Do not cite India: Population cohorts by Education (2030) Incomplete education (45%); Primary (35%), Secondary (12%); Tertiary (8%).

Work in progress. Do not cite India: Population cohorts by Education (2035) Incomplete education (41%); Primary (37%), Secondary (13%); Tertiary (10%).

Work in progress. Do not cite India: Population cohorts by Education (2040) Incomplete education (37%); Primary (38%), Secondary (13%); Tertiary (12%).

Work in progress. Do not cite India: Population cohorts by Education (2045) Incomplete education (34%); Primary (38%), Secondary (14%); Tertiary (13%).

Work in progress. Do not cite India: Population cohorts by Education (2050) Incomplete education (31%); Primary (38%), Secondary (15%); Tertiary (15%).

Work in progress. Do not cite India: Population cohorts by Education (2055) Incomplete education (29%); Primary (38%), Secondary (16%); Tertiary (17%).

Work in progress. Do not cite India: Population cohorts by Education (2060) Incomplete education (27%); Primary (37%), Secondary (17%); Tertiary (19%).

Work in progress. Do not cite India: Population cohorts by Education (2065) Incomplete education (24%); Primary (36%), Secondary (18%); Tertiary (21%).

Work in progress. Do not cite India: Population cohorts by Education (2070) Incomplete education (23%); Primary (35%), Secondary (19%); Tertiary (23%).

Work in progress. Do not cite India: Population cohorts by Education (2075) Incomplete education (21%); Primary (34%), Secondary (20%); Tertiary (25%).

Work in progress. Do not cite India: Population cohorts by Education (2080) Incomplete education (20%); Primary (32%), Secondary (21%); Tertiary (27%).

Work in progress. Do not cite India: Population cohorts by Education (2085) Incomplete education (18%); Primary (30%), Secondary (22%); Tertiary (29%).

Work in progress. Do not cite India: Population cohorts by Education (2090) Incomplete education (17%); Primary (28%), Secondary (23%); Tertiary (32%).

Work in progress. Do not cite India: Population cohorts by Education (2095) Incomplete education (16%); Primary (26%), Secondary (24%); Tertiary (34%).

Work in progress. Do not cite India: Population cohorts by Education (2100) Incomplete education (15%); Primary (24%), Secondary (24%); Tertiary (36%).

Work in progress. Do not cite India: Population trajectories by Educational status Three educational transitions: c. 2040, c and 2085

Work in progress. Do not cite India Population-Education Trends (2000 – 2100) I 1.India’s population peaks at between 1.6 billion+ between 2055 and The ‘demographic dividend’ is reaped by mid-century, with the largest potential national working population of over 800 million 3.But India could by then also have over 500 million people over the age of 65. Posing a serious challenge to future welfare and health care policy. Social and family structure could be a major question 4.At 2100, ~ 25% of the population could have a primary, 25% a secondary school and over a third a tertiary education. 5.This may lead to the further ‘trifurcation’ of the economy with increasing wage differentials based on educational status 6.India becomes a significant knowledge power, early in the century, crossing the US college educated population of 100 million in Health and education will be growth businesses in India over the century, both to address domestic and global markets

Work in progress. Do not cite India Population-Education Trends (2000 – 2100) II India will be faced with multiple challenges: Accelerating school and tertiary education Enabling the development of livelihoods that use a mix of traditional knowledge and primary education in increasing uncertainty and competitive primary and household manufacturing markets Enabling the growth of labour intensive manufacturing employment located in rural and small urban centres– implying the rapid expansion of competitive energy, transportation and communication infrastructure Enabling the penetration of the knowledge economy into the Secondary and Primary sectors and outside megacities and metropolitan centres Building cities for over 500 million people Developing and scaling world-class quality knowledge institutions by 2015 Addressing the challenge of a ‘lost generation’ of less educated aged citizens

Work in progress. Do not cite Exploring Global Economic Power in an IFs World ( )

Work in progress. Do not cite IFs: Base Case Economic Growth Trends for Major Economic Powers ( ) India, China & Japan had the largest urban populations in the world till the early 19 th century The US and EU continue as major powers till the 2030s, after which China will typically lead for up to 50 years, while India comes up from behind China-EUChina-USIndia-EUIndia-USIndia-China

Work in progress. Do not cite IFs Base Case scenario: Six Transitions in Economic Power India, China & Japan had the largest urban populations in the world till the early 19 th century Six transitions in economic power: EU-US-China-India

