LECTURE 27 A FOURTH ARGUMENT FOR DUALISM THE “PURPLE GOO” ARGUMENT: SCORPIANS AND HUMANS.

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Presentation transcript:

LECTURE 27 A FOURTH ARGUMENT FOR DUALISM THE “PURPLE GOO” ARGUMENT: SCORPIANS AND HUMANS

THE CONSTELLATION SCORPIO (SCORPIUS)

ALIEN FROM A GALAXY IN THE CONSTELLATION SCORPIO (ALSO JUST HAPPENS TO LOOK LIKE A SCORPIAN)

THE “PURPLE GOO” ARGUMENT (1)IT IS POSSIBLE FOR THERE TO BE RATIONAL BEINGS WHOSE PHYSICAL MAKEUP IS VERY DIFFERENT FROM OURS, BUT WHO PERCEIVE AND THINK. (2) THE PHYSICAL PROCESSES IN SUCH BEINGS WHEN THEY ARE THINKING OR PERCEIVING WOULD BE VERY DIFFERENT FROM THE BRAIN PROCESSES IN US. (3)IF THE BRAIN PROCESSES IN US ARE IDENTICAL WITH THINKING AND PERCEIVING, THEN THEY ARE NECESSARILY IDENTICAL WITH THINKING AND PERCEIVING. THEREFORE: BRAIN PROCESSES ARE NOT IDENTICAL WITH THINKING AND PERCEIVING.

A CLOSE-UP LOOK AT A SCORPIAN’S “BRAIN” WHEN IT IS THINKING THAT EARTHLINGS ARE STUPID. NO PHYSICAL PROCESS WE RECOGNIZE IS GOING ON.

A HUMAN BRAIN

A HUMAN BRAIN WHILE THE PERSON IS THINKING THAT EARTHINGS ARE STUPID

THIS IS YOUR BRAIN ON DRUGS

IF SCORPIANS ARE SO MUCH AS POSSIBLE, THE ARGUMENT SEEMS TO SHOW THAT BRAIN PROCESSES ARE NOT MENTAL PROCESSES THE MODAL PRINCIPLE USED IS “THE NECESSITY OF IDENTITY”: IF X AND Y ARE IDENTICAL, THEN X AND Y ARE NECESSARILY IDENTICAL THIS PRINCIPLE IS CORRECT IF PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD. WE DO NOT EXPLAIN THIS FURTHER IN THIS CLASS (CF. PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC, FALL 2014)

VAN INWAGEN’S RESPONSE IT REALLY ISN’T CLEAR THAT SUCH BEINGS ARE EVEN POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, EVEN IF THEY ARE POSSIBLE, THE PHYSICALIST HAS TWO REPLIES. BOTH DEPEND ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN “TYPES” AND “TOKENS” AS APPLIED TO EVENTS OR PROCESSES. AN EVENT TYPE IS A GENERAL KIND OF EVENT: WAR, DEATH, EATING,.. AND SO ON. A TOKEN OF A TYPE IS A CONCRETE EVENT OR PROCESS. WORLD WAR 1, CONSISTING OF ALL THE CONCRETE EVENTS THAT WERE INVOLVED, IS A TOKEN OF THE TYPES “WAR” AND “WORLD WAR.”

TYPE-TYPE PHYSICALISM VS. TOKEN- TOKEN PHYSICALISM TYPE-TYPE PHYSICALISM: EVERY MENTAL EVENT TYPE IS IDENTICAL WITH SOME PHYSICAL EVENT TYPE. E.G. “PAIN = STIMULATION OF C-FIBERS” IS CLAIMED TO BE A TRUE IDENTITY (FOR SOME PHYSICAL PROCESS, HERE PRESENTED BY STIMULATION OF C-FIBERS). THIS IS A VERY STRONG THESIS. IT RULES OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SCORPIANS FEELING PAIN. PHILOSOPHERS ALSO COMPLAIN THAT THIS IS ARM-CHAIR NEURO-PHYSIOLOGY. WE MUST DO EMPIRICAL RESEARCH TO SEE WHAT EVENT TYPES ARE TO BE IDENTIFIED (IF ANY) MOST PHYSICALISTS ACCEPT THE WEAKER: TOKEN-TOKEN PHYSICALISM: EVERY PARTICULAR MENTAL EVENT TOKEN IS IDENTICAL WITH SOME PHYSICAL EVENT TOKEN.

SO A PERSON’S PARTICULAR THOUGHT MAY BE IDENTICAL WITH SOME PHYSICO- CHEMICAL ACTIVITY IN HIS/HER BRAIN. THIS DOES NOT RULE OUT A SCORPIAN’S THOUGHT TOKEN BEING IDENTICAL WITH A PHYSICAL DISTURBANCE OF SOME SORT IN HIS PURPLE GOO “BRAIN”. THE SECOND REPLY IS THAT EVEN TYPE-TYPE PHYSICALISM MAY BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF SCORPIANS WITH PURPLE GOO “BRAINS”. TYPES CAN BE MORE OR LESS ABSTRACT. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOME VERY ABSTRACT TYPE HAS BRAIN ACTIVITIES AND PURPLE GOO DISTURBANCES AS BOTH BEING OF THAT TYPE. (FOR MORE DETAIL, CF. VAN INWAGEN’S “RADIO ANALOGY’)

ANGELINA JOLIE THINKING ABOUT TOKEN-TOKEN PHYSICALISM

LECTURE 28, ON FRIDAY, WILL BE A REVIEW SESSION GO OVER THE STUDY QUESTIONS AND THE READINGS AND WRITE DOWN ANY QUESTIONS OR PUZZLES YOU MAY HAVE ABOUT THEM. BE SURE TO REVIEW: THE MODAL ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT AND THE METAPHYSICAL ARGUMENT AGAINST THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON.

FINAL EXAMINATION WEDNESDAY, JUNE 11, 4:00-7:00 P.M. IN THIS ROOM. THE EXAMINATION WILL COVER CHAPTERS 6-10, THE INTRODUCTORY MATERIAL TO THESE CHAPTERS, THE ADDITIONAL READINGS, THE LOGIC HANDOUT, AND ALL HANDOUTS SINCE THE MID-TERM EXAMINATION. BRING A BLUE BOOK.