Towards efficient traffic-analysis resistant anonymity networks Stevens Le Blond David Choffnes Wenxuan Zhou Peter Druschel Hitesh Ballani Paul Francis.

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Presentation transcript:

Towards efficient traffic-analysis resistant anonymity networks Stevens Le Blond David Choffnes Wenxuan Zhou Peter Druschel Hitesh Ballani Paul Francis

2 Snowden wants to communicate with Greenwald without Alexander to find out Ed’s IP Glenn’s IP

The problem of IP anonymity Client Server 3 VPN proxy Proxies are single point of attack (rogue admin, break in, legal, etc)

4 Proxy Traffic analysis Onion routing (Tor) Onion routing doesn’t resist traffic analysis (well known)

Outline 5

Anonymous Quanta (Aqua) k-anonymity: Indistinguishable among k clients BitTorrent – Appropriate latency and bandwidth – Many concurrent and correlated flows 6

7 Threat model Global passive (traffic analysis) attack Active attack Edge mixes aren’t compromised

Padding 8 Constant rate (strawman) Defeats traffic analysis, but overhead proportional to peak link payload rate on fully connected network

Outline 9

10 Multipath Multipath reduces the peak link payload rate Padding

Variable uniform rate 11 Reduces overhead by adapting to changes in aggregate payload traffic

Outline 12

k-anonymity sets (ksets) 13 Send ksetRecv kset Provide k-anonymity by ensuring correlated rate changes on at least k client links Padding

Forming efficient ksets 14 Epochs Peers’ rates Are there temporal and spatial correlations among BitTorrent flows?

Outline 15

Methodology: Trace driven simulations Month-long BitTorrent trace with 100,000 users – 20 million flow samples per day – 200 million traceroute measurements Models of anonymity systems – Constant-rate: Onion routing v2 – Broadcast: P5, DC-Nets – P2P: Tarzan – Aqua 16

edges 17 Models Overhead Much better bandwidth efficiency

edges 18 Models Throttling Efficiently leverages correlations in BitTorrent flows

Outline 19

Ongoing work 20 Prototype implementation Aqua for VoIP traffic – “tiny-latency” (RTT <330ms) Intersection attacks Workload independence

Take home messages Efficient traffic-analysis resistance by exploiting existing correlations in BitTorrent traffic At core: – Multipath reduces peak payload rate – Variable uniform rate adapts to changes in aggregate payload traffic At edges, ksets: – Provide k-anonymity by sync rate on k client links – Leverage temporal and spatial correlations of BitTorrent flows 21