UNCLASSIFIED World Wide Chemical Conference October 15, 2004 Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense

UNCLASSIFIED Agenda Joint Combat Developer JCIDS Training, Doctrine, and Exercises FY POM Study Installation Protection Upcoming Targets

UNCLASSIFIED Joint Combat Developer for CBRN Defense Implementation plan tasks Army, as Executive Agent, to serve as JCD - Directed by JRO - Force Protection FCB oversight Focus is concept experimentation Medical and non-medical Resources: - D049 - USACMLS Objectives: - Support JCIDS analysis - Validate doctrine/TTP - New applications for existing capabilities - Support JPEO materiel development, fielding plans

UNCLASSIFIED JCIDS Acceleration of CBRN Capabilities Documents CJCSI C, 24 Jun 2003, established the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and implemented the Knowledge Management / Decision Support (KM/DS) Tool Integrated Concept Teams CbtWMD Issue Team Force Protection Functional Capabilities Board Results – Since JCIDS was instituted, 16 CBRN capabilities documents have been staffed and approved – The rate of production of approved CBRN capabilities documents increased 220% in the last two years under JCIDS

UNCLASSIFIED As of 20 Sep 04 Approved Capabilities Documents

UNCLASSIFIED CBRN Joint Capabilities Improvement Initiative Team (CIIT) Purpose: –To integrate new JCBRN processes and developments into the Joint National Training Center –Create capability to train and exercise CBRN and other war fighting skills Objectives: –Develop the capability to train the force under CBRN conditions –Identify/address CBRN capability gaps Implementation: –CIIT Charter approved – USJFCOM/JRO-CBRN collaborative effort –Staffed with 2 JRO-CBRN funded and 2 USJFCOM funded contractors –Support to COCOMs – USEUCOM AGILE RESPONSE, USPACOM UFL-04, NORTHCOM DETERMINED PROMISE 03 and 04, Senior Leadership Seminars at three COCOMs, CBRN Familiarization Courses at three COCOMs

UNCLASSIFIED National Strategy to Combat WMD published in Sep 2002 JROC approved the CBRN Defense Concept, Baseline Capabilities Assessment and its attributes, assumptions, and metrics; the prioritized insights; and the core capability gaps, July SPG directed Department to reduce gaps/risk Combating WMD Enhanced Planning Process Study

UNCLASSIFIED Procurement: Enough equipment for most Homeland Defense and Win Decisively needs, but not for Swiftly Defeat and Deter Forward needs RDT&E: Leaves 39 gaps identified by JROC, particularly in –Defense against Non-Traditional Agents –Medical countermeasures –Standoff bio detection –Genetically-engineered bio threats Infrastructure: Program can be executed, but testing incomplete and slower, leading to fielding equipment of potentially lesser reliability. Scientists harder to retain. Summary of Risk in PB05-09 FYDP

UNCLASSIFIED Testing with simulants, not live agents –Most problematic: detection, decontamination Testing components, not entire system –Most problematic: standoff detection, bio point detection, and integrated early warning Testing with aging instrumentation and outdated methodologies –Limited production capacity Most problematic: medical countermeasures, especially product-testing bottlenecks –Delay in ability to meet future needs Most problematic: decontaminants; detectors; medical countermeasures –Limited ability to attract and retain scientists Relying on models, especially for Non-Traditional Agents Current Infrastructure Capability

UNCLASSIFIED Enhanced Planning Process Guidance Combating the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is a SECDEF top-10 priority SPG Guidance: Develop funding options to reduce risk for: –Chem-Bio Defense Program: Address the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Defense Program (CBRNDP) capability gaps identified in the Defense Baseline Capabilities Assessment (DBCA) –Combating WMD Operations: Identify executive agents for new missions – Addressed separately through Functional Area Assessment process –WMD Infrastructure: Address intellectual and physical infrastructure recapitalization for medical and non-medical laboratories and key WMD testing and evaluation (T&E) facilities

UNCLASSIFIED Concepts Architectures BCA: Attributes Assumptions Metrics Enhanced Planning Process JPG Language EPP Analytical Process Force Protection Architecture Personnel Assets Information Functional Concepts Joint Operating Concepts Joint Operating Concepts Joint Vision National Military Strategy National Military Strategy National Strategy to Combat WMD CBRN Operational Elements Infrastructure S&T - T&E - Training Infrastructure S&T - T&E - Training DETER FORWARD DETER FORWARD DETER FORWARD DETER FORWARD SWIFTLY DEFEAT SWIFTLY DEFEAT WIN DECISIVELY DETER FORWARD DETER FORWARD Homeland Defense (HLD) Must win, while conducting one of the following scenarios (1) Counterproliferation Consequence Management Nonproliferation SWIFTLY DEFEAT DETER FORWARD SHAPE SHIELD SENSE SUSTAIN CbtWMD Architecture Non Proliferation Counter Proliferation Consequence Management (4) (1) (2) DETER FORWARD Resourcing Options Risk Assessment Operational CBRNDP Infrastructure New Missions Future Force Mgt Institutional Green Yellow Green – full capability, minimal risk Yellow – partial capability, moderate risk Red Red – minimum capability, high risk

UNCLASSIFIED Infrastructure S&T - T&E - Training Infrastructure S&T - T&E - Training DETER FORWARD DETER FORWARD DETER FORWARD DETER FORWARD DETER FORWARD SWIFTLY DEFEAT SWIFTLY DEFEAT WINDECISIVELY DETER FORWARD DETER FORWARD (4) (2) (1) Homeland Defense Homeland Defense (1) Counterproliferation Consequence Management Nonproliferation Interdiction = Proliferation Security Initiative, etc. Elimination = WMD + Delivery Systems IAW JP 3-40 Methodology Derived from Strategy DETER FORWARD Most demanding planning scenarios used SWIFTLY DEFEAT SWIFTLY DEFEAT

UNCLASSIFIED EPP issue team developed five options to address shortfalls in CBRND Program and related infrastructure –Cost-benefit model optimizes content of each option Objective: Balance procurement and RDT&E to support the most demanding scenarios: –Simultaneous HD, WD, SD, and DF –CBRN threat in all scenarios –Each option incrementally reduces risk to the force Options Development

UNCLASSIFIED IPP Implementation Approach Urgent Requirement Capability Document Installation Prioritization Installation Standards CBRNE Concept of Operations DOD Force Protection Review Annually Project Guardian Implementation

UNCLASSIFIED Installation Priority List { Services confirm list annually Installations can be slightly reordered to coincide with adjacent DOD installations Learn lessons first, then do OCONUS JSIPP / IPP Implementation Timeline 9 JSIPP15 IPP 20 IPP FY 03 9 JSIPP FY IPP FY IPP FY IPP FY IPP FY IPP FY IPP 30 IPP40 IPP45 IPP50 IPP From these, 15 are OCONUS FY 10 ?? IPP FY 11 ?? IPP ~75 IPP TBD

UNCLASSIFIED Upcoming Targets COCOM Conference Consequence Management Baseline Capabilities Assessment Emerging Missions Functional Area/Needs Analyses R & N

UNCLASSIFIED JRO-CBRND Way Ahead Strengthening the alliance with JSTO, JPEO, industry Using/adapting existing methodologies to address emerging mission areas JRO for Combating WMD COMBATING WMD Consequence Management Homeland Security Nonproliferation Counterproliferation