National Security Strategy – United Kingdom Presentation to the 20 th Meeting of EU Director Generals for Civil Protection Ljubljana May 2008 Peter Tallantire Cabinet Office United Kingdom

Mutual learning opportunities Exchange of best practices: United Kingdom: ‒ National Risk Method The Netherlands: ‒ National Safety and Security Strategy

The Role of the Cabinet Office The aim of the Cabinet Office is: ‒ To make government work better The Cabinet Office Objectives: ‒ Supporting the Prime Minister ‒ Supporting the Cabinet ‒ Strengthening the Civil Service Cabinet Office Groups / Secretariats: ‒ Security, Intelligence & Resilience, Civil Contingencies, Foreign & Defence Policy, European & Global Issues, Economic & Domestic, and Ceremonial ‒ Service Cabinet and its Committees ‒ Broker agreement between Departments where policy initiatives cannot otherwise be agreed

The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom:

Security Challenges NUCLEAR WEAPONS and other WMD Stockpile of nuclear weapons No state currently has the intent or capability to pose a direct nuclear threat to the UK but risk might emerge in the future. TRANS NATIONAL ORGANISED CRIME fraud, illegal drugs trade, weapons, immigration and human trafficking Threat to legitimate livelihoods, undermine & corrupt economies, societies & governments ; cause or exacerbate state failures leading to civil war or violent conflict. Support of terrorist networks? GLOBAL INSTABILITY and CONFLICT and FAILED and FRAGILE STATES Violent and serious conflict within states Difficult to predict shocks or conflicts. TERRORISM CONTEST strategy in place Serious and sustained threat from violent extremists. Threat levels published. Mass casualty impact using CBRN technology and can include CNI targets. STATE LED THREATS TO THE UK No state or alliance has both the intent and the capability to threaten the UK militarily UK subject to high levels of covert non- military activity by foreign intelligence organisations. CIVIL EMERGENCIES Over half the COBR activations in 2007 Ability to respond to disruptive challenges such as FMD, pan flu, fuel shortages, power failures and extreme weather. DRIVERS OF INSECURITY Climate change, competition for energy, poverty / inequality, globalisation & increasing interdependence of risks.

Working Together STRENGTHENING NATIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURES JOINT PARLIAMENTARY NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE STRENGTHEN FORWARD PLANNING IMPROVE STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE ON PRIORITIES THROUGH BETTER CONNECTIONS NATIONAL SECURITY FORUM PULISH NATIONAL RISK REGISTER CONTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUALS & COMMUNITIES Individuals have essential role to play: BEING VIGILANT AGAINST TERRORISM PLANNING FOR AND TAKING A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN RESPONDING TO EMERGENCIES PLAYING PART IN TACKLING LONGER TERM CHALLENGES VOLUNTEERING & DIALOGUE TO ENSURE SHARED VALUES UPHELD

National Risk Assessment Matrix 5 Key 4 Impact 3 2 H6, H25 H26, H38, T5 T10, T18, T26 T35, T46, T59 H4, H48, T3, T4 T13, T37, T39, T Likelihood Very high High Medium Low T38, H41

= Consequences What are the generic consequences? Reasonable worst case warning time? Regional variation? Military involvement? Interdependency? National Resilience Planning Assumptions Risks What risks should drive planning ? What is the reasonable worst case, taken across those risks plus Functional Planning Assumptions Essential Services Planning Assumptions

Planning Assumptions - Functional Human Fatalities with Infectious Disease People with Illness Human Fatalities caused by Conventional Incidents Human Casualties caused by Conventional Incidents Biological Release Radiological Environmental Contamination Radiological Release Chemical Releases Debris / Rubble Major Flooding Influx of British Nationals Infected Animals Fire and Rescue Cover

Planning Assumptions - Essential Services Water Supply Transport Oil and Fuel Gas Electricity Telecoms Health Financial Services

The Future – Continue Building Capability Technical: ‒ Mass fatalities ‒ Humanitarian Assistance ‒ CBRN (Model Response) ‒ Telecomms resilience Planning ‒ Flu; and … Human: ‒ The Human Component of Resilience ‒ Crisis leadership capacity ‒ Professionalism through standards

Raise the Bar Catastrophic Events: ‒ Wide Area Flooding ‒ ‘Black Start’ Recovery Continue Learning the Lessons (Newton, Pitt, Anderson) CCA ‘6000-mile Service’ London Olympics 2012 New or more physical capabilities The human component ‒ New/more/different procedures ‒ Horizontal Mutual Aid ‒ Training – especially collective. ‘Reaching Out’: ‒ Citizens and their families ‒ Citizens in communities

National Security Strategy The Netherlands The first results: National Risk Assessment Mass Evacuation Task Dick Schoof Director-general for Public Safety and Security Ministry of the Interior & Kingdom Relations, The Netherlands Ljubljana, May 2008

Short background Netherlands’ Security Strategy National Security Strategy published May 2007 There is a need for a more coordinated and integrated approach on National Security More complex society Increased dependence on complex systems Diffuse and changing threats Interdependence dimension of threats International dimension of threats Focus: all-hazard approach

What is National Safety & Security? Focus on 5 vital interests: - Territorial security - Physical security - Economical security - Ecological security - Social & political stability Scope: (Potential) disruption of society throughout the entire security chain

National threat progress report (short & long term horizon scanning) National risk assessment Advice national capabilities Horizon scanning Risk Assessment Tasks Capabilities (planning assumptions ) National Security Strategy Threat/risk analysis What do we need to do? What do we need to have? Which threats do we face? And what is the impact? Policy arrangements

National Risk Assessment priority is given to: 1.Climate change 2.Polarization and radicalization 3.Certainty of the energy supply In total 13 risk scenarios

Very unlikelyUnlikelyPossibleLikelyVery likely E B A C D I III II Impact Likelihood Risk Diagram

3 Risk categories 1.High impact and highly probable: Flu pandemic Oil crisis 2.High impact but unlikely: Malicious disruption of electricity Floods 3.Low impact but highly probable: Polarisation and radicalisation National black-out electricity

Overall analysis high impact risks: High impact criteria:  costs  disruption common life  psychological/social impact Shortage vital products and services  Management of vital products and services In critical phase: government cannot do it alone  Self help of citizens

Shared responsibilities Government (Central, Regional, Local) Private sector Citizens Cooperation with non-profit and international organizations Dilemma’s How to activate the private sector without financial donations? How to raise awareness of citizens without a real time threat? Risk communications

Mass evacuation 2 scenario’s: coast and rivers Conclusion: Coast: preventive evacuation is no option Rivers: preventive evacuation is possible

10 actions for the future 1. Itensify preparation flu pandemic 2. Review IEA mechanism (oil crisis) 3. National operational evacuation plan 4. National strategy distribution of shortage (securing, guarding, energy, (drinking) water) 5. Research solidness communication (C2000, cell broadcast) 6. National information system (Netcentric) 7. Continuity vital infrastructure 8. Increase self helpness citizens 9. Investigation capabilities civil-military cooperation 10. Broaden mass evacuation to CBRN and forest fires

In the near future I.End of May reports: National Risk Assessment + Mass Evacuation Task  Council of Ministers Advice: all information is made public II.Follow-up international conference on national safety & security  Questionnaire: to set up a network of people (government, science, private sector) interested in issues of particular aspects of national safety & security Analysis outcomes questionnaire will follow before the Summer

Thank you for your attention Questions?