Is Statistical Thermodynamics Helpful in Understanding Smart Grid Behavior? David P. Chassin LANL CNLS Seminar January 12, 2010.

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Presentation transcript:

Is Statistical Thermodynamics Helpful in Understanding Smart Grid Behavior? David P. Chassin LANL CNLS Seminar January 12, 2010

Power Markets and Smart Grids

Smart Grid: Build Data Lines, Not Power Lines

R&D Objectives of Smart Grid Demos Engaging loads Understand how loads behave in Smart Grid world Provide new kinds of control strategies Enhancing utility business model Study how new virtual assets can be used effectively Producing business cases for Smart Grid programs Extending market-like processes into distribution Demonstrate real-time price controls Produce control strategies for "prices to devices" Understanding how it all works Examine aggregate system behaviors (stability, etc.) Identify aggregate models of system and control

Thermostatic/periodic loads Load (kW) Time (m) Load (kW) PeriodOn time Quantity Phase Duty cycle = ontime/period Diversity = phase randomness

Diversity masks cyclic behavior

Diversity can be defeated but always returns

Drivers of diversity Phase/Period Probability Maximum diversity High diversity Low diversity Minimum diversity N Loads Different periods Phases scatter as a result of cyclic with different periods Demand events Demand “short circuits” normal cycle Shortens diversification time Increases mean load Diversity is entropy-like

Typical aggregate load shape Time (h) Load (MW) Question: What parts of this load is periodic within a given time interval T?

Simple Numerical Example 200 kW white noise over 15 MW mean Periodic loads introduced numerical 1 minute100kW 1 hour500kW 1 day2MW 1 year10MW Choose T to observe human/equipment cycles < 1 day cycles ~ human/equipment > 1 day cycles ~ natural

Load periodicity curve dayhourminute second Period = 1/Frequency Load (MW)

Mean load component dayhourminute second Period Load (MW) 15 MW mean

Noise component of load dayhourminute second Load (MW) 200 kW noise Period

Cyclic components of load dayhourminute second Load (MW) 500 kW hour cycle 2 MW day cycle 100 kW minute cycle Period

Same load – maximum diversity dayhourminute 10kW 100kW 1MW 10MW 1kW second 15 MW mean 1.4 MW noise Period

Virtual asset: demand response as storage dayhourminute Load (MW) Period Maximum diversity curve Periodicity curve Deficit “storage” (buy) Surplus “storage” (sell)

Power delivery: Vertically integrated utility ~~ Central generation Bulk transmission (>200kV) Industrial loads Distribution (<50kV) Commercial & residential loads Topology Capacity Feeders Gens Model 225+kVTotalBoundary NodesNodesNodesNodes Eastern Interconnect 450 GW 192,857 5,791 37,259 37, , ,564 Western System 150 GW 64,285 2,264 11,667 11,764 78,216 66,452 Source: Chassin DP, and C Posse, "Evaluating North American electric grid reliability using the Barabasi-Albert network model," Physica A, 355(2-4): , Sub-transmission (50-200kV) Q

Today: Market-based operation ~~ Bulk Markets Generators sell Large customers buy in bulk Utilities buy in bulk Small customers buy at fixed rates $ Fairly limited number of market participants: N < 1000 Power

Tomorrow: Smart Grid power system ~ ~~~ ~ ~~ $ and Q Much greater number of market participants: N > 10 6 Bulk Markets Generators sell Utilities buy deficit & sell surplus Small customers buy/sell at local market prices $ Large customers buy at bulk price Power

Using price to control resources 20 P clear Q clear Quantity (kW) Price ($/MWh) Large commercial customers with asynchronous DG or managed loads First synchronous DG unit Feeder Residential RTP customers Unresponsive loads (control/fixed/TOU res, and large unmanaged commercial loads) Second synchronous DG unit

Consumer and producer surplus 21 Producer surplus P clear Q clear Quantity (kW) Price ($/MWh) Consumer surplus

Real-time price thermostats 22 Temperature Price T current P bid P average P clear T set T desired T min T max P average -3  P average +3  k Small k: low comfort, high demand response Large k: high comfort, low demand response

Feeder capacity impact High load with good response 23

RTP load shifting 24 Unconstrained supplyConstrained supply

GridLAB-D: Simulating the Smart Grid Power system modelsLoad modelsMarket models GridLAB-D model unifies keys elements of a Smart Grid Next generation tool Integrates models Smart Grid analysis  Projects  Technologies  Cost/benefits  Business cases Multi-scale models Seconds to decades Links to existing tools Open source Contributions from  Government  Industry  Academic  Vendors Vendors can add/extract modules for their own uses Drives need for high performance computers

GridLAB-D Issues There are problems Models are difficult to create (lack of good data, input detail) Simulation can be very slow Convergence is not always guaranteed No first principles foundation for model order reduction Few analytic insights Lacks some generality Need for alternative modeling approaches Ab initio model necessary More general approach to modeling Smart Grid Elucidate aggregate behavior (emergence) Basis for monitoring and diagnosis Foundation of better control design/theory

Thermodynamic analogy Some interesting observations Many independent devices (> 10 8 ) States are primarily driven by internal variables States influenced by external "forces" Few global parameters (price, frequency) Few conserved quantities (money, surplus, income) Identifiable constraints (supply, demand) Questions: Are there… aggregate properties that describe the system? these properties usable to manage the system?