Work in progress. Do not cite IFs Markets First scenario: Six Transitions in Economic Power India, China & Japan had the largest urban populations in the world till the early 19 th century Markets First favours India, with earlier (5 to 10 year) Transitions

Work in progress. Do not cite IFs Security First scenario : Two Transitions in Economic Power India, China & Japan had the largest urban populations in the world till the early 19 th century Security First creates a divided world with continuing US hegemony. Chinese economic power declines by 2060

Work in progress. Do not cite IFs Sustainability scenario : Six Transitions in Economic Power India, China & Japan had the largest urban populations in the world till the early 19 th century Sustainability favours China, forcing an earlier US-China transition. The China-India transition is delayed to end-century

Work in progress. Do not cite Transitions in Economic Power over the 21 st century 1.The 21 st century could be increasingly multi-polar, with Asian ‘dominance’ emerging in the latter portion of the century, ONLY IF the World-system experiences multiple relatively smooth transitions 2.China could become the single largest economy by the 2030s, but the US and the EU could continue to produce 15-20% of global output till late century 3.India could grow steadily from 5 to 20% of global output to become the largest economy only by late century. The Markets First scenario favours India in the long-run 4.The Sustainability First scenario favours China vs. the US and EU in the medium run, if it is able to implement its transition to a more harmonious and sustainable society effectively 5.The Security First scenario creates a divided ‘Fortress World’ where the US continues as the dominant economic and political power and manages to contain China, in alliance with the EU (?) & India (?)

Work in progress. Do not cite Exploring Global ‘Hard’ Power in an IFs World ( )

Work in progress. Do not cite IFs: Base Case Transitions in Hard Power ( ) India, China & Japan had the largest urban populations in the world till the early 19 th century Hard power transitions typically take place well after Economic power transitions take place, e.g. the 2060s between US & China. The 2070s onwards are a potential period of struggle.

Work in progress. Do not cite IFs scenarios : Changes in China’s ‘Hard’ Power ( ) India, China & Japan had the largest urban populations in the world till the early 19 th century Sustainability First favours China, Security First contains China’s hard power considerably

Work in progress. Do not cite IFs scenarios : Changes in India’s ‘Hard’ Power ( ) India, China & Japan had the largest urban populations in the world till the early 19 th century All scenarios including Markets First favour growth of Indian hard power. Security First constrains a potential India hard power buildup

Work in progress. Do not cite IFs scenarios : Changes in USA’s ‘Hard’ Power ( ) India, China & Japan had the largest urban populations in the world till the early 19 th century USA’s hard power declines steadily over the century. The Security First scenario helps stem the tide for a while, while Sustainability First leads to the fastest decline.

Work in progress. Do not cite IFs Security First scenario : Transitions in ‘Hard’ Power India, China & Japan had the largest urban populations in the world till the early 19 th century Security First creates a divided world with continuing US hegemony. Chinese economic power declines by 2060

Work in progress. Do not cite IFs Base case : Nuclear warheads with major Powers India, China & Japan had the largest urban populations in the world till the early 19 th century Sharp decline in US & Russian arsenals, matched by Chinese arsenal by the 2030s. India seeks to maintain minimum strategic deterrence over the rest of the century

Work in progress. Do not cite Changes in Soft Power in a Networked IFs World ( )

Work in progress. Do not cite IFs Base case: Changes in National Soft Power Potential India, China & Japan had the largest urban populations in the world till the early 19 th century China and India’s share of the global e-networked population grows rapidly till the 2020s

Work in progress. Do not cite Transitions in ‘Hard’ Power over the 21 st century 1.The 21 st century could be a period of slow transition of ‘hard’ power as the US lead is slowly whittled down by China 2.China becomes an increasingly important ‘hard’ power but only after its emergence as an economic and potential soft power 3.China’s expansion may be successfully contained by the US in the Security First scenario at the expense of global economic growth, equity and environmental concerns 4.The Sustainability First scenario is most beneficial to China, even in terms of ‘hard’ power 5.Indian ‘hard’ power grows in all scenarios, in response to regional concerns and maintaining a minimum parity with China. Markets First favours India 6.Soft power, as measured by potential e-networked populations shifts towards China and India by the 2020s, potentially changing the dynamics of economic development 7.New alliances can be expected in the world-system as lagged phase changes in economic, hard and soft power shares of China and India ripple through

