Institutional Analysis Lecture 4: The electoral connection and the organization of Congress

Mayhew’s Central Argument Hypothesis Mayhew are that members of Congress spend the bulk of their time enagaged in reelection activities. Moreover, the institutional arrangements of Congress—weak parties, strong committees, reflect members’ reelection goals.

Assumptions Members want reelection They may be interested in other things like making good policy, prestige, power or fame. But they first have to get elected. Constituents homogeneous Can clearly define a single preference across issues.

Activities Advertising— Creating a favorable image of self Emphasis is place on personal qualities Credit Claiming Member can personally claim responsibility for government action Policy is divisible Members actively intervene on the behalf of constituents—I.e. social security check, veterans benefits. Position Taking Public statements on policies, like roll call votes

Legislative organization Offices Staff members Franking Privileges Mailings Other office resources Committees Good platform for position taking Particularized benefits Allows for a division of labor among members Political Parties Parties help overcome collective action Problem they help build coalitions

Predictions Policy should be universalistic Deference to committees Political parties weak; they only facilitate logrolling. Members maximize reelection by catering to the median voter in district by picking policies, advertising and claiming credit to ensure a majority of votes.

Test predictions Maximize reelection by catering to median voter Problem What if members of Congress do not have a single set of constituents but many as suggested by Fenno Would this prediction still hold?

Median Voter X _

Tension between general and primary elections X _ Median Voter Xp _ Median primary Voter

What happens to members’ election strategies? How will they seek reelection? How will they organize Congress to pass laws What will policies look like?