DESIGN FOR SAFETY HAZARD & OPERABILITY STUDIES -HAZOPs

RISK ANALYSIS METHODS HAZOP - (HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY) PETERS & TIMMERHAUS, P. 29 AND PERRY’S, EXAMINES CONDITIONS AT DIFFERENT LOCATIONS IN THE FACILITY RESULTS IN A REPORT WITH WITH LIST OF CHANGES FOR PROCESS DEFINITION OF PROCESS HAZARDS CLARIFICATION OF OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCEDURES

SAFETY IN PLANTS MORE THAN JUST A PHRASE THE COMBINATION OF CHEMICALS AND PROCESSES CAN RESULT IN HAZARDS THE SIMPLEST HAZARDS ARE THE SAME AS IN ANY OTHER INDUSTRIAL OR OFFICE SITUATION –TRIPPING OR FALLING –ELECTRIC SHOCK, –CHOKING –JUST GETTING TO WORK

CAUSES OF DEATHS National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 61, No. 7, October 26, 2012

CAUSES OF DEATHS National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 61, No. 7, October 26, 2012

BREAKDOWN FOR ACCIDENTS AGES 35 – 44, 2004 DATA

LOCATION OF INJURIES jury_usa.htm jury_usa.htm THE SAME REPORT INDICATES THE LOCATIONS OF MOST DEATHS AND INJURIES

RELATIVE RATES FOR CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES PER 10,000 WORKERS FOR THE COUNTRY PER 10,000 WORKERS FOR THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY 124 PER 10,000 WORKERS FOR THE ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY 85 PER 10,000 WORKERS FOR THE DRUG INDUSTRIES

OBJECTIVE FOR ENGINEERS ANTICIPATE THE POSSIBLE HAZARDS AND DESIGN THEM OUT OF THE SYSTEM DESIGN THE SYSTEM TO MINIMIZE THE FREQUENCY AND THE INTENSITY REDUCE THE RISK AS LOW AS PRACTICAL WHILE STILL KEEPING AN ECONOMICALLY SOLVENT OPERATION

RISK AVERSION

IDENTIFY INHERENT PROBLEMS METHODS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED WITH OBJECTIVES: DEFINE PROCESS HAZARDS HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS SAFETY & HEALTH IMPACTS OF LOSS OF CONTROL DETERMINE HISTORY OF INCIDENTS IN RELATED FACILITIES CONFIRM ADEQUACY OF OPERATING, ENGINEERING AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS EVALUATE IMPACT OF FACILITY SITING

LEGAL REQUIREMENTS ANALYSES ARE NOW REQUIRED FOR PROCESSES AS PART OF: SARA TITLE III - COMMUNITY RIGHT TO KNOW AS PER EPA DEVELOPED 40CFR67, RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM ( a.htm) SARA TITLE III - COMMUNITY RIGHT TO KNOW AS PER EPA DEVELOPED 40CFR67, RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM ( a.htm) a.htmhttp:// a.htm OSHA REGULATION CFR ( ow_document?p_id=9760&p_table=STANDARD S ow_document?p_id=9760&p_table=STANDARD Shttp:// ow_document?p_id=9760&p_table=STANDARD S

HAZOPS FLOW CHART

ASSEMBLE ANALYSIS TEAM WHO HAVE NECESSARY PROCESS EXPERIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE DESIGN ENGINEERS OPERATORS MATERIALS SPECIALISTS EH&S SPECIALISTS MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL

COLLECT DATA PFD’S, P&ID’S, ONE-LINES, LOGIC DIAGRAMS, & OTHER DESIGN DRAWINGS EQUIPMENT DRAWINGS, CALCULATIONS AND SPECIFICATIONS MAINTENANCE INFORMATION MSDS

DEFINE PROCESS NODES WALK THROUGH THE PROCESS AND BREAK IT INTO AREAS FOR ANALYSIS LOCATE THESE ON P&IDs ility/refinery.jpg 1/PID.jpg

ANALYZE PARAMETERS FOR EACH NODE PURPOSE OR INTENT PROCESS FUNCTIONS INCLUDE: HEATING/COOLING, PRESSURIZATION, SEPARATION, MIXING, REACTION, INVENTORY, TRANSPORT, ETC. HEATING/COOLING, PRESSURIZATION, SEPARATION, MIXING, REACTION, INVENTORY, TRANSPORT, ETC. PROCESS VARIABLES INCLUDE: PRESSURE, FLOW, TEMPERATURE, LEVEL, COMPOSITION, MIXING, SEPARATION, CORROSION, EROSION, ETC. PRESSURE, FLOW, TEMPERATURE, LEVEL, COMPOSITION, MIXING, SEPARATION, CORROSION, EROSION, ETC. HUMAN INTERACTION: HOW IS THE OPERATOR INTEGRATED INTO THE OPERATION OF THE PROCESS AT EACH NODE. HOW IS THE OPERATOR INTEGRATED INTO THE OPERATION OF THE PROCESS AT EACH NODE.

POSSIBLE PROCESS DEVIATIONS PREDICT RESULTS IF NON-STANDARD CONDITIONS ARISE, WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF SOURCE NO OR NOT MORELESS AS WELL AS REVERSE OTHER THAN FLUCTUATIONEARLYLATE

DEFINE RISK SEVERITY AND PROBABILITY DETERMINE CAUSE –EQUIPMENT FAILURE –OPERATOR ERROR –ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES –EXTERNAL IMPACTS rica.com/QAProducts/i mages/fishbone.jpg

ESTIMATE SEVERITY

PREDICT EVENT FREQUENCY

COMPLETE REVISION RECOMMENDATIONS EXAMINE EXISTING SAFEGUARDS DEFINE REVISIONS AND ESTABLISH CHECK LIST TO IMPLEMENT –ACTIONS THAT CAN REMOVE THE CAUSE – –INHERENT FAIL-SAFE DESIGN ACTIONS TO MITIGATE OR ELIMINATE CONSEQUENCES