The Medical Hospice Benefit: The Effectiveness of Price Incentives in Health Care Policy Written By Vivian Hamilton, McGill University RAND Journal of.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Factors Affecting Physicians Medicare Service Volume: Beneficiaries Treated and Services per Beneficiary By Jack Hadley and Jim Reschovsky 2005 Academy.
Advertisements

Tor Iversen Health service provision Economic incentives and organization of the hospital sector I.
AHA Task Force on Variation in Health Care Spending Report to the Institute of Medicine Committee on Geographic Variation In Health Care Spending and Promotion.
Overview of Health Care Coverage and Cost Trends in Minnesota Presentation to the State Budget Trends Study Commission April 22, 2008 Julie Sonier Director,
What are the causes of age discrimination in employment?
Moral hazard and contracts
Do Primary Care Physicians Treating Minority Patients Report Greater Problems Delivering Quality Care? 1 A New Perspective on Racial and Ethnic Disparities.
A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Net Based Nursing Education by Niklas Hanes and Sofia Lundberg, Centre for Regional Science at Umeå University (CERUM), Sweden.
PHSSR IG CyberSeminar Introductory Remarks Bryan Dowd Division of Health Policy and Management School of Public Health University of Minnesota.
Health Insurance October 19, 2006 Insurance is defined as a means of protecting against risk. Risk is a state in which multiple outcomes are possible and.
HSA 171 CAR. Health care Systems 1436/ 6/30  The Means by Which Societies Provide Support for Citizens to Maintain Their Good Health 3.
McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2013 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 7: Demand Estimation and Forecasting.
Competition and Specialization in the Hospital Industry: An Application of Hotelling’s Location Model A paper by Paul S. Calem and John A. Rizzo Southern.
Presenter: Joseph Reid Paper: The Market for Health Care Date : 6/04/07.
Chapter 2 – Tools of Positive Analysis
Topic 3: Regression.
Analysis of the rationale for, and consequences of, nonprofit and for-profit ownership conversions by Tami Mark Health Services Research, April 1999 Presentation.
Chapter 6 The production, costs, and technology of health care 1.Production and the possibility for substitution 2.Economies of scale and scope 3.Technology-
Trends In Health Care Industry KNH 413. Difficult questions What is health insurance? What is health care versus health insurance? Is one or both a right.
Unpaid Care and Labor Supply of Middle-aged Men and Women in Urban China Lan Liu Institute of Population Research, Peking University Xiaoyuan Dong Department.
The Effects of De-listing Publicly Funded Health Care Services Mark Stabile Department of Economics and Center for Economics and Public Affairs University.
Urban and Regional Economics Week 3. Tim Bartik n “Business Location Decisions in the U.S.: Estimates of the Effects of Unionization, Taxes, and Other.
Impact of Hospital Provider Payment Mechanism on Household Health Service Utilization in Vietnam (preliminary results) Sarah Bales Public Policy in Asia,
Neeraj Sood, Schaeffer Center and School of Pharmacy, USC RAND Corporation 1 Competition, Prospective Payment, and Outcomes in Post-Acute Care Markets.
ECON 6012 Cost Benefit Analysis Memorial University of Newfoundland
Tax Subsidies for Out-of-Pocket Healthcare Costs Jessica Vistnes Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality William Jack Georgetown University Arik Levinson.
The Affordable Care Act Early Impacts. The main provisions of the law do not launch until However, a lot of change has taken place. Dependent Coverage:
Long-Term Care: Managing Across the Continuum (Second Edition)
1 Chapter 4 Application on Demand and Supply. 2 Elasticity Elasticity is a general concept that can be used to quantify the response in one variable when.
Lukas Steinmann Mexico 10. June 2008 To your health: diagnosing the state of healthcare and the global private medical insurance industry.
Socioeconomic Status and Health Care Outcomes Jianhui Hu, Ph.D., Research Associate Center for Health Policy & Health Services Research Henry Ford Health.
Perfect Competition *MADE BY RACHEL STAND* :). I. Perfect Competition: A Model A. Basic Definitions 1. Perfect Competition: a model of the market based.
Chapter 5 Demand Forecasting.
Hospital Ownership Form and Quality Changes: Changes in Nurse Staffing and Failure-to-Rescue following the BBA of 1997 David K. Song, M.D., Ph.D. Kevin.
Why are White Nursing Home Residents Twice as Likely as African Americans to Have an Advance Directive? Understanding Ethnic Differences in Advance Care.
Health Care Facts and Guiding Principles for Health Care Reform Public Employees Union, Local #1.
Econometric Estimation of The National Carbon Sequestration Supply Function Ruben N. Lubowski USDA Economic Research Service Andrew J. Plantinga Oregon.
Exploratory Analysis of Observation Stay Pamela Owens, Ph.D. Ryan Mutter, Ph.D. September, 2009 AHRQ Annual Meeting.
LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION, EARNINGS AND INEQUALITY IN NIGERIA
OUTLINE OF HEALTH CARE PLAN RICHARD R. SCHNEIDER, MD F.A.C.P., F.A.C.C.
Competition, Subsidy and Requirement Regulations -Effects of State Policies and their Interactions on Hospital Uncompensated Care Provision L EI Z HANG.
Do Individual Accounts Postpone Retirement? Evidence from Chile Alejandra C. Edwards and Estelle James.
CHAPTER 3 NATIONAL INCOME: WHERE IT COMES FROM AND WHERE IT GOES ECN 2003 MACROECONOMICS 1 Assoc. Prof. Yeşim Kuştepeli.
Managerial Economics Demand Estimation & Forecasting.
Consumer Valuation of Medicare Part D Plans VERY PRELIMINARY-Please do not quote Claudio Lucarelli Dept of Policy Analysis and Management, Cornell University.
Using Willingness to Pay to Evaluate Hospital Mergers: Results from 16 Mergers Presented by Rich Lindrooth Co-authors: David Dranove Mark Satterthwaite.
Chapter 7: Demand Estimation and Forecasting McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2011 by the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
Appendices. Appendix 1: Supplementary Data Tables Trends in the Overall Health Care Market.
1 Effects of Medicaid Policy on Long-Term Care Decisions and Medical Services Utilization among the Low-Income Elderly Song Gao SUNY-Stony Brook.
Hospital Utilization by Fee-for-Service and Medicare Advantage Enrollees Lauren Hersch Nicholas University of Michigan September 15, 2009.
International Health Policy Program -Thailand NHA TEAM International Health Policy Program Draft report presentation for external peer review October 7,
The Aggregate Effects of Health Insurance: Evidence from The Introduction of Medicare.
Chapter 31 (cont.) Income, Poverty, and Health Care.
Home and Community Based Waivers for Disabled Adults: Program versus Selection Effects Courtney Harold Van Houtven Durham Veteran’s Administration Duke.
Value of Time for Commercial Vehicle Operators in Minnesota by David Levinson and Brian Smalkoski University of Minnesota.
Demand for Local Public Services: The Median Voter and Other Approaches.
Geography of Medicare By David M. Cutler and Louise Sheiner American Economic Review Vol. 89 No Cliff Gagnier.
ARIZONA HEALTHCARE FORUM JULY 21-22, 2011 PHOENIX, AZ RURAL HEALTH CLINICS 101.
AbstractResults A Comparative Analysis of Vaccine Administration in Urban and Non-urban Skilled Nursing Facilities Yuan Pu 1, Veronika Dolar 2, and Azad.
Appendices. Appendix 1: Supplementary Data Tables Trends in the Overall Health Care Market.
Explanations for the Decline in Health Insurance Coverage Michael Chernew, Michigan and NBER David Cutler, Harvard and NBER Patricia Keenan, Harvard This.
Economics 101. Economics  Is a Science that examines how goods and services are produced, sold, and used.  It involves how people, governments and businesses.
1 HEALTH CARE REFORM – Implications for Patients Kenneth W. Kizer, MD, MPH Alaska State Hospital and Nursing Home Association Fairbanks, AK September 7,
Medicaid Influence in the Drug Market Dana Costea PhD student, Department of Economics, Lehigh University Franklin Carter Assistant Professor, Marketing.
Chapter 7 The Demand for Healthcare Products Copyright 2015 Health Administration Press.
Contra Costa County Sustainability Audit
Hospitals Student lecture
Filling in the gaps: Extrapolations of VMMC unit costs and economies of scale using pool data from several studies. Carlos Pineda.
BMC Health Service Research 2015 By Gang Nathan Dong PERFORMING WELL IN FINANCIAL MANAGMGMENG AND QUALITY OF CARE.
Entry and Regulation – Evidence from Health Care Professions
Presentation transcript:

The Medical Hospice Benefit: The Effectiveness of Price Incentives in Health Care Policy Written By Vivian Hamilton, McGill University RAND Journal of Economics 24(1993) Presented By Jing Zhou

1. Introduction 1. This paper mainly examines the effectiveness of per- diem reimbursement within the context of the Medicare Hospice Benefit program. 2. Specifically, this paper gives answers to the following three questions: 1. Does the rate of reimbursement influence the individual hospice’s certification decision? 2. Does the rate of reimbursement influence the access to hospice care? 3. How to explain the the variations in certification rates across different regions in US?

2. A Description of Hospices and the Medicare Hospice Benefit 1. Hospices care for terminally ill persons who have exhausted their efforts to cure the disease that afflicts them 2. The Medicare Hospice Benefit lays out the type of care hospices are expected to provide(HCFA, 1988) 3. A hospice that becomes under the Medicare Hospice Benefit (certified) must provide the expected care to its patients. 4. Then the Health Care Financing Administration(HCFA) reimburses hospices for their services on a per-diem basis. 5. So the reimbursement rate plays a significant role in determining whether or not a hospice seeks medicare certification

3. The Model(1) 1. The basic model in this paper is a model of the hospice’s certification decision process. 2. Since 95 percent of hospices are nonprofit organizations, the primary goal of a hospice is not likely to be profit maximization. Instead, utility maximization is its goal. 3. So the hospice chooses to be certified if doing so leads to an increase in utility.