Ensembles Example: electric water heaters 1 heater has 2 states: on or off N heaters have 2 N configurations Only N+1 distinct states Enumeration of states is binomial Utilities call this load diversity ½N½N N on N off

Bid prices (  from 24 hr average $/MWh) Number of observations Olympic Peninsula Prices

Olympic Peninsula Quantities Bid quantities (kW) Number of observations

Conserved Quantities Conservation laws exist for some properties Funds available for trading (e.g., gold, fiat, credit) Number of devices Limits and constraints Constant are for a given ensemble But certainly can and do vary over time Time-dynamics can be very complex

Entropy in a closed system Counts the number of ways of clearing market Must meet ensemble specifications (Q clear ) Example: 8 ideal storage devices P clear emerges in the absence of external price BSBSSBBS N = possible configurations 9 distinct states: Q = {  8,  6,  4,  2,0,+2,+4,+6,+8} Q = 0 (4S and 4B) is most probable (70/256) Q =  8 (8S or 8B) is least probable (1/256) Entropy  (Q) = log (N choose ½Q)  (N+½)log2  ½log  N  Q 2 /2N

Impact of bulk power prices (open system) Changes in P bulk result in changes to Q clear. P bulk > P clear  fewer local buyers and more local sellers P bulk < P clear  fewer local sellers and more local buyers P bulk = P clear  decoupling of bulk and local system 0 ½N½N QQ +½N+½N Quantity  Entropy

Total surplus Markets convert potential value of trading into surplus S B = 6 S S = 5 S B = 10+9 = 19 S S = 0 Q = 5, P = 6 Q = 5, P = 3 Q = 12, P = 5 S B = = 15 S S = = 19 Total surplus change is  S = (34-30) = +4 Markets minimize potential value and maximize total surplus.

Trading activity Activity  is defined as the change in total surplus with respect to the change in entropy Observations about entropy and activity: Total surplus is maximized when entropy is maximum Entropy tends to increase -- Second Law applies Entropy is additive Surplus increases as activity increases Prices can be used to regulate activity (reduce entropy) Fractional fluctuations from entropy max usually small

Migration potential Migration potential is the change in number of agents with respect to a change in entropy (as a function of activity) Observations about migration potential Transfer of control/ownership is a form of "migration" More agents raises potential Agents migrate from higher potential markets to lower potential markets Price can regulate effect of potential: higher price differentials tend to increase potential * Victor Sergeev coined the term "migration potential"

Partition function Need factor to find average properties over ensemble The probability of finding the system in the state 1 is When number of agents is invariant we define The ensemble average total surplus S is

Negative trading activity It is possible to have  /  U, so that trading activity can be negative: There must be a finite upper limit to the value of states The market must be at internal equilibrium (relaxed) The negative states must be isolated from the positive ones The trading activity scale is +0…+X…+ ,  …  X…  0 This can happen in markets with rules the prevent otherwise natural trades When isolated states become accessible (e.g., cheating, changing the rules), the result can be abrupt/dislocating "relaxation" of the system. Reverses effect of migration potential (flow reverses)

Free surplus Agent constraints mean not all potential surplus can be obtained by agents Most system have surplus obtained by suitable controls This is called free surplus Suggests that a Carnot-like cycle is possible for markets Buy in system 1 at constant low activity (raise  ) Move to system 2 at constant high entropy (raise  ) Sell in system 2 at constant high activity (lower  ) Move to system 1 at constant low entropy (lower  ) Net revenue W is at most free surplus and limited by efficiencies

Net revenue Net revenue should never exceed free surplus Change in net revenue can be broken in two components Unitary elasticity is same as dW = 0 Differences in components can be indicators of changes in markets dW P /dt :change in net revenue from a change in price dW Q /dt : change in net revenue from a change in quantity

Open issues and questions Even the simplest agents aren't strictly  q equaprobable states, so things are usually more complicated Most proposed Smart Grid projects don't have clear enough rules to make predictions easy Data collection is a serious unresolved issue Most AMI networks don't have enough bandwidth Projects are not viewed as a hypothesis/model test Need first principles predictions to know what data to collect Most Smart Grid project aren't really considering many of the observations made Differences between those that do and those that do may be discernable given a thorough analysis of the data Need for a single comprehensive data clearinghouse

Conclusions Within limits of assumptions thermal physics methods can be used What do we do about unmet assumptions? Short term: Should we build Smart Grid systems we can't model/don't understand generally? Long term: Models of most programs should be possible using such an approach May end up being very arcane and difficult to use Probably beyond the reach of most utility planners

Questions and comments Contact