YOU CAN’T FIX STUPID… and other safety myths

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Presentation transcript:

YOU CAN’T FIX STUPID… and other safety myths Paul Gantt, M.Eng, CSP, CET Ron Gantt, M.Eng, CSP, CET Paul

Safety professionals behaving badly… Paul

Objectives Review the traditional ways of approaching safety, their assumptions, and their implications Identify factors that influence human performance List new ways of thinking about and approaching safety Paul

Why do they do what they do? Paul You just can’t fix stupid!

The “bad apple” theory Some (most) people don’t care enough about safety to be safe Some (most) people don’t know enough about safety to be safe Ron These people are the primary cause of accidents

What is the underlying assumption? Our systems are essentially safe People make it unsafe through violations and human error We (safety pros, regulators, managers, etc.) know the safest way to do the job Any deviation is, therefore, unsafe (stupid) Ron

Traditional Safety Thinking The best way to intervene is at the behavioral level Safety is best measured by its absence (injuries, incidents, risk) People are unreliable and are a problem to control Ron

Hearts and Minds Strategies Management Systems The best way to intervene is at the behavioral level Safety is best measured by its absence (injuries, incidents, risk) People are unreliable and are a problem to control SOPs Incident Rates BBS Safety Rules/Discipline Regulations/Compliance Ron Training EMRs Reliance on Technology

Is the juice worth the squeeze? BUT… Is the juice worth the squeeze? Paul

Let’s make some new assumptions Most people don’t do things that they think gets them hurt Most people don’t do things that they think will hurt others Most people don’t do things that will cause them to do a bad job Paul People do things that they think will help them achieve their goals

Lets Look Closer Paul

Is this the most efficient/productive way to do the job? What’s this guy doing? Is this the most efficient/productive way to do the job? Paul

What’s that? What’s that? Paul Why would he choose to stand on the rails if he had the tools to do the job?

When we look closer at “stupid” behavior… We find that it’s not so stupid It’s people responding to Varied environments Scarce resources Competing goals Unclear risks Ron And they’re normally successful!

Now, nobody’s putting a gun to their heads… True, but all actions have consequences What happens if they don’t do the work? What happens if they do? Ron It is difficult to get a man to know something when his salary depends on his not knowing it. -Upton Sinclair

But actions should have consequences… True, but often the consequences provided do not achieve the goals Justice – People are often punished for outcomes, not actions Safety – We’ve had behavior controls throughout history and people are still dying Ron

Quick Reality Check What we are NOT saying What we are saying That laws should go unpunished That rules, procedures, etc. do not have a place What we are saying Current approaches may be missing the mark Paul Ask not who’s to blame, ask what’s to blame

The bottom line… What we see as “stupid” is often just people applying strategies that normally work Paul If we eliminate those strategies before we understand them, we might be shooting ourselves in the foot

Human Performance 101 Help them apply better strategies Give them complete information about the risks they face Provide them with an accurate mental model of the system Ensure they have adequate resources to do the job (resilience) Make systems forgiving (error tolerant) Provide coping skills for managing trade-offs Ron

BP Texas City Refinery 2005 Unclear risks Inaccurate mental model Inadequate resources Unforgiving system Competing goals Ron Source: Hopkins (2008)

A Learning Culture After an event, you have to choose between LEARNING and BLAME You can’t do both Before an event Normal accountability structures apply After an event The organization is accountable to learn from the event Paul The root of the word “accountability” is to make an account of what actually happened.

When should we learn? Paul

Safety, Differently The best way to intervene is at the contextual level Safety is best measured by its presence (i.e. success) People are usually reliable and are the source of safety and success Ron

Summary Reviewed the “bad apple” theory and why its assumptions are not true Identified factors that influence the choices people make Listed strategies to enhance human performance, such as: Help them make informed adjustments to their environments Stop being surprised by error! Start learning from it! Ron

Paul Gantt, M.Eng, CSP, CET Ron Gantt, M.Eng, CSP, CET Questions? Paul Gantt, M.Eng, CSP, CET Ron Gantt, M.Eng, CSP, CET Ron Slides/more info available on our website: http://www.scm-safety.com/past-seminars