3. The Model(2) 1. In this model, We should consider the factors that will affect a hospice’s utility before and after it is certified 2. The number of patients is an important index of a hospice’s utility. Why? 3. Providing services on a large scale is assumed to lead to the enhancement of the prestige of the institution and the likelihood of its ability to continue operating within the community. 4. High quantity may also attract donations.

3. The Model(3) 1. The other important factor influencing a hospice’s utility is its costs and revenues from operation. Why? 2. Excess revenues can be used to satisfy other possible utility-increasing objectives, such as improving facilities or increasing salaries. 3. So the model of the hospice’s certification decision process should take into consideration the quantity and the revenues and costs changes before and after a hospice is certified.

3. The Model(4) 1. The basic model in Hamilton’s paper is: 2. is a continuous, unobservable index. When it is greater than 0, this shows the hospice is certified. is a vector of explanatory variables that affect the hospice’s expected costs and revenue before and after the certification 3. and are the expected value of the logarithm of the number of patients a hospice will serve if it is certified and noncertified.

3. The Model(5) 1.We also have two patient equations for each hospice: If Certified (1) If Noncertified (2) Where is a vector of market-specific variables that characterizes the demand for the hospice’s services. 2. Taking expectation of equations (1) and (2), we have: 3.Taking these two Conditions into our original model, we have (3) 4. Estimation of Equation (1) through (3) will determine which factors are significant in explaining a hospice’s certification decision

3. The Model(6) 1. The explanatory variables in the vector include four kinds of variable: 1. Reimbursement rate: Hospice Rate and Home Health Rate 2. Case Mix variables: % Female, % Noncancer and Length of Stay 3. Organizational structure variables: Hospital Dummy, Home Health Dummy, % Volunteers, Voluntary Nonprofit and Years of Operation 4. Labor Cost Variables: Hospital Cost Index and Home Health Cost Index 2. The explanatory variables used to estimate the patient equations include region-specific demographic variables, County-specific health care market variables and some organizational structure variables.

4. Estimation 1. This system of Equations is a switching regression model with endogeneous switching(Maddala, 1983) 2. Using OLS to get the parameters in (1) and (2), then using the derived parameters to run a probit estimation of equation(3) will yield inconsistent estimates 3. Using the maximum likelihood method to estimate this system of equations is a more appropriate approach. 4. Most data are from National Hospice Organization(NHO)’s annual hospice census(1987). The county-level data are from the Department of Health and Human Services’ 1989 Area Resource File(ARF)

5. Estimation Results Results from the certification-decision equation (3) 1. Holding all other factors constant, a $1.00 increase in the hospice reimbursement rate increases the probability of certification by 1.7%. This shows hospices do indeed respond to price incentives. 2. A percentage increase in the number of patients a hospice can expect has a positive impact on its probability of certification. 3. Some other variables, such as a higher share of female patients and years of operation also have positive influence on a hospice’s probability of certification

Estimation Results(2) Results from the patients equation(1) and (2) 1.A higher percentage of specialists has a positive influence on certified hospice size. 2. The total number of hospices in the county has a negative impact on the number of patients a certified hospice serves. 3. These market variables influence’s size differently when it is certified as opposed to noncertified. Generally, hospice can expect a significant increase in size with certification.

Estimation Results(3) 1.Using a probit equation, this paper also shows the variation in the Medicare reimbursement rates across regions play a significant role in explaining the observed differences in certification across geographic divisions and between urban and rural areas. 2. The underlying reason for this variation is that the wage indices used to adjust the Hospice Benefit rates don’t correctly account for variations in cost across regions. 3. Even using two other alternative wage indicies, the Hospital Cost Index and the Home Health Cost Index, we can barely alter the observed differential.

6. Conclusion 1. The hospices are indeed responsive to change in reimbursement rate. 2. The fixed-price reimbursement mechanism can be an effective instrument in encouraging the provision of more high-quality hospices care for Medicare enrollees. 3. However, this mechanism increased access comes at a price: the higher reimbursement rate may reduce the cost-effectiveness to the Medicare program of hospice care relative to conventional care. 4. In addition, reimbursement rare must be set carefully in order to narrow the variations in certification rates across different regions.

Comments 1. This paper uses cross-sectional data analysis method. This mainly is due to the limits of data in In today, maybe we can also use time series analysis to do the test work. 2. This paper does not consider the influence of private insurance policies because at that time, such insurance did not pay much for hospice care. However, now many private insurers also have added coverage for hospice care. So the model here may needed modification.