Cross-layer Analysis for detecting Wireless Misbehavior Anand Patwardhan Ph.D Candidate eBiquity Group Computer Science and Electrical Engineering Department October 19, 2005
Securing MANETs Security for resources Trust in other resources Malicious behavior (Activity monitoring) Misuse (Resource protection) Response/recourse (Accountability) Trust in other resources Dependence on recommendations (Identities and Reputations) Reliability of information
Security Issues Wireless communication Short range (802.11, Bluetooth etc.) Open medium Identification and Authentication PKI based solutions infeasible No prior trust relationships Routing Based on dynamic cooperative peer relations Key to survival of MANET Device constraints Power Conservation Finite Storage Computation power
Intrusion Detection Challenges Identity Use SUCVs Mobility, congestion, radio interference False positives Scalability Large radio-ranges or dense networks Aggregation of data Communicate intrusions data to warn others
Packet Forwarding B A C Datagram dgram_in has: Source IPv6 address, x U – {B,C} Destination IPv6 address, y U – {B,C} MAC source, mac(u), u U – {B,C} MAC destination, mac(B) Corresponding dgram_out must have: Source IPv6 address, x Destination IPv6 address, y MAC source, mac(B) MAC destination, mac(u), u ε U – {B,C} dgram_in dgram_out
Stateful Packet Monitoring AODV TCP IPv6 Ethernet Frame { RREQ, RREP, RERR } { TCP Sequence no., TCP checksum } Update in-memory Hash table Build and Maintain Neighbor table (mac, ipv6) pairs And route status From the packet capture library (pcap) Packets that should be forwarded
Threats MAC/PHY level attacks Routing attacks Attacks on data traffic RTS, CTS attacks – gain unfair share of bandwidth, disruption Routing attacks gray holes, black holes, worm holes … Attacks on data traffic Dropping, mangling or injecting data packets Trustworthiness of resources, reliability of information Identities, reputations, trust evolution
MAC vulnerabilities Wireless Misbehavior Prevention MAC protocols have no inbuilt mechanism to prevent unfair contention resolution Adversaries can: gain unfair share of bandwidth temporarily stall parts of the network, affect the routing process Prevention Misbehavior-resilient backoff for contention resolution Challenges and shortcomings Require core MAC protocol to be changed Colluding adversaries can still subvert the scheme
Related Work Proposed approaches Drawbacks Game theoretic models Incentives for fair-sharing Misbehavior resistant MAC contention Drawbacks Colluding adversaries can subvert these schemes Require changing core MAC protocol Inefficient Cannot prevent jamming
Sophisticated attacks Classical attacks are easy to detect using thresholds Packet dropping, mangling,misrouting etc. To evade detection attacker must stay under the detection threshold (insignificant disruption) However more sophisticated attacks are possible Launching attacks at multiple levels, e.g. Combining RTS attacks and packet drops Any single attack signature might not suffice for detection Observations on a single layer in isolation will be inconclusive
Intrusion Detection challenges Classifying intrusions Threshold based False positives – mobility, environmental conditions, limited radio range, short period of observations Increase accuracy and efficiency by Incorporate factors like mobility, congestion and distance in classifying intrusions Use signal strengths, response times to judge distance Monitor media contention and incoming traffic to judge congestion
Trust evolution, reputation management, Cross-layer Analysis Trust evolution, reputation management, recourse Intrusion Detection Application Commendations Accusations (to other devices) Packet dropping, Mangling, injection Transport Routing attacks, disruptions Link Unfair contention, Jamming MAC/PHY Response
Neighbor table size
True positives (no RTS attack)
True positives (RTS attack)
Goodput with RTS attacks
References Jim Parker et al., “Cross Layer Analysis for Detecting Wireless Misbehavior,” Proceedings of CCNC 2006 Anand Patwardhan et al., "Active Collaborations for Trustworthy Data Management in Ad Hoc Networks", Proceedings of the 2nd IEEE International Conference on Mobile Ad-Hoc and Sensor Systems, November 2005 Anand Patwardhan et al., "Secure Routing and Intrusion Detection in Ad Hoc Networks", Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications, March 2005 Jim Parker et al., "On Intrusion Detection in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks", 23rd IEEE International Performance Computing and Communications Conference -- Workshop on Information Assurance , April 2004