1 Acquisition and Technology Overview: System Assurance and Cyber Security Kristen Baldwin Deputy Director, Strategic Initiatives Office of the Deputy.

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Presentation transcript:

1 Acquisition and Technology Overview: System Assurance and Cyber Security Kristen Baldwin Deputy Director, Strategic Initiatives Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) March 2009

(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 2 Agenda  Increased priority for program protection  Threats  Vision of Success  A plan for improving DoD Program Protection  Policy  Designing for Security  Program Protection Plans  Tools  Outcomes  Defense Industrial Base Cyber Security  Call to attention  Acquisition and contracting actions

(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 3 3 Increased Priority for Program Protection  Threats: Nation-state, terrorist, criminal, rogue developer who:  Gain control of IT/NSS/Weapons through supply chain opportunities  Exploit vulnerabilities remotely  Vulnerabilities: All IT/NSS/Weapons (incl. systems, networks, applications)  Intentionally implanted logic (e.g., back doors, logic bombs, spyware)  Unintentional vulnerabilities maliciously exploited (e.g., poor quality or fragile code)  Consequences: Stolen critical data & technology; corruption, denial of critical warfighting functionality System Assurance is the confidence that the system functions as intended and is free of exploitable vulnerabilities, either intentionally or unintentionally designed or inserted during the lifecycle

(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 4 4 Vision of Success  The requirement for assurance is allocated among the right systems and their critical components  DoD understands its supply chain risks  DoD systems are designed and sustained at a known level of assurance  Commercial sector shares ownership and builds assured products  Technology investment transforms the ability to detect and mitigate system vulnerabilities Prioritization Supplier Assurance Engineering- In-Depth Industry Outreach Technology Investment Assured Systems

(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 5 Reduce Cost of Implementing Protection Reduce Program Level of Effort Reduce Program Documenta- tion Increase Efficiency of Program Personnel Improving DoD Program Protection 5 Streamlining The PPP Program Protection Tools Early ID, Designed-In Protection Coordinating Security Disciplines Improved Protection of DoD Weapon Systems

(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 6 Program Protection Policy  DoD Policy: DODI “Critical Program Information Protection Within the DoD”  Provide uncompromised and secure military systems to the warfighter by performing comprehensive protection of CPI  CPI. Elements or components of an RDA program that, if compromised, could cause significant degradation in mission effectiveness; oIncludes information about applications, capabilities, processes, and end-items. oIncludes elements or components critical to a military system or network mission effectiveness. oIncludes technology that would reduce the US technological advantage if it came under foreign control  To minimize the chance that the Department’s warfighting capability will be impaired due to the compromise of elements or components being integrated into DoD systems by foreign intelligence, foreign terrorist, or other hostile elements through the supply chain or system design.  DoD  CPI shall be identified at MS A in the Technology Development Strategy  Program Protection Plan shall be developed and approved by MS B; updated and approved at MS C

(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 7 7 DoD : Early, Designed-In Program Protection Identify draft CPI, estimated protection duration and S&T Lab countermeasures Acquisition Strategy, TDS, RFP, SEP, and TEMP revised to include PPP relevant information Milestone Decision Authority approves Program Protection Plan (PPP) Assess supplier risks Develop design strategy for CPI protection Enhance countermeasure information PPP Evaluate that CPI Protection RFP requirements have been met Update PPP with lifecycle sustainment planning Full Rate Prod DR MS CMS B MS A TechDev CDD Engineering & Manufacturing Development & Demonstration CPD Production & Deployment O&S MDD Materiel Solution Analysis Streamlined Program Protection Plan One-stop shopping for documentation of acquisition program security (ISP, IAS, AT appendices) Living document, easy to update, maintain Improve over time based on feedback Update PPP, with contractor additions Preliminary verification and validation that design meets assurance plans

(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 8 Systems Security Engineering: Integration of Security Resources 8

(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 9 Engineering for System Assurance  “Engineering for System Assurance” V1.0 Guidebook signed out at NDIA October 1, 2008  Posted on SSE Web site at:   Provides guidance on how to address System Assurance through Systems Engineering processes  Aligns to DoD acquisition lifecycle processes with actionable criteria  Adds emphasis to ISO/IEC SE processes  Enhanced IA focus and alignment with current processes  Focus on hardware, software and operational environment  Dovetails with Program Protection Planning (PPP) processes  Supports identification of trusted foundry resources  Informs Anti-tamper considerations

(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 10 Approval Letter

(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 11 New PPP: Data Driven Format Critical Program Information (CPI) Critical Program Information Impact of Loss (Low, Med, Hi) Reason (for each change in status)List Locations (Lab(s), PMO, Contractor Name(s), Test Site(s)) Status Dates (watch, new, removed) GPSNew: Critical warfighting componentPMO, Contractor XNew 6/2006 Radar FPGANew: target for hackersPMO, Prime, Subcontractor Z Watch 6/2007 Communication Card Watch: US lead in technology Removed: No longer leading edge technology N/ANew 4/1998 Removed 4/ Verbose, Static, Essay Pithy, Dynamic, Modular Example Format

(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 12 Program Protection Tools 12

(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 13 PPP Process Desired Outcome Program Benefit  Coherent direction and integrated policy framework to respond to security requirements  Risk-based approach to implementing security  Provision of expert engineering and intelligence support to our programs  Streamline process to remove redundancy; focus on protection countermeasures DoD Benefit  Reduced risk exposure to gaps/seams in policy and protection activity  Improved oversight and focus on system assurance throughout the lifecycle  Ability to capitalize on common methods, instruction and technology transition opportunities  Cost effective approach to “building security in” where most appropriate

(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 14 Defense Industrial Base Cyber Security

(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 15 Defense Industrial Base Cyber Security  DEPSECDEF Call to action: “Stop the Bleeding”  July 10, 2007: DSD, DNI, VCJCS meeting with CEOs of 16 DIB partners  DIB Cyber Security Task Force formed: oDeveloping strategies for information sharing; oIncident reporting; oBenchmarking information security practices; oAcquisition and contracting procedures oDamage assessment  SSE/Strategic Initiatives leads the Acquisition and Contracting efforts for DIB CS Task Force

(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 16 DIB CS – Activities for Acquisition and Contracting  AT&L Policy Memo –  Directs Acquisition Executives to engage their Program Executive Offices and Program Managers to take immediate steps to: oEnsure that CUI is identified and appropriately protected in DoD acquisition programs. oReport incidences and exfiltrations  Evaluating information security standards  Developing DFAR Language  Piloting with Services to learn and refine policy and guidance  Working with industry partners to “raise the bar”  NDIA System Assurance Committee  AIA, ITAA, other interactions  Developing Education and Training materials  Program Managers  Contracting Officers  Small Business Mentors

(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA) 17 Questions