Ideal spectator approach Lecture 2 “The hypothesis which we embrace is plain. It maintains that morality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary.” --Hume, Appendix I

Topics today: n Hume’s view of moral judgment n His critique of the rationalist position

Sec. 5: Why utility pleases n Why do we morally admire those qualities that are socially useful? n Can’t just be a result of education. There must be a basis in human nature. n 2 possibilities: self-regard or humanitarian concern

Self-regard or concern for others? n Moral sentiment can oppose our self-interest n Can concern matters that don’t affect our self- interest u far away in space or time u fictional n Concern for self and moral concern feel different n Moral sentiment cannot be a form of self- regard n Must be a concern for others

Universal benevolence n Rooted in an innate human capacity for sympathy n Sympathy can take the form of a sentiment of benevolence toward all, a humanitarian concern. n This concern is what drives our moral judgments

Objection n Sympathy leads to more concern for those close to us n Our moral judgments do not vary in this way

Reply n Unequal concern arises from a biased point of view n An impartial consideration of the situation channels benevolence equally toward all n Correct moral judgments express the attitudes of an impartial, sympathetic observer

Role of reason in morality n Reason ascertains facts about what promotes or diminishes pleasure and happiness n So reason plays a role n But reason does not make the moral judgment n Moral judgment expresses a sentiment evoked by consideration of the facts revealed by reason.

1st argument against rationalism n Reason: inductive or demonstrative n Inductive: infers facts from observation n Demonstrative: works with abstract mathematical and logical relations. n Moral judgments don’t pick out such facts or relations n Hence they are not made by reason

Example: the “crime” of ingratitude n Observable fact: ill will or indifference in the mind of the ungrateful person n This is not a moral fact because it is not always wrong n Abstract relation: contrariety of attitude n Again, this is not always wrong

2nd argument n Reason operates to infer NEW facts and relations n A moral judgment must be based on all the facts of a situation n Hence moral judgments are not made by reason

3rd argument n Moral judgments are like judgments of beauty n Beauty is not a quality or feature we discover in the object n Rather, a judgment of beauty is an expression of a favorable sentiment toward the object n Moral judgments express a similar kind of sentiment

4th argument n Non-human objects can manifest all the relations that obtain in a moral situation. n But we don’t apply morality to the non-human world n Hence morality is not a matter of relations.

5th argument n Reason alone is never a motive to action n Moral judgments can move us to action n Hence reason by itself cannot give us morality