Functional Safety Solutions for Automotive

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Presentation transcript:

Functional Safety Solutions for Automotive FMEDA automation and predictable ISO 26262 compliance Vladislav Palfy vladislav.palfy@onespin.com

SoC/ASIC/FPGA Verification Flow IC Integrity Functionally correct, safe, secure, and trusted SoCs/ASICs/FPGAs Functional Correctness Trust and Security Safety OneSpin provides certified IC Integrity Verification Solutions to develop functionally correct, safe, secure, and trusted integrated circuits. IC Integrity SoC/ASIC/FPGA Verification Flow Design Integration Implementation

SoC/ASIC/FPGA Verification Flow IC Integrity Functionally correct, safe, secure, and trusted SoCs/ASICs/FPGAs Functional Correctness Trust and Security Safety OneSpin provides certified IC Integrity Verification Solutions to develop functionally correct, safe, secure, and trusted integrated circuits. IC Integrity SoC/ASIC/FPGA Verification Flow Design Integration Implementation

Introduction to Functional Safety The objective of functional safety: Freedom from unacceptable risk of physical injury or of damage to the health of people either directly or indirectly Functional Safety Risks Risk drivers Risk management through functional safety standards Systematic Failures Design faults Tool faults Random Failures Permanent faults Transient faults Continuous increase in flow and tool complexity Continuous increase in functionality Increasing density of the design process node Decreasing energy levels Minimize systematic failures Safeguard against random failures

High-Level Safety Flow Minimize systematic failures Safeguard against random failures Functional Requirements Safety Requirements/Goals HW Specification HW Safety Specification HW Safety Analysis Design Implementation Diagnostic Coverage Determination Safety Mechanism Implementation Functional Verification Quantification of Verification Verification of the Safety Mechanism Evaluation of Hardware Metrics Covered by OneSpin

OneSpin FMEDA Methodology Overview ISO 26262 compliant flow Safety Goals HW Safety Analysis ISO 26262 work products in regards to random hardware failures Diagnostic Coverage Determination Evaluation of Hardware Metrics

Top Down and Bottom Up Safety Analysis Deductive Top Down Inductive Bottom Up Safety Goal: No unintended inflation of airbag, ASIL C/D Failure Mode: Wrong value from CPU Failure: 4 + 4 = 4 Fault: StuckAt 0 on bit reg[2]

Hardware Safety Analysis Failure Mode Contribution Analysis (FCA) App Safety Engineer analyzes the failure modes causing safety goal violations. But which failure mode can be caused by which fault? Hardware Design Safety Goals Safety Goal Failure Mode Fault HW Safety Analysis And, which Safety Mechanisms are in place? Diagnostic Coverage Determination Evaluation of Hardware Metrics We ran this at over 2 billion transistors. Runs at SoC level. It’s a structural analysis. Failure Mode is conversative

Hardware Safety Analysis Failure Mode Contribution Analysis (FCA) App Safety Engineer analyzes the failure modes causing safety goal violations. But which failure mode can be caused by which fault? Hardware Design Safety Goals Safety Goal Failure Mode Fault HW Safety Analysis And, which Safety Mechanisms are in place? Diagnostic Coverage Determination The FCA App runs a structural HW safety analysis by linking failures to faults (failure mode distribution). This is a deductive (top down) analysis validated by an automated inductive coherency check. Evaluation of Hardware Metrics We ran this at over 2 billion transistors. Runs at SoC level. It’s a structural analysis. Failure Mode is conversative

Hardware Safety Analysis Failure Mode Contribution Analysis (FCA) App Safety Engineer analyzes the failure modes causing safety goal violations. But which failure mode can be caused by which fault? Hardware Design Safety Goals Safety Goal Failure Mode Fault HW Safety Analysis And, which Safety Mechanisms are in place? Diagnostic Coverage Determination The FCA App runs a structural HW safety analysis by linking failures to faults (failure mode distribution). This is a deductive (top down) analysis validated by an automated inductive coherency check. Evaluation of Hardware Metrics Automated failure mode distribution reduces engineering effort. Precise fault allocation minimizes/eliminates fault simulation. We ran this at over 2 billion transistors. Runs at SoC level. It’s a structural analysis. Failure Mode is conversative

FCA Example: FIFO with ECC Protection FCA results with diagnostic coverage estimation data rd_data encode FFs decode rd_error rd_corrected clk/rst read control full write empty Sub part Area / Failure Mode Distribution State Count Fault Count Diagnostic Coverage storage 151.2 72 1024 100% control 32.3 8 434 0% clk/rst-tree 0.7 28 active-encode 4.4 52 ?% active-decode 9.55 126 passive-decode 10.73 130

Hardware Safety Analysis Overview ISO 26262 compliant flow Automated design analysis a key factor for efficient analysis of random hardware failures Safety Goals HW Safety Analysis ISO 26262 work products in regards to random hardware failures Diagnostic Coverage Determination Evaluation of Hardware Metrics

Diagnostic Coverage Determination Fault Propagation and Detection Analysis (FPA/FDA) Apps How many faults are covered by safety mechanisms? How many of the faults in the safety-related hardware element cannot violate the safety goal (Safe Fault Fraction)? Hardware Design Safety Goals HW Safety Analysis Diagnostic Coverage Determination Evaluation of Hardware Metrics

