Building Reliable Software Requirements and Methods

Reliability Reliability means that the level and frequency of failure is acceptable We are not requiring no failures at all Merely an acceptable level Failure is measured pragmatically

Correctness Software is correct if its behavior is correct Correctness of behavior has to be defined The definition is called a specification So correctness is a matter of the implementation matching the specification And is typically interpreted formally

Correctness and Reliability Correct but unreliable –Can result from an incorrect specification Reliable but incorrect –Can result from a program that does not exactly meet its specification, but which works well enough. Reliability is really what we are after –Correctness is a means to this end

Requirements for Reliability If a failure has high cost, then reliability becomes important. How important depends on the cost Most software is typically not very reliable

Safety Critical Software Software is said to be safety critical if a failure can cause loss of life or severe injury –Nuclear power plant control –Breaking systems in cars –Avionics (military and commercial) –Train signal systems –Dam control systems –etc

SC Software – An example The Boeing 777 –Fully computerized control –All avionics programmed in Ada –All safety critical –No flight problems ever encountered Except in entertainment system Which is in C++ and not safety critical

How do We approach Reliability Use reliable tools Program carefully Test thoroughly Is that good enough? –Would you fly on an airplane if that was the best we could say about our approach?

Safety Critical Programming We can’t depend on people being careful –Control the tools that are used –Control the process that is used –Develop formal specifications –Use formal design techniques –Use formal techniques for proving correctness –Do systematic testing –Measure how we are doing quantitatively

Control Tools We need simple programming languages Avoid “dangerous” constructs –Dynamic storage allocation –Non-determinacy –Recursion Typically very simple subsets are used –SPARK (

More on Tools Languages with strenuous compile time checking are more desirable Redundancy is desirable –Say what you want multiple times and check consistency of usage Ease of writing is irrelevant compared to ease of analysis and writing

More on SPARK SPARK is a very simple subset of Ada –No allocators, tasks, generics, exceptions etc But adds static assertions –What variables are accessed and modified –What routines call one another etc All assertions are verified at compile time

More on Processes Organized configuration control Procedural standards (ISO 9000) Use of metrics Strict coding practices Formal code reviews Clean room techniques

More on Formal Methods A program is a mathematical object We can reason about programs using standard mathematical techniques Proving properties of programs –Proof of correctness –More limited proofs Careful examination always helps –Formalizing this examination helps more!

More on Specification A formal specification is one about which we can reason mathematically And for which correctness is a mathematical property Specification languages –Very high level, not necessarily compilable But how do we know the spec is correct?

Formal Testing Coverage testing –Every source line executed at least once Decision testing –Every decision path tested Flow testing –Every definition use chain tested

Def-Use testing Program fragment A := 1; … A := 2; … B := A; … C := A; Suppose both definitions reach both references Then tests must cover all four paths

The Basic Idea Behind Testing We trust software much more if it has executed once than if it has never executed So let’s set up testing so that as much as possible has been executed at least one Testing does not guarantee reliability But it helps

Source/Object Traceability Reasoning at the source level is useful But it is not good enough Why? Because we can’t trust compilers So we need to reason and test at the object (generated machine code) level We need to trace source-to-object easily Optimization is a problem!

Safety Critical Standards DO-178B (also ED-12B) –A safety critical standard used for both military and commercial avionics in the US and Europe –Requires full documentation of process –Forbids certain constructs –Requires certain aspects (e.g. traceability) –Requires formal testing –Does not rely on any one aspect

Other Guidelines The ISO HRG of WG 9 –Prepares guidelines –HRG report catalogs safety critical techniques

Is this relevant only for SC Safety Critical programs MUST be reliable But reliability is generally desirable Reliability is expensive We need a tradeoff But we need to know the techniques to make the tradeoff accurately So the answer is “not at all”