Concerns of Using Online Social Networks

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Presentation transcript:

Whispers in the Dark: Analysis of an Anonymous Social Network IMC’14 Gang Wang, Bolun Wang, Tianyi Wang, Ana Nika, Haitao Zheng, Ben Y. Zhao UC Santa Barbara gangw@cs.ucsb.edu

Concerns of Using Online Social Networks Users cannot speak freely in online social networks User profile is linkable to real-world identity Online actions can cause serious consequences

Whisper Anonymous Social Network Whisper, an anonymous social app Online profile unlinkable to real identity Express freely without fear of retaliation or abuse Share stories, seek advice, express complaints Whistleblowers, teenagers avoiding bully Interact with people anonymously > 3 billion monthly page views, 2014 Part of wave of new, anonymous social networks SnapChat, Secret, Yik-yak, Wickr, Rooms (Facebook)

Key Features No personally identifiable information No real names, only nicknames No user profiles (phone#/email) No explicit social links Moderate content to make sure users don’t reveal their identity Post whisper messages Topics including relationships, family, work, religion, politics, sex, etc. Secrets, confessions 3

Our Goals Understand how anonymity affects user behavior in anonymous social networks How is Whisper’s network structure different from existing networks like Facebook and Twitter? How does anonymity impact the friendships between users and user engagement over time? Implications on user anonymity and privacy

Outline Motivation Dataset and Whisper Network Data Collection Basic Network Structure User Engagement and Stickiness Anonymity and Privacy in Whisper Conclusion

Whisper Functions and Data Nickname and a (rough) location System-wise recent whispers Public whisper lists Latest: all recent whispers in the network Nearby: whispers in local area < 40 miles Popular: whispers received many replies Featured: editor-picked whispers Whisper and replies are public data; Chatting is private

Data Collection Crawled the “latest whisper” stream for 3 months* All public messages from February to May 2014 9,343,590 original whispers, 15,268,964 whisper replies 1,038,364 unique userIDs Interacted frequently with Whisper In-person meetings to get data collection permission Whisper removed GUID in June 2014 Global universal identifier (GUID)  Link the same user’s data over time *Data collection with Whisper’s permission, IRB approved

Basic Analysis: Interaction Graph Whisper graph has high dispersion Interact with a wide range of strangers Whisper How do users interact with each other with no explicit social links? Interaction graph: Whisper vs. Facebook and Twitter Users are nodes, edges represent user interaction 3-month time window for all three graphs Existing social networks: Interact with a fixed set of friends Facebook VS. Graph Interact. Event Nodes Edges Avg. Degree Clustering Coefficient Avg. Path Length Assort. Whisper Replies 690K 6531K 9.47 0.033 4.28 -0.011 Facebook Wall Posts 707K 1260K 1.78 0.059 10.13 0.116 Twitter Retweets 4,317K 16972K 3.93 0.048 5.52 -0.025

Persistent Friendship Persistent user pairs (strong ties) are extremely rare Only 7.7% user pairs interacted multiple times (out of all edges) Majorities are weak ties, talked once, never again Lower bound of user interactions (no data on private messages) Majority of user-pairs have weak relationships: short-lived, with few interactions Number of Total Interactions Time Between First and Last Interaction (Days)

Do Communities Exist? Community detection on Whisper interaction graph Modularity-based approaches: Louvain and Wakita Resulting modularity: Louvain (0.492), Wakita (0.409) Modularity > 0.3  community structure Facebook (0.63), Youtube (0.66), Orkut (0.67) [IMC’09] Whisper has weak community structures Even though users don’t have persistent friends, they still form communities

Why Do Users Form Communities? Intuition: users interact with nearby users (via nearby list) Validation: whether community membership correlates with geographic location Example community of 28,342 users, its top 4 regions are California (62%), Texas (1.5%), England (1.2%), Arizona (0.9%) Users within a community likely from the same region Percentile of Communities 1st Region 2nd 3rd 4th 50-percentile 52% 3.9% 1.5% 1.4% 70-percentile 45% 1.3% 90-percentile 32% 0.9% 0.8% Users form communities based on geolocation

Outline User Engagement and Stickiness Motivation Dataset and Whisper Network User Engagement and Stickiness User Engagement Over Time Predicting Future Engagement Anonymity and Privacy in Whisper Conclusion

From Network Ties to User Engagement Background: social ties impact network “stickiness” Strong ties: close friends, weak ties: strangers Strong ties help keep existing users from leaving  a more “sticky” network Our question: with a network of strangers, how well can Whisper maintain user engagement over time? Evaluate per-user engagement over time How long do users stay active? Do users turn dormant quickly? stranger

How Long Do Users Stay Active? User’s active period (normalized) “Active” means users still generate new content User’s active period / our monitoring period of that user Significant portion of users quickly turn dormant Bimodal distribution  predict users stay or not? Users who stayed active Users who were only active for the first1-2 days (~35%)

Predicting User Engagement Binary prediction, whether disengage quickly or not Input: user’s data during initial X days ML classifiers: Random Forest, SVMs, Bayes, Decision Tree Features (20) Content posting volume, frequency (7) Social interactions (8) Temporal features (2) Activity trend (3) A extensive list of features, can be further trimmed

Prediction Result (Random Forest) Top 4 Features produce accurate results # of days with > 1 whisper # of days with > 1 reply Is posting volume decreasing? # of total posts 10-fold cross validation on ground-truth dataset Classify users using their first X days of data 1-day data already has 75% of accuracy 94% Accuracy when predicting engagement Whisper can identify users likely to leave Increase user engagement using other tools 16

Outline Motivation Dataset and Whisper Network User Engagement and Stickiness Anonymity and Privacy in Whisper Conclusion

Privacy and Anonymity in Whisper Existing mechanisms to prevent PII leakage No personal information is collected (no real name, phone# or email address) Server only stores public whispers, private chats stay on the phone Noise is added to user GPS before sending to Whisper’s servers Worst case: attacker compromises servers and obtains data Much more external data needed to de-anonymize users Whisper ?

Location Tracking Attack Tracking whisper users’ locations Pinpoint current location: error < 0.2 miles Allow attackers to follow (stalk) users How to attack “Nearby list” shows whispers by distance Triangulate user location using distance measurements Reverse-engineer Whisper’s noise function Key problem: lack of GPS authentication Unlimited # of queries from any location (fake GPS input) Use statistics to overcome noise

An Example Attack Fixed by Whisper Attack fully automated with forged GPS Query “distance” to the victim Navigate to victim step by step until convergence Whisper: “Get more beer!” Whisper: “BZ is away in Dublin, party in the lab!” Triangulate target location! Attacker Location converged! Victim Distance Query More Details Fixed by Whisper

Summary The first large-scale measurements on Whisper User interaction has high dispersion, difficult to build persistent friendship User engagement shows bimodal distribution, future engagement can be predicted by early-day data Anonymous apps can still leak personal information Location: once shared with the app, has the risk of leaking No reliable GPS authentication, attacker can query any locations

Thank You! Questions?

References [COSN’13] GARCIA, D., MAVRODIEV, P., AND SCHWEITZER, F. Social resilience in online communities: The autopsy of friendster. In Proc. of COSN (2013). [IMC’09] KWAK, H., CHOI, Y., EOM, Y.-H., JEONG, H., AND MOON, S. Mining communities in networks: a solution for consistency and its evaluation. In Proc. of IMC (2009)