Parliamentary Scrutiny of the Military in the Westminster Tradition: Why is Canada so Weak? Philippe Lagassé Associate Professor and Barton Chair Norman Paterson School of International Affairs Carleton University

Outline Legislatures and scrutiny of defence affairs American Bias Westminster Structures Variables among Westminster states The United Kingdom Australia New Zealand Canada Conclusions

Legislatures and Defence Affairs Research question: How and why do democratic legislatures vary in their oversight of the military and defence policy? Fifteen country study Hundreds of interviews with parliamentarians, ministers, advisors, officials and GOFOs. Intra and inter-regime comparison Presidential systems European/Continental Parliaments Westminster Parliaments

American Bias The American Constitution and United States Congress as the democratic standards Separation of powers between the President and Congress in military affairs Budgets Promotions Military service and loyalty War powers Congressional Oversight Classified information Large staffs and budgets Budgetary leverage and promotion influence Visible and powerful committees

Westminster Structures Separation of powers mingled with the confidence convention: Executive with confidence is solely responsible for defence affairs and controlling the military Parliament holds the executive to account for its performance Parliament passes the budget, but it is set by the government Parliament and the military: Review rather than oversight Accountability rather than control Limited committees, little direct leverage, reliance on unclassified information

Variables and Measures Measures/Indicators Institutional Design Unicameral or bicameral Electoral system Number of committees Committee membership rules Committee roles Officers of Parliament   Party and Individual Incentives Vote-seeking or influence-seeking parties Office-seeking or influence-seeking individuals Subject matter interest/expertise Bureaucratic incentives Military incentives Access to Information Secret briefings Executive transparency and responsiveness Audits and intra-executive oversight Public and Media Attention Civil society attention to defence issues Media devoted to defence coverage Domestic defence industrial considerations

The British Parliament Institutional Design Bicameral with many former military leaders in the House of Lords.   Single-member plurality for MPs with a low turn-over rate at election, enabling longevity. Two committees with a strong interest in military affairs: the Defence Committee and the Public Accounts Committee. Committee chairs chosen by the House of Commons. Committees focused on legislation, spending, procurement, operations, military personnel; ministers appear regularly. National Audit Office regularly reports on defence issues. Party and Individual Incentives Parties are vote-seeking in the Commons. High degree of backbench independence and rebelliousness. Many MPs and Lords are influence-seeking, not seeking ministerial office. Many MPs and Lords with an interest and expertise in defence issues. Defence bureaucrats take committees seriously, particularly Public Accounts. Military leaders can use the Defence Committee to highlight their concerns with government policy.

The British Parliament Access to Information Select parliamentarians can be given secret briefings related to defence.   The executive is fairly responsive to parliamentary requests for information and fairly transparent. Audits provide the Public Accounts Committee with strong leads for defence oversight. Public and Media Attention Defence carries weight with civil society. Media devote significant resources to defence issues. Defence industries are a significant employer in the United Kingdom.

The Australian Parliament Institutional Design Bicameral with strong elected upper house, independent of the government.   Electoral system that empowers the Senate against a government majority in the House of Representatives. Two committees with a strong interest in military affairs: the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade and the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade; Public Accounts Committee. Committee chairs and members chosen by parties. Senate committee focused on legislation and estimates; Joint committee focused on studies; Public Accounts on spending and audits. National Audit Office regularly reports on defence issues. Party and Individual Incentives Parties are vote-seeking in the House. Parties are influence-seeking in the Senate. Strong party discipline in the House; independence of many Senators from the government. Many MPs seek ministerial office. Many Senators are influence-seeking. Many Senators with an interest and expertise in defence issues. Defence bureaucrats take committees seriously, particularly the Senate estimates. Military leaders take Senate estimates more or less seriously.

The Australian Parliament Access to Information Select parliamentarians can be given secret briefings related to defence.   The executive is responsive to parliamentary requests for information and fairly transparent, especially during Senate estimates. Audits provide the Public Accounts Committee and the Senate Committee of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade with strong leads for defence oversight. Public and Media Attention Defence carries weight with civil society, but it is not the subject of significant debate. Media devote significant resources to defence issues. Defence industries are a significant employer in key regions represented by Senators.

The New Zealand Parliament Institutional Design Unicameral with a small elected house.   Mixed-member proportional representation. One committee with defence focus: Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. Committee chairs chosen by parties. Committee focused mostly on foreign affairs, some interest in defence procurement and administration. Office of the Auditor General regularly reports on defence issues. Party and Individual Incentives Major parties are vote-seeking; small parties are office-seeking. Strong party discipline. MPs use committees to advance their careers. Some former ministers sit on committees. Defence bureaucrats take the committee seriously. Military leaders did not see the committee as significant.

The New Zealand Parliament Access to Information FADT can hear sensitive information in camera.   The executive is very responsive to parliamentary requests for information and fairly transparent. Audits provide the FADT with strong leads for defence oversight. Public and Media Attention Defence carries little weight within civil society. Media few resources to defence issues. Defence industries are insignificant in New Zealand.

The Canadian Parliament Institutional Design Bicameral with appointed upper house.   Single member plurality for the lower house; very high turn over rate for MPs. Three to four committees interested in defence: Commons defence committee; Public Accounts Committee; Senate national security and defence committee; Senate finance committee. Commons committee chairs chosen by parties. Commons defence committee and Senate national security and defence focused on all aspect of defence; Public Accounts and Senate finance focus on management and procurement. Office of the Auditor General and Parliamentary Budget Officer regularly report on defence issues.

The Canadian Parliament Party and Individual Incentives Major parties are vote-seeking.   Strong party discipline. MPs are office-seeking, hoping for cabinet positions. Former ministers leave at a high rate. Few Senators from CAF leadership, but some Senators with a keen interest in defence. Defence bureaucrats take Public Accounts, Senate finance, and estimates seriously. Military leaders are more divided about the utility of committees; some effort to use committees to advance CAF concerns.

The Canadian Parliament Access to Information Committees tend not to hear sensitive or classified information, but in camera is possible.   Opposition parliamentarians are rarely briefed by the government. The executive tends to be guarded with information. Transparency is a challenge. Audits from the OAG and reports from PBO are used by committees, but easily politicized when dealing with procurement. No Major Projects Report in Canada. Public and Media Attention Defence carries some weight within civil society. A few defence-focused reporters. Defence industries are significant and have sway, but mostly within the executive.

Sources of Strength, Causes of Weakness Strength: Independently-minded parliamentarians Low turn over Parliamentary careers Subject matter interest/expertise Influence-seeking Robust estimates processes, Public Accounts Committees, Auditors General Estimates about more than money PACs and AGs are key accountability actors for defence management and procurement Classified information? Not as important as we might think Transparency: Baseline minimum is required

Sources of Strength, Causes of Weakness Weakness: Party discipline in confidence chambers High turn over rates for elected members Members incentivized to seek ministerial offices Classified information: can be a source of weakness, too Transparency: an obstructionist executive does not help

Conclusion Why is Canada so weak? Blame our electoral system and the incentives it structures for parties and MPs Our lack of transparency does not help either We are overly dependent on the OAG and interested Senators Could it be worse? At least we’re not New Zealand!