1. Tarzan: A Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network Layer Michael J. Freedman, NYU Robert Morris, MIT ACM CCS 2002 http://pdos.lcs.mit.edu/tarzan/

2. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 2 Participant can communicate anonymously with non-participant User can talk to CNN.com User ? ? Nobody knows who user is The Grail of Anonymization

3. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 3 Our Vision for Anonymization Thousands of nodes participate Bounce traffic off one another Mechanism to organize nodes: peer-to-peer All applications can use: IP layer

4. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 4 Alternative 1: Proxy Approach Intermediate node to proxy traffic Completely trust the proxy Anonymizer.com User Proxy

5. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 5 Threat model Corrupt proxy(s) –Adversary runs proxy(s) –Adversary targets proxy(s) and compromises, possibly adaptively Network links observed –Limited, localized network sniffing –Wide-spread (even global) eavesdropping e.g., Carnivore, Chinese firewall, ISP search warrants

6. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 6 Failures of Proxy Approach User Proxy Traffic analysis is easy Proxy reveals identity Proxy

7. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 7 Proxy Failures of Proxy Approach User X X CNN blocks connections from proxy Traffic analysis is easy Adversary blocks access to proxy (DoS) Proxy reveals identity

8. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 8 Alternative 2: Centralized Mixnet User Relay MIX encoding creates encrypted tunnel of relays –Individual malicious relays cannot reveal identity Packet forwarding through tunnel Onion Routing, Freedom Small-scale, static network Relay

9. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 9 Failures of Centralized Mixnet CNN blocks core routers X Relay User

10. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 10 Relay Failures of Centralized Mixnet CNN blocks core routers Adversary targets core routers Relay User

11. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 11 CNN blocks core routers Adversary targets core routers So, add cover traffic between relays –Hides data traffic among cover Alternative 2: Centralized Mixnet Relay User Relay

12. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 12 Failures of Centralized Mixnet CNN blocks core routers Adversary targets core routers Relay User

13. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 13 Failures of Centralized Mixnet CNN blocks core routers Adversary targets core routers Still allows network-edge analysis Relay User Relay

14. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 14 Failures of Centralized Mixnet Internal cover traffic does not protect edges External cover traffic prohibitively expensive? –n 2 communication complexity Relay User Relay

15. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 15 No distinction between anon proxies and clients –Peer-to-peer model Anonymity against corrupt relays –MIX-net encoding –Robust tunnel selection –Prevent adversary spoofing or running many nodes Anonymity against global eavesdropping –Cover traffic protects all edges –Restrict topology to make cover practical –Choose neighbors in verifiably-random manner Application-independence –Low-latency IP-layer redirection Tarzan goals

16. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 16 Tarzan: Me Relay, You Relay Thousands of nodes participate –CNN cannot block everybody –Adversary cannot target everybody

17. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 17 Tarzan: Me Relay, You Relay Thousands of nodes participate Cover traffic protects all nodes –Global eavesdropping gains little info

18. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 18 Benefits of Peer-to-Peer Design ? ? ? ? ? Thousands of nodes participate Cover traffic protects all nodes All nodes also act as relays –No network edge to analyze –First hop does not know he’s first

19. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 19 No distinction between anon proxies and clients –Peer-to-peer model Anonymity against corrupt relays –MIX-net encoding –Robust tunnel selection –Prevent adversary spoofing or running many nodes Anonymity against global eavesdropping –Cover traffic protects all nodes –Restrict topology to make cover practical –Choose neighbors in verifiably-random manner Application-independence –Low-latency IP-layer redirection Tarzan goals

20. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 20 1. Contacts known peers to learn neighbor lists 2. Validates each peer by directly pinging Tarzan: Joining the System User

21. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 21 Tarzan: Generating Cover Traffic 4. Nodes begin passing cover traffic with mimics: –Nodes send at some traffic rate per time period –Traffic rate independent of actual demand –All packets are same length and link encrypted User

22. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 22 Tarzan: Selecting tunnel nodes User 5. To build tunnel: Iteratively selects peers and builds tunnel from among last-hop’s mimics PNAT

23. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 23 But, Adversaries Can Join System User PNAT

24. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 24 But, Adversaries Can Join System User Adversary can join more than once by spoofing addresses outside its control Contact peers directly to validate IP addr and learn PK PNAT

25. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 25 But, Adversaries Can Join System User Adversary can join more than once by running many nodes on each machine it controls Randomly select by subnet “domain” (/16 prefix, not IP) PNAT

26. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 26 But, Adversaries Can Join System User Adversary can join more than once by running many nodes on each machine it controls Randomly select by subnet “domain” (/16 prefix, not IP) PNAT

27. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 27 But, Adversaries Can Join System User Colluding adversary can only select each other as neighbors Choose mimics in universally-verifiable random manner PNAT

28. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 28 H(216.165) Tarzan: Selecting mimics 3. Nodes pair-wise choose (verifiable) mimics User H 2 (U.IP) H 4 (U.IP)H 3 (U.IP) H i (A.IP) H i (B.IP)H i (C.IP) CB A H(216.16.108.10) H(216.16.31.13) H(216.16.54.8) H(13.1) H(128.2) H(169.229) H(18.26) K16 = H(H(U.IP/16)) lookup(K16) D K32 = H(H(U.IP)) lookup(K32) IP/16 IP

29. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 29 No distinction between anon proxies and clients –Peer-to-peer model Anonymity against corrupt relays –MIX-net encoding –Robust tunnel selection –Prevent adversary spoofing or running many nodes Anonymity against global eavesdropping –Cover traffic protects all nodes –Restrict topology to make cover practical –Choose neighbors in verifiably-random manner Application-independence –Low-latency IP-layer redirection Tarzan goals

30. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 30 Tarzan: Building Tunnel 5. To build tunnel: Public-key encrypts tunnel info during setup Maps flowid  session key, next hop IP addr User Tunnel Private Address Public Alias Address Real IP Address PNAT

31. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 31 PNAT Tarzan: Tunneling Data Traffic 6. Reroutes packets over this tunnel User APP Diverts packets to tunnel source router IP X

32. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 32 IP Tarzan: Tunneling Data Traffic 6. Reroutes packets over this tunnel User APP IP NATs to private address 192.168.x.x Pads packet to fixed length PNAT

33. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 33 IP Tarzan: Tunneling Data Traffic 6. Reroutes packets over this tunnel User APP IP Layer encrypts packet to each relay Encapsulates in UDP, forwards to first hop PNAT IP

34. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 34 Strips off encryption Forwards to next hop within cover traffic Tarzan: Tunneling Data Traffic 6. Reroutes packets over this tunnel User IP APP PNAT Somebody (IP) speaking to CNN IP

35. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 35 IP NATs again to public alias address Tarzan: Tunneling Data Traffic 6. Reroutes packets over this tunnel User APP PNAT

36. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 36 Tarzan: Tunneling Data Traffic 6. Reroutes packets over this tunnel User APP Reads IP headers and sends accordingly IP I’m speaking to PNAT PNAT

37. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 37 Response repeats process in reverse IP Tarzan: Tunneling Data Traffic 6. Reroutes packets over this tunnel User IP APP IP PNAT IP

38. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 38 Integrating Tarzan Can build double-blinded channels Use transparently with existing systems Peer Speakin g to Peer Speakin g to PNAT

39. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 39 Packet forwarding and tunnel setup Tunnel Setup (public key ops) ~30 msec / hop latency + network delay Packet forwarding (without cover traffic) pkt sizelatencythroughput 64 bytes 250 µsec7 Mbits/s 1024 bytes600 µsec60 MBits/s

40. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 40 Summary Application-independence at IP layer –Previous systems for email, web, file-sharing, etc. No network edge through peer-to-peer design –Core routers can be blocked, targetted, or black-box analyzed Anonymity against corrupt relays and global eavesdropping –Cover traffic within restricted topology –MIX-net tunneling through verified mimics Scale to thousands –Towards a critical mass of users

41. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 41 http://pdos.lcs.mit.edu/tarzan/

42. November 20, 2002 Tarzan: a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network LayerPage 42 Packet forwarding and tunnel setup (msec)