Work in progress. Do not cite Climate Change: an ‘inconvenient’ but real Threat

Work in progress. Do not cite Global Climate Change: An Inconvenient Overshoot India, China & Japan had the largest urban populations in the world till the early 19 th century Climate change emerges as a serious threat as all scenarios overshoot targets

Work in progress. Do not cite The Problem of the Traverse: The Challenge of Transforming India’s Old Economy

Work in progress. Do not cite India: Long-range Growth Characteristics ( ) (at constant prices) Increasing GDP & productivity growth Workforce-population growth differential Maintaining high GDP growth rates (at constant prices), increasing employment growth and raising labour productivity are key challenges

Work in progress. Do not cite India: Factor Contributions to Growth Savings & Investment and Technology & Institutions are the primary growth drivers of the Indian economy

Work in progress. Do not cite Importance of Investment, Technology & Institutions to Urban Growth Labour contribution to Secondary & Tertiary growth declined to < 20% in 2000, with ‘Capital’ ~ 55 % and Technology & Institutions at ~ 25%

Work in progress. Do not cite India: Steady but Decelerating Urban growth since the 1980s BUT period of urban growth deceleration Steady urban growth A major puzzle: India’s decelerating urbanisation since the 1980s. Possible explanations: stagnant urban employment, declining living conditions and relative immobility of rural India

Work in progress. Do not cite Indian cities: a world of natural population growth Net Rural-Urban migration is ~ 20% of Indian urban population growth Natural population growth is the most important component (~ 60%) of Indian urban population growth Net reclassification of rural to urban areas and vice-versa make up ~20%) of urban population growth Net rural-urban migration makes up only 20% of Indian urban growth

Work in progress. Do not cite Catalysing India’s Urban Economy Source: TARU analysis, 2006, NAS, 2006 Stagnant or declining employment growth Moderate employment growth Low employment growth Trade & part of Other Services (e.g. IT/ITES) are key growth drivers that also create steady jobs. Core urban economic sectors (manufacturing, finance, Govt.) have stagnant or declining employment growth

Work in progress. Do not cite Strategic International Opportunities: Trade & Energy Flows Trade Gas

Work in progress. Do not cite Strategic Long-term Climate Risks: Coastal Flooding, Drought & Glacial melt Coastal Flooding Drought Glacial melt

Work in progress. Do not cite Questions this approach could (in time) help answer for India 1.Is a Sustainable Development Transition that addresses poverty, livelihoods and eco-development possible? What are the key drivers and constraints? How quickly can this happen? What will it cost? 2.How can this be linked to the potential for social transformation? 3.Which are the most viable macro-economic and social development envelopes within which these transitions can be enabled? With or without discontinuous change? 4.What is the mix of roles of institutional groups to enable these transitions? 5.Which are the leading and lagging economic (ecological) sectors? Which are the most challenged stocks and constrained flows? 6.What are the key ecosystem services that are at risk? What are the key leverage points for risk mitigation? 7.Which external societies and institutional groups will benefit/lose most from discontinuous change? How can we fill these niches/ ally with new partners to leverage these new opportunities? 8.How can one establish a credible ‘neutral’ arena to test these alternative Visions of the future?

Work in progress. Do not cite Questions this approach could (in time) help answer for China Work in Progress Act II in Shanghai & Beijing in June 2007

Work in progress. Do not cite Intermediate Conclusions

Work in progress. Do not cite The World could change in dramatic ways by the 2030s This could be accentuated by heterogeneous regional behaviour and emergent discontinuities in the world-system Many countries in the current OECD could move from the centre to the semi-periphery of the world-system as new regional groupings (e.g. EU), potential hegemonic powers (e.g. China) and new transnationals emerge Much of the new polycentric world-system will be populated by relatively poor nations unlike the 20 th century when Great Powers had small and affluent populations, large capital and technology concentrations Demography, education and institutions could play a much stronger role in economic and soft power than earlier anticipated The world-system could be more interconnected: a positive opportunity for the rapid spread of innovation but also the risk of entrainment of sub- regional ‘collapses’, hence a challenge to the international system The geographical concentration of strategic resources (e.g. oil and gas), sub-regional resource scarcity and poverty could accentuate future geo- political challenges beyond the absorptive capacity of trade and redistributive mechanisms Climate change and potential regional conflict could emerge as real threats

Work in progress. Do not cite Future Histories Aromar Revi Exploring Pathways for India and China in the 21st Century