CS 188: Artificial Intelligence Fall 2007

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Presentation transcript:

CS 188: Artificial Intelligence Fall 2007 Lecture 9: Utilities 9/25/2007 Dan Klein – UC Berkeley

Announcements Project 2 (due 10/1) SVN groups available, email us to request Midterm 10/16 in class One side of a page cheat sheet allowed (provided you write it yourself) Tell us NOW about conflicts!

Preferences An agent chooses among: Notation: Prizes: A, B, etc. Lotteries: situations with uncertain prizes Notation:

Rational Preferences We want some constraints on preferences before we call them rational For example: an agent with intransitive preferences can be induced to give away all its money If B > C, then an agent with C would pay (say) 1 cent to get B If A > B, then an agent with B would pay (say) 1 cent to get A If C > A, then an agent with A would pay (say) 1 cent to get C

Rational Preferences Preferences of a rational agent must obey constraints. These constraints are the axioms of rationality Theorem: Rational preferences imply behavior describable as maximization of expected utility

MEU Principle Theorem: Maximum expected likelihood (MEU) principle: [Ramsey, 1931; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944] Given any preferences satisfying these constraints, there exists a real-valued function U such that: Maximum expected likelihood (MEU) principle: Choose the action that maximizes expected utility Note: an agent can be entirely rational (consistent with MEU) without ever representing or manipulating utilities and probabilities E.g., a lookup table for perfect tictactoe, reflex vacuum cleaner

Human Utilities Utilities map states to real numbers. Which numbers? Standard approach to assessment of human utilities: Compare a state A to a standard lottery Lp between ``best possible prize'' u+ with probability p ``worst possible catastrophe'' u- with probability 1-p Adjust lottery probability p until A ~ Lp Resulting p is a utility in [0,1]

Utility Scales Normalized utilities: u+ = 1.0, u- = 0.0 Micromorts: one-millionth chance of death, useful for paying to reduce product risks, etc. QALYs: quality-adjusted life years, useful for medical decisions involving substantial risk Note: behavior is invariant under positive linear transformation With deterministic prizes only (no lottery choices), only ordinal utility can be determined, i.e., total order on prizes

Example: Insurance Consider the lottery [0.5,$1000; 0.5,$0] What is its expected monetary value? ($500) What is its certainty equivalent? Monetary value acceptable in lieu of lottery $400 for most people Difference of $100 is the insurance premium There’s an insurance industry because people will pay to reduce their risk If everyone were risk-prone, no insurance needed!

Money Money does not behave as a utility function Given a lottery L: Define expected monetary value EMV(L) Usually U(L) < U(EMV(L)) I.e., people are risk-averse Utility curve: for what probability p am I indifferent between: A prize x A lottery [p,$M; (1-p),$0] for large M? Typical empirical data, extrapolated with risk-prone behavior:

Example: Human Rationality? Famous example of Allais (1953) A: [0.8,$4k; 0.2,$0] B: [1.0,$3k; 0.0,$0] C: [0.2,$4k; 0.8,$0] D: [0.25,$3k; 0.75,$0] Most people prefer B > A, C > D But if U($0) = 0, then B > A  U($3k) > 0.8 U($4k) C > D  0.8 U($4k) > U($3k)

Reinforcement Learning [DEMOS] Basic idea: Receive feedback in the form of rewards Agent’s utility is defined by the reward function Must learn to act so as to maximize expected rewards Change the rewards, change the learned behavior Examples: Playing a game, reward at the end for winning / losing Vacuuming a house, reward for each piece of dirt picked up Automated taxi, reward for each passenger delivered

Markov Decision Processes An MDP is defined by: A set of states s  S A set of actions a  A A transition function T(s,a,s’) Prob that a from s leads to s’ i.e., P(s’ | s,a) Also called the model A reward function R(s, a, s’) Sometimes just R(s) or R(s’) A start state (or distribution) Maybe a terminal state MDPs are a family of non-deterministic search problems Reinforcement learning: MDPs where we don’t know the transition or reward functions

Solving MDPs In deterministic single-agent search problem, want an optimal plan, or sequence of actions, from start to a goal In an MDP, we want an optimal policy (s) A policy gives an action for each state Optimal policy maximizes expected if followed Defines a reflex agent Optimal policy when R(s, a, s’) = -0.04 for all non-terminals s

Example Optimal Policies R(s) = -0.01 R(s) = -0.03 R(s) = -0.4 R(s) = -2.0

Example: High-Low 3 4 2 2 Three card types: 2, 3, 4 Infinite deck, twice as many 2’s Start with 3 showing After each card, you say “high” or “low” New card is flipped If you’re right, you win the points shown on the new card Ties are no-ops If you’re wrong, game ends Differences from expectimax: #1: get rewards as you go #2: you might play forever! 3 4 2 2

Note: could choose actions with search. How? High-Low States: 2, 3, 4, done Actions: High, Low Model: T(s, a, s’): P(s’=done | 4, High) = 3/4 P(s’=2 | 4, High) = 0 P(s’=3 | 4, High) = 0 P(s’=4 | 4, High) = 1/4 P(s’=done | 4, Low) = 0 P(s’=2 | 4, Low) = 1/2 P(s’=3 | 4, Low) = 1/4 P(s’=4 | 4, Low) = 1/4 … Rewards: R(s, a, s’): Number shown on s’ if s  s’ 0 otherwise Start: 3 4 Note: could choose actions with search. How?