Diagnostic Coverage Determination Fault Propagation and Detection Analysis (FPA/FDA) Apps How many faults are covered by safety mechanisms? How many of the faults in the safety related hardware element cannot violate the safety goal (Safe Fault Fraction)? Hardware Design Safety Goals Expert judgment of diagnostic coverage leverages precise FCA fault allocation. When expert judgment cannot be applied the FDA App determines the diagnostic coverage or fault simulation is applied. FPA App automates safe fault extraction based on assumptions of use. HW Safety Analysis Diagnostic Coverage Determination Evaluation of Hardware Metrics

Diagnostic Coverage Determination Fault Propagation and Detection Analysis (FPA/FDA) Apps How many faults are covered by safety mechanisms? How many of the faults in the safety related hardware element cannot violate the safety goal (Safe Fault Fraction)? Hardware Design Safety Goals Expert judgment of diagnostic coverage leverages precise FCA fault allocation. When expert judgment cannot be applied the FDA App determines the diagnostic coverage or fault simulation is applied. FPA App automates safe fault extraction based on assumptions of use. HW Safety Analysis Diagnostic Coverage Determination Safe fault extraction eliminates manual fault analysis. Automated diagnostic coverage determination does not require a testbench and can replace fault simulation. Evaluation of Hardware Metrics

Fault Detection Analysis App Flow Input Constraints Fault List Observation Points Diagnostic FDA Fault Classification Report/DB Fault Inputs RTL / Netlist Detected (multipoint) Fault can propagate to at least one observation point and alarm is asserted Non-detected (residual) point and alarm is NOT asserted Non-propagated (safe or latent) Fault does not propagate to observation points Fault Detection Analysis App Flow Diagnostic coverage without simulation Inject Faults in SMs encode decode control FFs

FDA Example: FIFO with ECC Protection Measuring diagnostic coverage for each sub-part data rd_data encode FFs decode rd_error rd_corrected clk/rst read control full write empty Sub part Area / Failure Mode Distribution State Count Fault Count Diagnostic Coverage mem-data 151.2 72 1024 100% control 32.3 8 434 0% clk/rst-tree 0.7 28 active-encode 4.4 52 active-decode 9.55 126 75% passive-decode 10.73 130 24%

OneSpin FMEDA Methodology Overview ISO 26262 compliant flow Automated design analysis a key factor for efficient analysis of random hardware failures Safety Goals HW Safety Analysis ISO 26262 work products in regards to random hardware failures Diagnostic Coverage Determination Evaluation of Hardware Metrics

Evaluation of Hardware Metrics Hardware Metric Computation (HMC) App Which metrics must be produced to achieve ISO 26262 compliance? Single-Point Fault Metric (SPFM) Reflects the robustness of the component with respect to safety goal violation by individual faults Latent Fault Metric (LFM) Reflects the robustness of the component with respect to safety goal violation by multiple-point faults (faults in safety mechanism and function) Probabilistic Metric for Random Hardware Failures (PMHF) Residual risk of the safety architecture. Measured by Failure in Time (FIT) Hardware Design Safety Goals HW Safety Analysis Diagnostic Coverage Determination Evaluation of Hardware Metrics

Evaluation of Hardware Metrics Hardware Metric Computation (HMC) App Which metrics must be produced to achieve ISO 26262 compliance? Single Point Fault Metric (SPFM) Reflects the robustness of the component with respect to safety goal violation by individual faults Latent Fault Metric (LFM) Reflects the robustness of the component with respect to safety goal violation by multiple-point faults (faults in safety mechanism and function) Probabilistic Metric for Random Hardware Failures (PMHF) Residual risk of the safety architecture. Measured by Failure in Time (FIT) Hardware Design Safety Goals HW Safety Analysis Diagnostic Coverage Determination The HMC App enables full chip, multi-user, early estimation of the hardware metrics and compliance when data from FCA and the Diagnostic Coverage Determination becomes available. Evaluation of Hardware Metrics

Evaluation of Hardware Metrics Hardware Metric Computation (HMC) App Which metrics must be produced to achieve ISO 26262 compliance? Single Point Fault Metric (SPFM) Reflects the robustness of the component with respect to safety goal violation by individual faults Latent Fault Metric (LFM) Reflects the robustness of the component with respect to safety goal violation by multiple-point faults (faults in safety mechanism and function) Probabilistic Metric for Random Hardware Failures (PMHF) Residual risk of the safety architecture. Measured by Failure in Time (FIT) Hardware Design Safety Goals HW Safety Analysis Diagnostic Coverage Determination The HMC App enables full chip, multi-user, early estimation of the hardware metrics and compliance when data from FCA and the Diagnostic Coverage Determination becomes available. Evaluation of Hardware Metrics No expert level ISO 26262 knowledge required and avoids spreadsheet madness.

Hardware Metric Calculation Example Web technology enables different use model Calculates hardware metrics SPFM LFM PMHF Supports layering Estimation layer FCA layer Client/Server architecture Multi-user Single DB

OneSpin FMEDA Methodology Summary ISO 26262 compliant flow Safety Goals FMEDA HW Safety Analysis ISO 26262 work products in regards to random hardware failures Diagnostic Coverage Determination Evaluation of Hardware Metrics Automated FMEDA flow for predictable ISO 26262 compliance Reduce fault simulation Reduce/eliminate manual analysis Implement a repeatable, reusable and robust flow

Thank You!