Common Pool Resources

Recall Thomas Malthus 1798, writes critique of Condorcet et al Food supplies increase additively (linear) Population increases geometrically (nonlinear)

Hardin essentially repeats the arguments of Hobbs: He says that education is not a solution; humans need higher authority for coercion The authority can be a government dictatorship that regulates human reproduction (communist model) or capitalist market that privatizes ownership of all resources (Spencer’s solution) Recall Garrett Hardin’s The Tragedy of the Commons

Recall that the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma suggested a solution to the dilemma: Rapoport’s tit for tat The first time meeting a program, cooperate The next time, repeat what it did last time. If T4T meets itself, they cooperate If T4T meets defect-only, it only gets fooled once If T4T meets random chooser (eg JOSS), it will retaliate on the next move (often when JOSS cooperates)

Something like tit-for-tat appears to be in cases of “reciprocal altruism” The long-tailed macaque: individuals which are groomed are much more likely to groom or support their groomers than monkeys that had not groomed

Spatial prisoner’s dilemma (Martin Nowak) Runs like cellular automaton Spatial structure allows “islands” of cooperation to rise in sea of defectors

Something like Nowak’s “islands of cooperation” may explain other examples Acorn Woodpecker: Why don’t “freeriders” rise in genetic frequency? Cooperation can be an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy

Elinor Orstom: cooperation as a “bottom- up” strategy in culture Rivalrous = “subtractability”—consumption by one means no one else can have it. Excludability = keeping some people out (like those who don’t pay) Common pool resources (CPR) —rival goods that are non-excludable—are what Hardin called “the commons.” He was wrong about the tragedy: CPR tend to be governed by self-organization in traditional societies.

Indigenous practices use “bottom-up” strategies for common pool resources At top Russia: centralized government control leaves land scarred where the thin topsoil has been exposed and degraded. At bottom Mongolia: indigenous practices treat land as Common Pool Resource, eg they cooperate in large-scale movements between seasonal pastures. Thus the vegetation cover is intact and uniform.

Under what circumstances was Hardin correct? Without effective rules defining rights and duties, substantial free- riding in two forms is likely: overuse without concern for the negative effects on others, and a lack of contributed resources for maintaining and improving the CPR itself. “Empirical studies show that no single type of property regime works efficiently, fairly, and sustainably in relation to all CPRs.”

Under what circumstances was Hardin correct for group property? (1)No system for collective agreements present; (2)No human investments have been made to improve the productivity of the resource system (3)The captured resource units become the private property (4)Harvest large enough to destroy local stock (5)The individual owners make decisions independently without local norms

Under what circumstances was Hardin correct? Orstrom cites Berkes et al. (2006) on “roving bandits”—fishing fleets that target valuable marine species in coastal waters, deplete local stocks, and then move on to exploit stocks located in other regions.

Under what circumstances was Hardin correct? (1)No effective governance system is present; (2)No human investments have been made to improve the productivity of the resource system (the ocean) (3)the resource units (fish captured) become the private property (of the boat owner) (4)harvest large enough to destroy local stock (of fish) (5)the individual owners (of fishing vessels) make decisions independently without local norms

Under what circumstances can self- organized CPR systems evolve? 1.Memory: those who use reciprocity gain a reputation for trustworthiness, which leads to increased gains for themselves and their offspring. 2.Identification: community more likely than groups of strangers to draw on trust, reciprocity, and reputation to develop norms that limit use. 3.Modern technology allows increasingly large groups to monitor one another's behavior and coordinate activities – hence phenomena such as Open Source Software. 4.Orstom did not foresee: modern technology also supports anonymity, hence our vulnerability to griefers and spam.

Irrigation Systems in Nepal Even though the concrete channels are markedly better than traditional earth canals, the modernized system delivered less water, and lowered agricultural productivity.

Allowing local control has other advantages Participants are less likely to adopt effective rules in regimes that presume that central authorities must make all decisions. If rules are imposed by outsiders without consulting local participants, local users may engage in a game of “cops and robbers” with outside authorities. Two centuries of colonization followed by state- run development policy has produced great resistance to externally imposed institutions.

Modern example: Lobster Fishers in Maine 1870s top-down control by State of Maine: Illegal to harvest egg- bearing female Fishers scrubbed the eggs off “berried females” and sold them Stocks of lobster declined dangerously

Bottom-up Approach by Lobster Fishers possible because Lived in shoreline communities for many generations Deep roots in their communities Local leadership Norms of trustworthiness and reciprocity via close interactions Effective knowledge about ecosystem and harvested resource

Lobster Fishers in Maine: bottom-up not “more natural” Fishers sort through their catch Safely return lobsters below and above a defined size, marking tail to reduce “free-ride” odds Safely return “berried” female lobsters (eggs on their bellies) without feeling like “dupes”

Challenges of Global Commons biodiversity, climate change, pollution. Scaling-up: more participants = difficulty of organizing, agreeing on rules, enforcing rules. Cultural diversity: attitudes on fertility, history of colonialism and neocolonialism, etc. Complications of interlinked CPRs: “carbon footprint” of consumption becomes increasingly complicated with global interconnections. Better for example to look at footprint of profits.

Challenges of Global Commons biodiversity, climate change, pollution. Accelerating rates of change: “learn by doing” less possible; experiments like geoegineering increasingly dangerous. Nations are not individuals: nations can ask for special favors in return for compliance in ways not possible for individuals in traditional CPR. Eg Lani Gunier’s questioning of one person, one vote rebuked. On the positive side: technology offers advantages

Technology in Global Commons 1.Modern technology allows increasingly large groups to monitor one another's behavior and coordinate activities – hence phenomena such as Open Source Software. 2.Orstom did not foresee: modern technology also supports anonymity, hence our vulnerability to griefers and spam. 3.Orstom did foresee: modern technology helps us monitor nature in ways that were previously impossible