Robert Moskowitz, Verizon July 2012 Project: IEEE P802.15 Working Group for Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs) Submission Title: Secure Device Identities Date Submitted: July 18, 2012 Source: Robert Moskowitz, Verizon Address 1000 Bent Creek Blvd, MechanicsBurg, PA, USA Voice:+1 (248) 968-9809, e-mail: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com Re: Secure Device Identities Abstract: Secure Device Identities Purpose: Discuss device identities for LED ID Notice: This document has been prepared to assist the IEEE P802.15. It is offered as a basis for discussion and is not binding on the contributing individual(s) or organization(s). The material in this document is subject to change in form and content after further study. The contributor(s) reserve(s) the right to add, amend or withdraw material contained herein. Release: The contributor acknowledges and accepts that this contribution becomes the property of IEEE and may be made publicly available by P802.15. Robert Moskowitz, Verizon

Secure Device Identities July 2012 Secure Device Identities Robert Moskowitz San Diego, CA July 18, 2012 Robert Moskowitz, Verizon

Abstract Classes of Identities Value case for Secure Identities July 2012 Abstract Classes of Identities Textual and Secure Value case for Secure Identities Trust in Secure Identities Formats for Secure Identities Secure Identities in Authentication and Key Establishment Robert Moskowitz, Verizon

Classes of Identities Textual Secure July 2012 Classes of Identities Textual A string of bits organized in some manner URN, RFID, IP address JPEG, MP3, biometric-data No assertion (spoofable) outside of origin Secure A string of bits that can be proved as coming from a source Robert Moskowitz, Verizon

Value Case for Secure Identities July 2012 Value Case for Secure Identities The value for Secure Identities comes for the device's ability to assert its identity and no other device to spoof that identity A Secure Identity does not require special hardware for proof Nor does it require a 3rd party for assertion It is self establishing Robert Moskowitz, Verizon

Trust in Secure Identities July 2012 Trust in Secure Identities Secure Identities are self-asserting But who/what is doing the asserting? You don't know who/what I am but you know you are talking to me. Types of trust assertion Geo-location 3rd party proofs Side channel But you don't always need such proofs Robert Moskowitz, Verizon

Format for Secure Identities July 2012 Format for Secure Identities Secure Identities today are asymmetric cryptographically based The public key is the identity and operation using the private key provides the proof Differing representation for various asymmetric cryptography makes public keys as poor identities Simple hash the public key into an agreed, common, format Robert Moskowitz, Verizon

Format for Secure Identities July 2012 Format for Secure Identities Thus the HASH of the public key IS the secure Identity! E.G. Host Identity Tag in the HIP protocol Robert Moskowitz, Verizon

Secure Identities in Authentication and Key Establishment July 2012 Secure Identities in Authentication and Key Establishment A peer that has a Secure Identity proof can directly request authentication of said identity from a trusted Authentication Service E.G. RADIUS req/resp of hash Asymmetric crypto protocols exist for key establishment Some very lightweight E.G. HIP DEX Robert Moskowitz, Verizon

Applications for LED ID July 2012 Applications for LED ID Passive LED ID (Transmit only) ECDSA Secure Identity Sends timestamped signed data object including ID hash Reader uses hash to acquire public key to validate signature Robert Moskowitz, Verizon

Applications for LED ID July 2012 Applications for LED ID Active LED ID ECDH Secure Identity Use protocol like HIP DEX for Identity proofing Can include encrypted data content within exchange Robert Moskowitz, Verizon

July 2012 Open Discussion Robert Moskowitz, Verizon