SecureMR: A Service Integrity Assurance Framework for MapReduce Wei Wei, Juan Du, Ting Yu, Xiaohui Gu North Carolina State University, United States Annual.

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SecureMR: A Service Integrity Assurance Framework for MapReduce Wei Wei, Juan Du, Ting Yu, Xiaohui Gu North Carolina State University, United States Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

Outline 1. Introduction 2. Background 3. System Model 4. System Design 5. Analysis 6. Evaluation 7. Conclusion and Future Work 2

1. Introduction  about MapReduce  A parallel data processing model  about communication security threats  Eavesdropping attacks  Replay attacks  Denial of Service (DoS) attacks  about Replication-based techniques 3

1. Introduction (cont.)  about SecureMR  A decentralized replication-based integrity verification scheme  Ensuring the integrity of MapReduce in open systems  A prototype of SecureMR based on Hadoop 4

2. Background  The data processing model of MapReduce is composed of three types of entities: a distributed file system (DFS), a master and workers.  MapReduce can be divided into two phases: i) a map phase ii) a reduce phase 5

2. Background (cont.) 6

3. System Model  MapReduce in Open Systems  The entities in MapReduce come from different domains  The communications and data transferred among entities are through public networks  SecureMR focus on protecting the service integrity for MapReduce 7

3. System Model (cont.)  Assumptions 1. A public/private key pair associated with a unique worker identifier 2. The master is trusted, but workers are not necessarily trusted 3. A good worker is honest and always returns the correct result for its task 4. The DFS for MapReduce provides data integrity protection 5. If a worker is good, then others cannot tamper its data 8

3. System Model (cont.)  Attack Models  Giving a wrong result without computation or tamper the intermediate result to mess up the final result  DoS, Replay attacks, Eavesdropping  Non-collusive malicious behavior  Collusive malicious behavior 9

4. System Design  Architecture Design 10

4. System Design (cont.)  Communication Design 11

Signed and Encrypts  Public-key cryptography from wikipediawikipedia 12

4. System Design (cont.)  Commitment Protocol 13

4. System Design (cont.)  Verification Protocol 14

4. System Design (cont.)  SecureMR Extension  An additional phase called Verify phase 15

5. Analysis  Security Analysis  An inconsistency between results returned by different mappers that are assigned the same task  An inconsistency between the commitment and the result generated by a mapper 16

5. Analysis (cont.)  No False Alarm  For any inconsistency detected by SecureMR, it must happen between good and bad mappers, between bad mappers or on a bad mapper  Non-Repudiation  For any inconsistency that can be observed by a good reducer or the master, SecureMR can detect it and present evidence to prove it 17

5. Analysis (cont.)  Attacker Behavior Analysis  Periodical Attackers  Strategic Attackers  Definition  D rate, detection rate  l, jobs  one master, n workers, m malicious workers (m < n)  b, number of blocks  p b, the percentage of blocks that will be duplicated in each job  b · p b, the number of duplicated blocks 18

5. Analysis (cont.)  Periodical attackers without collusion 19

5. Analysis (cont.)  Periodical attackers with collusion  P(B i ) denote the probability that a block will be duplicated i times  P(D) denote the probability that the inconsistency caused by the misbehavior of a malicious mapper will be detected. 20

5. Analysis (cont.)  Strategic attackers  P(F) denote the probability that the intermediate result that reducers receive is tampered 21

5. Analysis (cont.)  Naive task scheduling algorithm  Commitment-based task scheduling algorithm  Launching the duplicates of a task only after the task has been committed. 22

6. Evaluation  Experiment Setup  14 hosts provided by Virtual Computing Lab  Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) is also deployed  11 hosts as workers that offer MapReduce services and one host as a master  HDFS uses 13 nodes, not including the master host  2.66GHz Intel Intel(R) Core(TM) 2 Duo, Ubuntu Linux 8.04, Sun JDK 6 and Hadoop 0.19  Hadoop WordCount application 23

6. Evaluation (cont.)  Performance Analysis 24

6. Evaluation (cont.) 25

6. Evaluation (cont.) 26

7. Conclusion and Future Work  SecureMR, a practical service integrity assurance framework for MapReduce.  It is impossible to detect any inconsistency when all duplicated tasks are processed by a collusive group 27