Example: High-Low 3 3 2 3 4 High Low , High , Low T = 0.5, R = 2

MDP Search Trees Each MDP state gives an expectimax-like search tree s is a state s a (s, a) is a q-state s, a (s,a,s’) called a transition T(s,a,s’) = P(s’|s,a) R(s,a,s’) s,a,s’ s’

Utilities of Sequences In order to formalize optimality of a policy, need to understand utilities of sequences of rewards Typically consider stationary preferences: Theorem: only two ways to define stationary utilities Additive utility: Discounted utility: Assuming that reward depends only on state for these slides!

Infinite Utilities?! Problem: infinite sequences with infinite rewards Solutions: Finite horizon: Terminate after a fixed T steps Gives nonstationary policy ( depends on time left) Absorbing state(s): guarantee that for every policy, agent will eventually “die” (like “done” for High-Low) Discounting: for 0 <  < 1 Smaller  means smaller “horizon” – shorter term focus

Discounting Typically discount rewards by  < 1 each time step Sooner rewards have higher utility than later rewards Also helps the algorithms converge

Utilities of States Fundamental operation: compute the utility of a state s Define the utility of a state s, under a fixed policy : V(s) = expected total discounted rewards (return) starting in s and following  Recursive relation (one-step look-ahead): s (s) s, (s) s,a,s’ s’

Policy Evaluation How do we calculate the V’s for a fixed policy? Idea one: turn recursive equations into updates Idea two: it’s just a linear system, solve with Matlab (or whatever)

Equivalent to doing fixed depth search and plugging in zero at leaves Example: High-Low Policy: always say “high” Iterative updates: Equivalent to doing fixed depth search and plugging in zero at leaves

Example: GridWorld [DEMO]

Q-Functions a s s, a s,a,s’ s’ To simplify things, introduce a q-value, for a state and action (q-state) under a policy Utility of starting in state s, taking action a, then following  thereafter

Optimal Utilities Goal: calculate the optimal utility of each state V*(s) = expected (discounted) rewards with optimal actions Why? Given optimal utilities, MEU lets us compute the optimal policy

Practice: Computing Actions Which action should we chose from state s: Given optimal q-values Q? Given optimal values V?

Recap: MDP Quantities Return = Sum of future discounted rewards in one episode (stochastic) V: Expected return from a state under a policy Q: Expected return from a q-state under a policy a s s, a s,a,s’ s’

Solving MDPs We want to find the optimal policy  Proposal 1: modified expectimax search: a s s, a s,a,s’ s’

Value Estimates Calculate estimates Vk*(s) Not the optimal value of s! The optimal value considering only next k time steps (k rewards) As k  , it approaches the optimal value Why: If discounting, distant rewards become negligible If terminal states reachable from everywhere, fraction of episodes not ending becomes negligible Otherwise, can get infinite expected utility and then this approach actually won’t work

Memoized Recursion? Recurrences: Cache all function call results so you never repeat work What happened to the evaluation function?

Value Iteration Problems with the recursive computation: Have to keep all the Vk*(s) around all the time Don’t know which depth k(s) to ask for when planning Solution: value iteration Calculate values for all states, bottom-up Keep increasing k until convergence

The Bellman Equations Definition of utility leads to a simple relationship amongst optimal utility values: Optimal rewards = maximize over first action and then follow optimal policy Formally: That’s my equation!

Value Iteration Idea: Theorem: will converge to unique optimal values Start with V0*(s) = 0, which we know is right (why?) Given Vi*, calculate the values for all states for depth i+1: This is called a value update or Bellman update Repeat until convergence Theorem: will converge to unique optimal values Basic idea: approximations get refined towards optimal values Policy may converge long before values do

Example: Bellman Updates

Example: Value Iteration Information propagates outward from terminal states and eventually all states have correct value estimates [DEMO]

Convergence* Define the max-norm: Theorem: For any two approximations U and V I.e. any distinct approximations must get closer to each other, so, in particular, any approximation must get closer to the true U and value iteration converges to a unique, stable, optimal solution Theorem: I.e. one the change in our approximation is small, it must also be close to correct

Policy Iteration Alternate approach: This is policy iteration Policy evaluation: calculate utilities for a fixed policy until convergence (remember the beginning of lecture) Policy improvement: update policy based on resulting converged utilities Repeat until policy converges This is policy iteration Can converge faster under some conditions

Policy Iteration If we have a fixed policy , use simplified Bellman equation to calculate utilities: For fixed utilities, easy to find the best action according to one-step look-ahead

Comparison In value iteration: In policy iteration: Every pass (or “backup”) updates both utilities (explicitly, based on current utilities) and policy (possibly implicitly, based on current policy) In policy iteration: Several passes to update utilities with frozen policy Occasional passes to update policies Hybrid approaches (asynchronous policy iteration): Any sequences of partial updates to either policy entries or utilities will converge if every state is visited infinitely often