Green Evolution From Regulatory Stalemate To Successful Pollution Control In California’s San Joaquin Valley.

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Presentation transcript:

Green Evolution From Regulatory Stalemate To Successful Pollution Control In California’s San Joaquin Valley

Green Evolution The Pollution Control Stalemate The Grasslands Program in Theory The Grasslands Program in Practice Cloning the System

The Pollution Control Stalemate Photo courtesy of the Joseph Skorupa, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

The Kesterson Disaster The Pollution Control Stalemate Photos courtesy of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

Nearby Wetlands Also Damaged The Pollution Control Stalemate

The Kesterson Solution A federal-state interagency committee completes its $50million study and concludes: using less water creates less pollution The Pollution Control Stalemate

Increase irrigation efficiency Re-Use drainwater To blend with good irrigation water To grow salt-tolerant crops Fallow the land and sell the water Retire the land and sell the water Discharge limited amounts to the San Joaquin River The Pollution Control Stalemate

Post-Kesterson: Voluntary BMPs Selenium Loads Discharged The Pollution Control Stalemate

Drainage was still threatening ecosystems and violating water quality standards Great egrets and great blue herons, San Luis Wildlife Refuge, Gary Zahm, FWS 9/99 The Pollution Control Stalemate

The Grasslands Program -- In Theory

Regulatory Options The Good --- Economic Incentives Tradable Discharge Permits Effluent Fees Input Fees The Bad --- Mandatory BMPs The Ugly --- Traditional Permits The Grasslands Program in Theory

Many small, independent, controllable sources Farmers are organized into irrigation districts Districts have authority to use input fees District discharges can be monitored A TMDL can define acceptable regional discharge California law allows permits for districts and farmers

Proposed Regulatory System The Grasslands Program in Theory

Regulatory Agency… Gives discharge permit to regional district Discharge target = TMDL Monitors discharge from regional drain Imposes sanctions for non-compliance (fines, drainage cut-off) The Grasslands Program in Theory

Regional District… Operates tradable discharge permit program among districts Determines initial allocations Monitors district discharges Imposes sanctions for noncompliance (fines, drainage cut-off) The Grasslands Program in Theory

Districts… Use input pricing to limit farm discharges Monitor water inputs Impose sanctions for non-compliance (fines, water cut-off) The Grasslands Program in Theory

Advantages of the Proposed Regulatory System Ease of administration: The regulatory agency issues one permit. Ability to meet the discharge limit: The regional cap assures that selenium discharges decrease to safe levels. The Grasslands Program in Theory

Cost-effectiveness: Tradable discharge permits among districts promote regional cost-effectiveness. Tiered water pricing means that decreasing drainage saves money for farmers. Local control: Farmers and districts can tailor inputs and discharges to their own needs. The Grasslands Program in Theory

But will it work? The Grasslands Program in Theory

The Grasslands Program --In Practice In 1996, the program was implemented. The Grasslands Program in Practice Photo credit: Panoche Drainage District

Current Regulatory System Contracts between Bureau of Reclamation and regional district The Grasslands Program in Practice

Bureau of Reclamation… Sets discharge limits monthly limits for selenium discharges gradual decrease to TMDL limits Monitors discharge from drain Imposes sanctions for non-compliance Fines for small exceedances Automatic termination for discharges greater than 120% of limits The Grasslands Program in Practice

Regional District… Developed internal “regulatory” system Chose tradable discharge allocation system Allocated discharges to districts Monitors district discharges Imposes sanctions for noncompliance (fines, drainage cut-off) The Grasslands Program in Practice

Districts… Developed internal “regulatory” systems Tiered water pricing Prohibition on surface discharges Recycling Individual sump discharge limits Land retirement Monitors water inputs Imposes sanctions for non-compliance (fines, water cut-off) Photo credit: Panoche Drainage District The Grasslands Program in Practice

Farmers… React to price signals on water Recycle surface runoff The Grasslands Program in Practice Photo credit: Panoche Drainage District

Results The Grasslands Program in Practice Grasslands Area Monthly Selenium Discharges

Why it works Quantitative limits on selenium discharges are set in advance and strictly enforced. Districts and farmers are accountable for meeting the limits. Districts and farmers can design their own mixes of drainage control actions. The Grasslands Program in Practice

Cloning the System

Prerequisites Motivation Legal and institutional mechanisms to regulate districts or farmers Enforcement capability Discharge targets Monitoring feasibility

Cloning the System Motivation to meet standards Precondition for receiving federal subsidies Farm Bill payments Subsidized irrigation water Subsidized drainage discharge Enforcement of TMDL limits

Cloning the System Legal and Institutional Mechanisms Federal contracts for irrigation water Federal and State authority to regulate pollution discharges Existing water districts Tradable discharge permit systems

Cloning the System Enforcement Capability Automatic termination of benefits Fines

Cloning the System Discharge Targets TMDLs TDP allocations

Cloning the System Monitoring Feasibility Drainage networks: sumps and canals Input surrogates Irrigation water applied Fertilizer and pesticide application rates

Cloning the System Sites for New Trading Programs Among Farmers

Cloning the System

Photo credit: Panoche Drainage District Cloning the System

Regionwide Pollution-Control Costs Appendices

Comparison of Regulatory Options Appendices

Performance of Potential BMPs for Cotton Appendices