NOTE: To change the image on this slide, select the picture and delete it. Then click the Pictures icon in the placeholder to insert your own image. CHOOSING IN GROUPS MUNGER AND MUNGER Slides for Chapter 9 Voting as a Collective Action Problem

Outline of Chapter 9  Reasons for abstention  Voting and collective action  The classical model  Turnout and strategic uncertainty  Collective action  Duty and expressive voting  Self-interest and probability  The paradox of not voting  Conclusion Slides Produced by Jeremy Spater, Duke University. All rights reserved.2

Reasons for abstention  Apathy  Little perceived difference between candidates  Belief that one’s vote is unlikely to influence outcome  Bigger picture  Particular election is unimportant in the greater scheme of things  Weather  Bad weather raises cost of voting  Lack of trust  Politicians will not improve the situation regardless of vote 3Slides Produced by Jeremy Spater, Duke University. All rights reserved.

Voting and collective action  Participation rate is product of four ratios:  Each step is a potential barrier to participation Slides Produced by Jeremy Spater, Duke University. All rights reserved.4

The classical model  Three circumstances in which eligible voter might not vote:  Indifference: No important differences between options  Alienation: All options are too far from voter’s position  Expected net benefit: Cost of voting is high enough to deter the voter  Classical model does not include voter’s consideration of what others will do Slides Produced by Jeremy Spater, Duke University. All rights reserved.5

Turnout and strategic uncertainty  Voting is costly in terms of time and inconvenience  If voters believe their candidate is far ahead/behind, one vote won’t affect outcome  Voters more likely to vote if they believe race is close  Voting is a collective action problem  If no one else votes, one person can show up to the polls and become dictator Slides Produced by Jeremy Spater, Duke University. All rights reserved.7

Collective action  Free riding is a problem in elections  I assume that others will vote, so I don’t need to  I can get the benefits of voting for free, without voting  Downsian model  Incorporates sense of civic duty  I vote if:  where:  P is prob. of my vote swinging election  NCD is net benefit from my candidate winning  D is benefit I receive from voting (civic duty)  C is cost of voting Slides Produced by Jeremy Spater, Duke University. All rights reserved.8

Duty and expressive voting  If D > C, I always vote, regardless of probabilities  Voting is a consumption activity, rather than a rational investment  In this case, rational choice theory is not particularly enlightening  Voting as fashion: might do it just to be seen Slides Produced by Jeremy Spater, Duke University. All rights reserved.9

Self-interest and probability  If the electorate size is 2N+1, my vote is decisive if others split votes evenly  The probability of this is given by  For electorate of 1 million, prob. is 8/100,000  Non-trivial Slides Produced by Jeremy Spater, Duke University. All rights reserved.10

The paradox of not voting  In Downs’ model, if p = 0, no one will vote  If no one votes, then p = 1.  Game theory provides means of resolving paradox  Mixed strategy equilibrium  Data vs. theory: more people vote than theory predicts  Models of “voter taste” address this gap  Altruism  Stigma of not voting Slides Produced by Jeremy Spater, Duke University. All rights reserved.11

Conclusion  “Investment” model of voting under-predicts turnout  “Consumption” model provides account of determinants of voting  However, voting involves choice, not just consumption  Problematically, voters fail to update beliefs in light of information  Is there an obligation to vote?  Democracy requires participation  However, ignorant voters will often choose incorrectly  Takeaway:  Healthy skepticism, while maintaining core optimism Slides Produced by Jeremy Spater, Duke University. All rights reserved.12