Science and induction  Science and we assume causation (cause and effect relationships)  For empiricists, all the evidence there is for empirical knowledge, including science, concerning “matters of fact” is sensory experience  For some, we move from individual experiences/singular statements to generalizations/universal statements using induction (and we certainly often do).  Science and we assume causation (cause and effect relationships)  For empiricists, all the evidence there is for empirical knowledge, including science, concerning “matters of fact” is sensory experience  For some, we move from individual experiences/singular statements to generalizations/universal statements using induction (and we certainly often do).

The Problem of Induction David Hume

Empirical generalizations 1.Millions of ravens have been observed and all are black. 2.A non-black raven has never been observed All ravens are black  Are, like other forms of inductive arguments, ampliative  Reasoning moves from the past and present to the future  From what has been experienced to what has not 1.Millions of ravens have been observed and all are black. 2.A non-black raven has never been observed All ravens are black  Are, like other forms of inductive arguments, ampliative  Reasoning moves from the past and present to the future  From what has been experienced to what has not

Hume’s question  What justifies our use of induction?  There are, he imagines, two possibilities:  Experience, which concerns matters of fact  Reason, which concerns relations of ideas  And he proposes that we explore each to see if the justification lies there  What justifies our use of induction?  There are, he imagines, two possibilities:  Experience, which concerns matters of fact  Reason, which concerns relations of ideas  And he proposes that we explore each to see if the justification lies there

The inference  What does my past or present knowledge about some kind of object (e.g., that bread has always been nourishing) suggest about my next encounter with that kind of object?  Put another way, propositions of the form:  What we have all experienced that X causes Y, and  X will always cause Y Are very different  What justifies such the inference from the first to the second?  What does my past or present knowledge about some kind of object (e.g., that bread has always been nourishing) suggest about my next encounter with that kind of object?  Put another way, propositions of the form:  What we have all experienced that X causes Y, and  X will always cause Y Are very different  What justifies such the inference from the first to the second?

Reason (aka Demonstrative Knowledge)  There is no necessary connection between  I’ve always experienced that X causes Y.  I foresee that the next X I encounter will cause Y.  It is logically possible that however many my experiences of X causing Y, it won’t next time, or next week, or next July…  Inductive arguments are not deductively valid.  There is no necessary connection between  I’ve always experienced that X causes Y.  I foresee that the next X I encounter will cause Y.  It is logically possible that however many my experiences of X causing Y, it won’t next time, or next week, or next July…  Inductive arguments are not deductively valid.

Experience  Can we appeal to our past experience using induction to justify our use of it?  After all, while not deductively valid, many inductive arguments seem strong and have proven helpful. 1.Induction has worked in the past. So, our use of induction is justified.  Appealing to an inductive argument (that induction has worked in the past) to justify induction is circular.  Can we appeal to our past experience using induction to justify our use of it?  After all, while not deductively valid, many inductive arguments seem strong and have proven helpful. 1.Induction has worked in the past. So, our use of induction is justified.  Appealing to an inductive argument (that induction has worked in the past) to justify induction is circular.

The “nature” of Nature: an added premise 1.Induction has worked in Induction will the past. 2.Nature is uniform work in the future. 1.Induction has worked in Induction will the past. 2.Nature is uniform work in the future. 1.The sun rose today. 2.The sun rose yesterday. n.The rose on n. 3.Nature is uniform The sun will rise tomorrow.

The “nature” of nature  What justifies the premise:  Nature is uniform  It was uniform in the past and it is uniform in the present.  That is, it is also the conclusion of an inductive argument.  What justifies the premise:  Nature is uniform  It was uniform in the past and it is uniform in the present.  That is, it is also the conclusion of an inductive argument.

Is this all about “secret powers”?  Is the problem just lack of knowledge?  Say, on Hume’s part, about why bread nourishes?  Say, about why the law of the conservation of energy holds?  The argument: No matter how much we learn, the problem will apply to that knowledge as well.  Is the problem just lack of knowledge?  Say, on Hume’s part, about why bread nourishes?  Say, about why the law of the conservation of energy holds?  The argument: No matter how much we learn, the problem will apply to that knowledge as well.

Can evolutionary theory help?  Induction assumes that the universe contains “kinds” and causation  It also assumes the uniformity of nature  Reasoning this way is useful because it underlies predictions.  Other species also use induction.  Is it possible that the capacity and/or disposition is the product of natural selection?  Induction assumes that the universe contains “kinds” and causation  It also assumes the uniformity of nature  Reasoning this way is useful because it underlies predictions.  Other species also use induction.  Is it possible that the capacity and/or disposition is the product of natural selection?

Can evolutionary theory help?  Is it possible that the capacity and/or disposition is the product of natural selection?  Yes and cognitive scientists maintain it likely is.  If this is the case, does it justify induction?  No: the problem remains.  And the past success of induction does not guarantee its success in the future.  Is it possible that the capacity and/or disposition is the product of natural selection?  Yes and cognitive scientists maintain it likely is.  If this is the case, does it justify induction?  No: the problem remains.  And the past success of induction does not guarantee its success in the future.