Open Pseudonymiser Project Julia Hippisley-Cox, 2011 www.openpseudonymiser.org.

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Presentation transcript:

Open Pseudonymiser Project Julia Hippisley-Cox,

Open pseudonymiser approach Need approach which doesn’t extract identifiable data but still allows linkageNeed approach which doesn’t extract identifiable data but still allows linkage Legal ethical and NIGB approvalsLegal ethical and NIGB approvals Secure, ScalableSecure, Scalable Reliable, AffordableReliable, Affordable Generates ID which are Unique to projectGenerates ID which are Unique to project Can be used by any set of organisations wishing to share dataCan be used by any set of organisations wishing to share data Pseudoymisation applied as close as possible to identifiable data ie within clinical systemsPseudoymisation applied as close as possible to identifiable data ie within clinical systems

Pseudonymisation: method Scrambles NHS number BEFORE extraction from clinical systemScrambles NHS number BEFORE extraction from clinical system Takes NHS number + project specific encrypted ‘salt code’ One way hashing algorithm (SHA2-256) – no collisions and US standard from 2010 Applied twice - before leaving clinical system & on receipt by next organisation Apply identical software to second datasetApply identical software to second dataset Allows two pseudonymised datasets to be linkedAllows two pseudonymised datasets to be linked Cant be reversed engineeredCant be reversed engineered

Wed tool to create encrypted salt: proof of concept Web site private key used to encrypt user defined project specific saltWeb site private key used to encrypt user defined project specific salt Encrypted salt distributed to relevant data supplier with identifiable dataEncrypted salt distributed to relevant data supplier with identifiable data Public key in supplier’s software to decrypt salt at run time and concatenate to NHS number (or equivalent)Public key in supplier’s software to decrypt salt at run time and concatenate to NHS number (or equivalent) Hash then appliedHash then applied Resulting ID then unique to patient within projectResulting ID then unique to patient within project

Openpseudonymiser.org Website for evaluation and testing withWebsite for evaluation and testing with Desktop applicationDesktop application DLL for integrationDLL for integration Test dataTest data DocumentationDocumentation Utility to generate encrypted salt codesUtility to generate encrypted salt codes Source code GNU GPLSource code GNU GPL (note: currently undertaking freedom to operate checks)(note: currently undertaking freedom to operate checks)

Key points Pseudonymisation at sourcePseudonymisation at source Instead of extracting identifiers and storing lookup tables/keys centrally, then technology to generate key is stored within the clinical systemsInstead of extracting identifiers and storing lookup tables/keys centrally, then technology to generate key is stored within the clinical systems Use of project specific encrypted salted hash ensures secure sets of ID unique to projectUse of project specific encrypted salted hash ensures secure sets of ID unique to project Full control of data controllerFull control of data controller Can work in addition to existing approachesCan work in addition to existing approaches Open source technology so transparent & freeOpen source technology so transparent & free