Vivek Ramachandran MD Sohail Ahmad www.airtightnetworks.net Caffé Latte with a Free Topping of Cracked WEP Retrieving WEP Keys From Road-Warriors.

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Presentation transcript:

Vivek Ramachandran MD Sohail Ahmad Caffé Latte with a Free Topping of Cracked WEP Retrieving WEP Keys From Road-Warriors

© AirTight 2007 Cracks in WEP -- Historic Evolution The insecurity of , Mobicom, July 2001 N. Borisov, I. Goldberg and D. Wagner Weaknesses in the key scheduling algorithm of RC4. S. Fluhrer, I. Mantin, A. Shamir. Aug Using the Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir Attack to Break WEP A. Stubblefield, J. Ioannidis, A. Rubin – KoreK, improves on the above technique and reduces the complexity of WEP cracking. We now require only around 500,000 packets to break the WEP key – Adreas Klein introduces more correlations between the RC4 key stream and the key – PTW extend Andreas technique to further simplify WEP Cracking. Now with just around 60,000 – 90,000 packets it is possible to break the WEP key. IEEE WG admitted that WEP cannot hold any water. Recommended users to upgrade to WPA, WPA2

© AirTight 2007 WEP Attacks – exposure area WEP Attacks Distance from Authorized Network (Miles) On the Moon FMS, Korek PTW No Mutual Authentication Message Modification Message Injection Using known methods, exposure is limited to RF range of WEP enabled network Can your keys be cracked when roaming clients are miles away from the operational network?

© AirTight 2007 Observation #1 uCan we somehow have an isolated Client generate WEP encrypted data packets using the authorized network’s key? Default uWindows caches the WEP key of networks in its PNL uTo crack WEP all we need is encrypted data packets u80K for PTW attack u500K for KoreK attack uIt does not matter if these packets come from the AP or the Client

© AirTight 2007 Observation #2 Probe Request “Default” Probe Response Authentication Request Authentication Success Association Request Association Response Data Can you force a WEP client connect to a honey pot without having knowledge of the key?

© AirTight 2007 Caffé Latte – Attack timelines uEvery spoofed Association gives us encrypted data packets (either DHCP or ARP) uSend a De-auth, process repeats, keep collecting the trace uTimelines for cracking the WEP key for various network configurations assuming 500k packets is as follows: Network Configuration Approximate Cracking time Shared + DHCP3 days Shared + Static IP 1.5 days Open + DHCP6 days Open + Static IP2 days

© AirTight 2007 Can we speed it up? DAYS HOURS MINUTES

© AirTight 2007 Problem Formulation A solution is complete Only if: uSolve for all network configurations uKey cracking should be done by the time a user finishes sipping a cup of coffee Network Configuration Approximate Cracking time Shared + DHCP3 days Shared + Static IP 1.5 days Open + DHCP6 days Open + Static IP2 days

© AirTight 2007 Caffé latte – Shared + DHCP Challenge Enc. Challenge bytes Keystream Probe Request “Default” Probe Response Authentication Request Challenge Encrypted Challenge Authentication Success

© AirTight 2007 Caffé latte – Shared + DHCP (2) We now have: u128 bytes of keystream uClient IP is somewhere between – uCan we find the Client IP? x.y Connection Established Assoc Request Assoc Response DHCP Gratuitous ARP

© AirTight 2007 Caffé latte – Shared + DHCP (3) Connection Established Brute force the Client IP u – is ~65,000 space uARP Request on wireless is 40 bytes (LLC + ARP +ICV) uWe have a 128 byte key stream from the previous step ARP Request for ARP Request for ARP Request for ARP Request for ARP Response from

© AirTight 2007

Caffé latte – Shared + DHCP (4) Connection Established Once the Client IP is known uSend a flood of ARP Requests uClient will reply back with ARP Responses uStart trace collection and run the PTW attack ARP Request for ARP Response from ARP Request for ARP Response from

© AirTight 2007

Caffé latte – Shared + DHCP (5) uOnce we have around 80,000 ARP Response packets:

© AirTight 2007 Caffé Latte for Shared Auth + DHCP - Analysis uClient IP Discovery phase: 3-4 minutes (send 2 packets for each IP) uARP Request/Response Flood: 4-5 minutes (to get around 80,000 packets) uKey cracking with Aircrack-ng: ~1 minute Can this technique be used for the other configurations as well? Network Configuration Approximate Cracking time Shared + DHCP~ 10 mins Shared + Static IP 1.5 days Open + DHCP6 days Open + Static IP2 days Is there a more general solution to the problem ? Lets look at the Open + Static IP case

© AirTight 2007 Caffé latte – Open + Static IP Probe Request “Default” Probe Response Authentication Request Authentication Success Assoc Request Assoc Response Gratuitous ARP from Gratuitous ARP from Lets say Client IP is uAfter Association, the Client sends Gratuitous ARP for uCan we use this ARP packet somehow?

© AirTight 2007 Using flaws in WEP – Message Modification and Message Replay uFirst mention in “Intercepting Mobile Communication: The Insecurity of ” – Nikita, Ian and David, UC Berkley uIt’s possible to flip bits in a WEP encrypted packet and adjust the ICV to make the packet valid uThis packet can now be replayed back into the air and will be accepted by WEP devices uUsing this technique we can convert a Gratuitous ARP request into an ARP request destined for the Client coming from a different IP address

© AirTight 2007 Applying Bit Flipping to an Encrypted ARP packet MAC Header WEP Params LLC Header ARP Header WEP ICV Hardware Type Protocol Type Hardware Size Protocol Size OpcodeSender MAC Sender IP Target MAC Target IP AA FF00 FF AA 5505 FA

© AirTight 2007 Caffé latte – Open + Static IP (2) Connection Established We send this bit flipped ARP packet to the Client uWe don’t really care what the bit flipped IP was uCollect the ARP responses and fire up Aircrack-ng ARP Request for from ARP Response from to ARP Request for from ARP Response from to

© AirTight 2007

Caffé latte – Open + Static IP (3) uOnce we have around 60,000 ARP Response packets:

© AirTight 2007 Caffé Latte for Open + Static IP - Analysis uCapturing an ARP packet and bit flipping it: ~1 msec uARP Request/Response Flood: 4-5 minutes (to get around 80,000 packets) uKey cracking with Aircrack-ng: ~1 minute Bit Flipping works for all the cases Network Configuration Approximate Cracking time Shared + DHCP~ 6 minutes Shared + Static IP ~ 6 minutes Open + DHCP~ 6 minutes Open + Static IP~ 6 minutes

© AirTight 2007 Implications of Caffé Latte Risk is higher than previously perceived: uWEP keys can now be cracked remotely, putting your enterprise at risk uWEP Honey-pots are now possible Few hours before our talk we came to know that a tool WEPOff had taken a stab at attacking isolated clients using a different technique (fragmentation) and only for a limited set of network configurations (DHCP). Also due to the nature of the fragmentation attack, it has to send 9 times the number of packets.

© AirTight 2007 Advisory uYet another reason to upgrade to WPA/WPA2 uRoad warriors need to be careful even more now: uExercise caution when using public hotspots uUpgrade your wireless drivers regularly uSwitch off wireless when not in use u… Too many best practices to remember! Use a freely available wireless security agent on your laptop uIf you are using legacy WEP, do not build your enterprise defenses assuming the WEP key cannot be broken

Questions? Airtight Networks Acknowledgements: Amit Vartak